BOOK REVIEWS

DIFFICULTIES WITH HUMANISTIC SCIENCE


Abraham Maslow, current president of the American Psychological Association, is a vociferous exponent of a clinical-humanistic approach to psychology. Trained himself as an experimental psychologist at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1930's, he soon thereafter became involved in clinical and "personological" studies of human beings, and for these he found inadequate the principles he had derived from his laboratory training. Since before World War II his research interest has been centered on "creative, self-actualizing" men and women, and though he has never published his results in this area in any systematic form, he has for many years been drawing on these investigations as a source of insights into the human condition as studied (and now as exemplified) by psychologists.

By Maslow's own admission, the present volume is more an outline-with-aphorisms than a comprehensive work in the manner of Polanyi's Personal Knowledge. It is the substance of the eighth annual lecture of the John Dewey Society, and retains the informal, colloquial, and occasionally ungrammatical style often found in lectures. The text of 151 pages includes 14 chapters, many of them constituting a kind of footnote to positions set forth in earlier books such as Motivation and Personality (1954) and Toward a Psychology of Being (1962), and bearing such titles as Mechanistic and Humanistic Science, The Cognitive Needs under Conditions of Fear and of Courage, Safety Science and Growth Science, Comprehensive Science and Simpleward Science, Suchness Meaning and Abstractness Meaning, Taoistic Science and Controlling Science, Value-Free Science, The Desacralization and the Resacralization of Science. Maslow's penchant for the not-quite-necessary neologism and the complex but less-than-apt designation (like the faintly anatomical-sounding "desacralization," and the recondite "reafference") bespeaks his continual effort to get as close as possible to the intricate reality of experience.

Maslow argues that psychology must progress from "phenomenological beginnings toward objective experimential, behavioral, laboratory methods," but he does little to tell us how to effect the transformation from empathic experience to critical science, and it is clear that he is much more concerned with affirming the former than developing the latter.

Many of Maslow's strictures against the arrogance of mechanistic science are well taken, and he is capable of an occasionally brilliant mot, like "Whatever is not worth doing, is not worth doing well." Yet on the whole the book is exasperating, partly because of the cumbersome over-colloquialism of his style, his fondness for lengthy lists of near-synonyms, as though he can't find the right word and uses all the words in his personal thesaurus that approximate it. Thus: "What exists here and now and what we actually experience is certainly more immediately real than the formula, the symbol, the sign, the blueprint, the name, the schema, the model, the equation, etc." Or: "... another kind of objectivity that comes from caring rather than from not caring. This is the kind which I have already described in various publications as a consequence of Being-Love, of peak experi-
ences, of unitive perception, of self-actualization, of synergy, of Taoistic receptivity, of the 'creative attitude,' of Being-Cognition, and as one general aspect of a psychology of being."

Most distressing of all in Maslow's presentation is his failure to distinguish between clinical experience and third-order inference only weakly and dispensably related thereto, as in his equation of various Freudian dogmatisms with phenomenological givens. He accordingly argues that "Freudian free-floating attention" is "most effective in understanding a therapeutic patient." (A therapeutic patient is a typical Maslowian pleonasm.) Moreover, the "Freudian system is primarily a description of many experiences," or "primarily a taxonomy, one might say almost a filing system in which all the clinical discoveries can find a place." And however deficient the language of psychoanalysis may be "from the point of view of finished and elegant science . . . these psychoanalytic words are the fumbling efforts to communicate intuitive, clinical feelings that cannot yet be expressed in any other way."

To no one but a doctrinaire Freudian are any of these statements clearly true, nor does Maslow offer any evidence in their support. For example, the few studies undertaken of the reliability of "free-floating attention" have been anything but encouraging, and how could Maslow regard the Freudian system as primarily a taxonomy, since most of its key concepts are second- or third-order constructs like infantile omnipotence, anal character, and Oedipus complex, very thinly, if at all, connected with clinical data? Moreover, I can think of no experience, however intuitive, that cannot be as well or better conveyed by the terminology of Adler, or Jung, or Sullivan, or Rogers, or Fromm than by Freud's. Maslow clearly prefers Freud's way of conveying "clinical feelings," but this is scarcely justification for concluding that these "cannot yet be expressed in any other way."

Many of Maslow's "insights," too, are oversimplifications. He thus confuses the relation between sample and universe with that between singular and class, and fails to distinguish between empirical and experimental science. He forgets or ignores the fact that Synanon, which he praises highly, has been a dismal failure as far as returning drug addicts to society is concerned; that intellectual analysis is not necessarily "dissecting," but may be "aspecting," i.e., not dismembering a whole but viewing it from different aspects; that the overwhelming majority of contemporary theologians do not hold to a view of Revelation as "perfect, final, and absolute truth," that to include within the realm of science that which we "cannot understand or explain . . . which cannot be measured, predicted, controlled, or ordered" is to equivocate hopelessly on the meaning of the term science. Above all, Maslow, with his distaste for "rubricizing," fails to appreciate that the first task of science is taxonomy; that this involves far more than the registration of raw experience, that it demands the recording and organizing of its features in consistent and non-overlapping categories which are not pre-fabricated by their correspondence to fictional suppositions like the Freudian death instinct or the Aristotelian notion of natural place; and that while "striving, concentration, and focusing of attention are not the best ways to perceive at the preconscious or unconscious level, in terms of primary process" (whatever that may mean), they are supremely necessary if one is to describe experience accurately and adequately.
The Psychology of Science, in conclusion, is a lusty brief for the clinical-empathic method as a foundation for what Maslow calls humanistic science, and an unsparing attack on the mechanist-reductionist methodology, typified in psychology by behaviorism. Maslow follows Polanyi in launching his strongest criticism of the classical mechanistic approach for its failure to account for science as a human enterprise and for the commitment of the scientist as a human being. Unfortunately, Maslow has not been equally critical of the cryptomechanism and reductionism of the Freudian psychoanalytic doctrine, and in his zeal to advance the value of clinical empathy has taken what amounts to an anti-intellectual stand on many issues.

Marquette University

AN EXISTENTIAL VIEW OF PERSONALISTIC HOLISM


This is a rare, splendid, and truly psychological book. One aspect of its rarity is its general disclaimer to immediacy. It is no road to “instant wisdom,” no text for a “workshop.” To follow the author’s carefully progressive presentation calls for time, and immersion in the subject matter, and this then seems to result in something like a maturing as well as a learning process.

What makes it a splendid book is not only the solidity of the author’s grasp and the sharpness of his insights, but also the patience, integrity, and positive attitude reflected in his commitment to transmit his position. No effort seems too much to insure the fullest clarification of a thought, and as van Kaam says, “because the subject matter is so profound and complex, the author did not hesitate to be repetitious” (p. xiv). He borrows no clichés; his own terms are well defined, and his concepts, examined. He is positive with regard to differing views in that he seeks enrichment from errors, and appreciates the limited usefulness of limited findings. He is positive also with regard to the potential level of understanding by seeing it bound up with man’s general evolutionary development and the life forces toward growth and perfection (p. 167).

What makes the book truly psychological is its concern with the understanding (rather than prediction and control) of man’s specifically human nature, in an integral view which refers to man-as-a-whole.

Van Kaam gives us in his own unique way the existential nature of man, and shows how psychology, as a branch of science, is rooted in that very nature. In the ex-sistential view:

I am in my bodily behavior a manifold question, and I make the world reply in many ways. The world itself is color and shape in reply to my seeing; it is a field of sound in answer to my hearing (p. 23). Man’s dynamic intentionality drives him to express himself in his surrounding reality, to insert himself meaningfully in the world (pp. 62-63). Every man is born a true psychologist of man at least in a naïve and pre-reflective way ... He is always searching for the meaning of life (p. 170). The characteristic of becoming also imbibes the persistent need of man to integrate meaningfully all that he knows about man (p. 167).

“The empirical, scientific mode is a methodical, critical, organized mode of standing-out into a selected area of reality which is given to the senses” (p. 92). “Psychology studies intentional behavior of man in its concrete givenness” (p.
Van Kaam’s anthropological psychology approaches man holistically, in that observation is a personal attention to the individual moving intentionally in his life situation. Any deviation from a personalistic holism results in distortion. In a statement which reminds us of Adler’s criticism of psychologists who “present their dogmas disguised in mechanistic or physical similes” and topographical terms van Kaam says, anthropological psychology cannot use metaphors. “It requires terminology appropriate to its subject-matter, which is the personal, motivated, intentional behavior of human beings . . . [However, it must also integrate] the impersonal aspects of the personality, which are rooted in the fact that human existence is also essentially a bodily, material existence in a material world” (p. 230).

Van Kaam holds an emphatically anti-dualistic view, describing “the behavior of man as a concrete unity of orientation and of embodiment of this orientation in observable behavior . . . [In this way] I can reach conclusions about [man] as a whole person which are susceptible to intersubjective affirmation by other observers in my field” (p. 296).

Perhaps the greatest strength of the phenomenological approach, as presented by van Kaam, is that anyone, regardless of his specific approach, can adopt it. It simply implies that one eschew one-sided attempts to impose man-made categories upon objectively given data or apply approaches from a priori conceptions about reality rather than from observation (p. 294).

Van Kaam’s work is in effect an orchestration of many aspects of similarly attuned positions, arranged from his individual perspective and often in his own striking terminology. Some of the trends, as will have been noted, are holistic, personalistic, purposive, transactional, organismic, non-inferential, operational, non-dualistic, and phenomenological. To this synthesis he has also added significant original contributions. For example, his brilliant criticism of Freudian theory is a wholly new, existential argument which no one can afford to miss (pp. 206-207).

Unfortunately for the undergraduate, the level of sophistication of this book is above him, but Chapter 11, on Anthropological Psychology and Behavioristic Animal Experimentation, with its excellent discussion of Skinner, might well stand by itself as an introductory reading. Assuredly the whole book will be greatly rewarding to the advanced student and to every teacher of psychology for its fresh insight into some of the most significant trends of our time, and for the very usefulness which van Kaam attributes to the psychology of personality, namely, “that it improves man precisely in his being man, as an independent growing self” (p. 192).

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbacher

For Empathic Understanding in National Policy


This is reading for every psychologist and social scientist, for everyone participating in government—indeed, for every concerned citizen. The report of findings and achievements in policy research on a world-wide scale, particularly
the uses to which these were put by the United States during and shortly after World War II, will exhilarate the reader, and will also arouse bitter shame at the tragic, self-defeating ignorance of our recent and present administrations.

Cantril has given us a brief, stirring autobiographical account of what one psychologist, with a transactional theory and an empirical approach, with commitment, imagination, and energy, together with the help of able coworkers and generous financial support, has succeeded in developing through research in people's hopes and fears, in assessing their attitudes, and in influencing their opinions.

Basic to Cantril's work has been his theoretical position, namely: The way we look at things and the attitudes and opinions we form are grounded on assumptions we have learned from our experience in life... The significances a person attaches to anything... are significances that he has so far found reliable in orienting himself to his environment... accepted on faith as long as they work... Once assumptions are formed and prove more or less effective, they serve both to focus attention and screen out what is apparently irrelevant, and as reinforcing agents... Thus we do not "react to" our environment in any simple mechanistic way, but "transact with" an environment in which we ourselves play the role of active agent (pp. 16-17).

This pattern of assumptions which a person builds up constitutes his "reality world," the only world he knows (p. 17). Cantril supports and illustrates this view with the results of perception research, largely conducted by Ames and himself. He links it with policy research in the following way: People in one country... cannot effectively communicate with important segments of the people in other countries... if they think only in terms that are significant to themselves and make no effort to understand the meanings that people in other lands attach to the same terms... Of course, arguments or approaches alone can never be a substitute for programs of substantive action... but the discovery of the right approaches to other peoples on certain issues of mutual concern at least provides a greater chance that our actions will not be made ineffective by our failure to recognize and try to overcome whatever psychological barriers separate us (p. 122).

The greatest care, of course, went into development of interviewing techniques and sampling, of measuring, controlling, and checking, and the like. One is particularly impressed with the intensive effort Cantril put into the preparation of his reports. "A great deal of valuable material social scientists uncover or create is presented in so academic or slipshod a fashion that no busy person is going to waste time digging out what may be of significance" (p. 41). And it should be noted that the readability of Cantril's reports (such as, e.g., to President Roosevelt) is replicated in the pages of this book.

With the utmost strength and simplicity Cantril makes his plea for observing psychological dimensions in policy. He calls for a whole new way of thinking which "entails a new way of feeling, a genuine empathic imaginative understanding of the people the policy is designed to affect" (p. 152). Without this, "effective, penetrating, honest, humanitarian communication becomes impossible. The policy planners will continue to flounder, to rely solely on military or economic power or on old-line diplomacy... They will thus unnecessarily poison the atmosphere in which they must operate" (p. 157). Surely it is up to every socially minded psychologist to implement these efforts and this view to the fullest extent of his individual potential.

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbacher
THE RANGE OF EARLY PSYCHOANALYSTS


The many readers who can be counted upon for an interest in psychoanalysis and the colorful persons who helped to found and develop it will be well served by this compendium, for the editors have succeeded in creating a fascinating volume by utilizing "living contacts with the early times" (p. vi) for describing the selected significant personalities, and for evaluating their contributions from today's perspective.

Ten of the 41 subjects are still living: Moshe Woolf, Sandor Rado, Theodor Reik, Helene Deutsch, Heinrich Meng, Hans Zulliger, Heinz Hartmann, Edward Glover, Anna Freud, and Erik H. Erikson. Franz Alexander, an editor also included as a pioneer, unfortunately died before the book's publication. The subjects range widely in every way, and from the very well-known, such as Jones, Jung, and Adler, to the less familiar, such as Victor Tausk, August Stärcke, and Ella F. Sharpe.

Adler is the only pioneer in whose case the reviewer would claim competence, and this happens to be one of the few whose life and work are described by someone lacking direct contact with his subject. The warmth which pervades the sketches of devoted colleagues or students, enriching their comments, is missing here although, considering this, S. T. Selesnick's account shows careful study of Adler and a generous appreciation of his contributions. It does, however, contain some inaccuracies, as speaking of "social interests" rather than using the singular term with its very different reference to Adler's complex concept; implying that fictions, as used by Vaihinger, are the equivalent of delusions; and attributing to Adler an oft quoted exchange with Freud, rather crudely uncomplimentary, which Jones very credibly attributes to Stekel. Furthermore, restricting the Adler references to his first monograph of 1907 and a paper of 1908 is not in the best interest of informing the reader. Still, one must recognize the editors' broad approach in including Jung and Adler in this work since they became the well-known adversaries of psychoanalysis.

In this connection it is impressive to see how far from monolithic is the picture given in these pages, even among the members who remained in the circle. There are many differences of interest, approach, and practice. For instance, it was of particular interest for this reviewer to learn that Paul Federn's first paper, in 1901, was concerned with reform of the doctors' hospital service (p. 144), that Siegfried Bernfeld's "psychoanalysis was interwoven with social responsibility" (p. 478), and that Zulliger conducted his child therapy wholly without interpretation, and held that the cure took place "only when ethical behavior becomes a matter of course to the child" (p. 346). The balance between individual differences and staunch adherence to the leader's position is an intriguing aspect.

This is apparent, in a somewhat different form, in the 50-page history of the movement by J. A. P. Millett which is most interesting for anyone concerned with organizational matters, or still seeking an explanation for the rise of psychoanalysis in the United States. Dr. Millet reports the spread of its influence "over every branch of culture in the U. S., with the force and speed of a forest fire," and the common acceptance of psychoanalysis in the psychiatric field; but he does not
note that what is considered psychoanalysis today often differs greatly from the
theory and practice as Freud conceived it, and that those he cites as psychana­
lysts in key positions today have rejected many of the very cornerstones of
Freudian theory. The editors, by their dedication of the book to "the pioneers of
the future," hail essential change; perhaps one might add that scientific progress
would be hastened if such change were more explicitly acknowledged and labeled.

Probably the greatest contribution of the book is along the human dimension,
in the opportunity it affords to become acquainted, mostly through sincerely
appreciative, face-to-face contact, with an unusual band of vibrant individuals
who made history in our time.

*Burlington, Vermont*  
*Rowena R. Ansbracher*

**THREE KINDS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THEIR GOALS**

**ALVIN R. MAHRER** (Ed.)  
Pp. viii + 301. $6.00.

In this book, unlike the usual edited volume, the contributed papers are made
part of an integrated study through closing chapters by the editor which to this
reviewer became the highlight of the book, although the individual contributions
are meritorious in their own right.

The purpose of the study was to arrive at an outline of psychotherapeutic
goals, to examine similarities and differences among therapeutic approaches in
terms of their goals, and to consider on this basis a functional taxonomy of psycho­
therapies.

To make the investigation operational and empirical the editor, rather than
studying the theoretically postulated goals of the various systems, invited 16
practitioners from private practice, hospitals, and university departments to write
on their particular, general, long-range, and ultimate psychotherapeutic goals.
They represented psychoanalytic, behavior therapy, client-centered, Adlerian,
existential, rational-emotive, and direct-analytic approaches to individual psycho­
therapy.

The contributions led to the following summary of psychotherapeutic goals
in general: reduction of psychopathology (symptoms, defenses), reduction of
psychological pain and suffering (anxiety, hostility, meaninglessness), increased
pleasure, increased experiencing, enhanced self-relationship (self-acceptance,
internal directedness), enhanced external relationship (interpersonal relations,
competence, ability to adjust, social commitment). Among these one must dis­
tinguish between what one contributor (Parloff, pp. 8-9) has called mediating
goals—i.e., "subgoals, instrumental goals, and goals which serve as the pathways
toward the more ultimate goals" (p. 264)—and ultimate goals.

The goals fell into the following three clusters or families, pointing to cor­
responding kinds of psychotherapy:

**Biopsychological developmental psychotherapies.** The mediating goals here
are correction of injurious traumas, removal of repressions, and resolution of intra­
psychic conflict, with the ultimate goal of attaining mature, healthy, normal
functioning. Contributions of Greenblatt and Levinson, Wolberg, Saul, White-
horn, Fine, Rosen, Raimy, and Wolpe were found to belong here. This group can be considered to correspond to the Freudian system.

**Psychological actualization psychotherapies.** Here the mediating goals are the removal or alleviation of blocks and interferences toward optimal functioning. But the latter is not seen as merely "mature, healthy, normal." Rather it is intrinsically invested "with philosophical good, and constitutes 'the good life,' complete with a value system" (p. 266). The therapists here were Gendlin, Mahrer, and van Kaam, corresponding to a client-centered-existential system.

**Reconstructive psychotherapies.** Here the mediating goals themselves function "to provide the pathway toward altering, revising, and reconstructing the system of personal constructs, assumptions, premises, and social goals" (p. 268), in the service of an ultimate goal of optimal functioning, a mode of being, that includes a well-functioning conceptual system. This has, however, not merely emerged from the patient but is offered by the therapist as a distinct social-philosophical value system (p. 268). Such goals were described by Albert Ellis, George A. Kelly, and Dreikurs. (The Adlerian chapter by Dreikurs is discussed under News and Notes in this issue.) For this group Mahrer chose the name learning-theory system.

The examination of goals of psychotherapy leads to numerous clarifications. E.g., insight must be understood as a mediating goal; "it is misleading to identify insight or any other mediating goal as an ultimate therapeutic goal" (p. 289). Regarding learning, while any psychotherapy is a learning process, in the light of goals, differences become apparent. "In the developmental model, learning is a means of clearing blocks and paving the way for normal, healthy functioning. The reconstructive model not only utilizes learning methods to clear away problems, but also directly to bring about optimal functioning" (p. 291). An examination of goals would also advance the planning of future psychotherapy research. Heretofore such research has concentrated on methods and techniques, and on indices of improvement. A consideration of goals shows that the former are but subgoals of therapy, and that the latter depend on an understanding of the general goals of psychotherapy.

Flaws in Mahrer's exposition are that it is sketchy and uneven in presentation, and especially that no information is given as to the method by which he arrived, from the data supplied by the contributors, at his own findings, summaries, and inferences. Also, the book is without an index.

Yet, as will have become obvious from the preceding, this reviewer found the book very stimulating, and its findings and inferences highly satisfactory for his own therapeutic family allegiance, which is the reconstructive.

*University of Vermont*  
*Heinz L. Ansbacher*

**SEX AND CONCERN**


A fine grasp of Adler's thinking informs Dr. Rattner's own views. The concept of the unity of the personality is the basis of his definition and interpretations
BOOK REVIEWS


This autobiography begins when Claude Brown, now 30 years old, was a little boy from the Harlem ghetto. It shows his background, his friends, how he grew up and got involved in crime and violence, his life in reformatory schools. It tells how he comes out and fights, in spite of the negative influences of slums, crime, superstition, bigotry and hate, toward health and maturity.

His story is straight and honest and brutally sincere. He goes through hell and does not feel sorry for himself for a second. He is exposed to hatred from both blacks and whites, to racists, criminals, psychopaths, anti-Semites, false leaders and preachers. But he follows his own directions which helped him to grow to health.

The language of the book is not any more shocking than the reality in which he was born and grew up; it is the language in which these children of Negro slums spoke to each other. Mr. Brown is tough and hardened, but he can describe very tender feelings without being sentimental or melodramatic.

OVERCOMING THE BLACK GHETTO

Alfred Adler Mental Hygiene Clinic, New York, N. Y.

Danica Deutsch

Alfred Adler Mental Hygiene Clinic, New York, N. Y.
The psychologist could state that everything in the experience and background of Claude Brown pointed to his future as a criminal, a drug addict, a mental case, or a combination of all three. He survived magnificently.

We wonder how this phenomenon happened. There is some hint of his meeting a number of people of intelligence, understanding and sensitivity, who were interested in him and in children of his kind. Among them is mentioned Ernst Papanek, the former director of the Wiltwyck School. Mr. Brown records many conversations with Dr. Papanek and we recognize that besides being an extraordinary human being, this former student and collaborator of Alfred Adler, in putting into practice the theory of "social interest," was an important influence in helping the child and the young man.

Mr. Brown went through many inner changes, and it would be good to know how these changes came about. A man with the honesty and clarity of Claude Brown will perhaps one day report further on these changes. He kept his integrity, and he does not hate people on the basis of color or faith.

Mr. Brown is now studying law and has the good wishes of many people who have read his book. It is gratifying to know that Manchild in the Promised Land has had an enormous sale both in hardcover and in paperback.

This book is more than the life story of one man who came through a pitiless and hopeless environment during childhood and adolescence and emerged a healthy and mature adult. It is a document of our time that will be quoted by future historians.

New York, N. Y.

Emery I. Gondor

BOOK NOTES


Arieti, S. (Ed.) American handbook of psychiatry. Vol. 3. New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. xiii + 778. $20.00.—Volumes 1 and 2 were published in 1959. Since then, the editor points out, biochemical, community, and conceptual or cognitive psychiatry have especially advanced and are presented in respective sections. While the first two are very enlightening, the last is somewhat disappointing, being very academic. The other three sections deal with special clinical problems such as suicide, retardation, old age; special aspects of psychotherapy including Rogers, Ackerman, Guntrip on Fairbairn, Bonime on depression, and Bieber on sadism; and finally a section on biological studies and artificial syndromes such as psychiatric genetics, Dement on sleep, sensory deprivation, space psychiatry, and extreme coercive conditions.

BablaDELIS, GEORGIA, & ADAMS, SUZANNE. The shaping of personality: text and readings for a social-learning view. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. ix + 522. $5.95 paper.—A quite "Adlerian" book: behavior is organized by goals; personality is the construct referring to this organiza-