BOOK REVIEWS

REALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND RIGHT-AND-WRONG


This simply written, hard hitting book presents a psychotherapy of "reality, responsibility, and right-and-wrong" (p. xii). It cannot fail to leave its mark, for Dr. Glasser not only presents a soundly based shorter therapy but also brings evidence of its large-scale effectiveness, although no control groups were used. Reality therapy, as he calls this method, was actually tried out on 370 seriously delinquent adolescent girls in an institution, on 210 chronic psychotic patients housed in a Veterans Administration hospital unit, and on 125 patients who were new admissions to a state hospital. The results are impressive numerically, and also because Glasser himself worked only with the delinquent girls, whereas one hospital study was carried out by his teacher and colleague, Dr. G. L. Harrington, and the other quite independently by Dr. Willard A. Mainord. Glasser also cites his office practice and, of far-reaching importance, his application of reality therapy in the public schools. In the latter as well as in institutions his work has been largely teaching, and he has been "gratified by the way in which the principles of Reality Therapy have been learned and put into practice by people who have little or no formal training in the social sciences, but who do have a desire to become personally involved with patients" (p. 154).

The rationale of Reality Therapy, as one might surmise from the above, comprises a bare minimum of principles strictly relevant to practice, and Glasser sets them forth clearly, in the language of common sense. They might be summarized as follows. All varieties of people who need psychiatric treatment suffer from one basic inadequacy, namely, the inability to fulfill their essential needs; and in their unsuccessful efforts, they all deny the reality of the world around them in some way. These needs are two: "the need to love and be loved and the need to feel that we are worthwhile to ourselves and to others" (p. 9). The needs can only be met by an individual who is properly involved with other people, and thus, "to obtain help in therapy the patient must gain or regain involvement, first with the therapist and then with others" (pp. 12-13). Once this occurs, the therapist makes the patient face "a truth that he has spent his life trying to avoid: he is responsible for his behavior" (p. 27). Glasser would substitute "responsibility" for "mental health," and "irresponsibility" for "mental illness" and its subcategories (p. 15).

Those interested in theory will not find Glasser's basic concepts sufficient for a system of psychodynamics, and many readers will not find his choice of basic terms to their liking (beginning with "fulfilling one's needs") or defined clearly enough (as, e.g., how does one differentiate the need to love and be loved "in all its forms ranging from friendship through mother love," p. 9, from the need to be involved with other people?). But in spite of Glasser's lack of concern for theoretical refinement, his points of difference with "conventional therapy" are extremely well taken. The following are some pithy quotations.
Contrary to almost universal belief, nothing which happened in his past, no matter how it may have affected him then or now, will make any difference once he learns to fulfill his needs at the present time (p. 13).—We have found that knowledge of causes has nothing to do with therapy ... He continues to have the phobia because of some present irresponsible behavior that may or may not be directly related to the origin of the phobia. If we examine his present life in detail, we will find behavior of which he is fully conscious that does not lead to fulfilling his needs (p. 53).—Incorrectly assuming that the patient is fully conscious of his present behavior, the conventional therapist emphasizes the past; in so doing he misses the extent to which the patient lacks awareness of what he is doing now (p. 55).—Once we become involved with a patient and teach him new ways of behavior his attitude will change regardless of whether or not he understands his old ways, and then his new attitude will help promote further behavioral change. What starts the process, however, is an initial change in behavior, and it is toward this that the therapist must work” (p. 51).—Conventional psychiatry does not directly concern itself with the issue of right and wrong. Rather, it contends that once the patient is able to resolve his conflicts ... he will be able to behave correctly. We have found that this view is unrealistic. All society is based on morality, and if the important people in the patient’s life, especially his therapist, do not discuss whether his behavior is right or wrong, reality cannot be brought home to him (p. 56).

This sample of Glasser’s approach and of his flare for expression should be sufficient to induce the reader to look into this book for himself. Most importantly for us, the sample shows that Glasser, while differing from the “conventional” approach, has rediscovered many of Adler’s most original insights to an uncanny extent.

A comment remains to be made regarding Professor Mowrer’s foreword, some of which is directed to placing Glasser’s work historically and systematically (which Glasser himself makes no attempt to do). In the light of Mowrer’s great knowledge it is difficult to understand why he telescopes the background of the present book into such relative recency. He writes “for more than a decade” it has been evident that something is seriously amiss in contemporary psychiatry, and “today there is a ‘shaking of the foundations’” (p. xi). “Freud held that psychological disorders arise when there has been a ‘cultural’ interference with the instinctual, biological needs of the individual, whereas Glasser and others are now holding that the problem is rather an incapacity or failure at the interpersonal, social level of human functioning” (p. xiii). As though there had been no voice before Glasser’s stating clearly that “all ‘clinical types’ represent under-socialization” (p. xix)! Adler made precisely this point 45 years ago, Sullivan brought interpersonal relations into prominence 35 years ago, and the trend of those dissatisfied with Freud has pretty much taken this direction ever since.

To see Glasser’s contribution in its wider setting of overlapping relationships is not to belittle it, but to find heartening confirmation for it, and evidence of an accumulating, empirically compelling logic. Actually, the impact of Reality Therapy derives largely from Glasser’s independently blending in practice so many other viable formulations which variously stress the social realities of man, his environment, his transactions, and his responsibility for them.

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansabacher
BOOK REVIEWS

"SCIENCE AND THE SINGLE CASE"¹


How to make scientific meaning of the life of one human being? There is no greater challenge to the psychologist, and one of the few psychologists to face the challenge of the single case is Gordon Allport. Letters from Jenny presents Allport's favorite personal document and his interpretations from three theoretical viewpoints. As always with Allport, the book is well written and carefully selective; it was a pleasure to read and re-read.

The 270 letters from Jenny, which occupy two-thirds of the paperback, are terse, vigorous, metaphoric, and intensely personal communications, abridged from the original 301 letters. Jenny bore the marks of the Victorian age into which she was born. The letters were written from age 58 until her death in 1937, when she was almost 70. In addition to Jenny the main characters in the drama are Ross, Jenny's only child, who died about midway in the series of letters; Betty, Jenny's sister; and Glenn and Isabel, the young couple to whom all the letters were written. The only external reports on Jenny's life are two letters from Ross, and a report from Isabel. These reports are so divergent from Jenny's own views that one wishes there were much more outside information. The first letters revolve around Jenny's conflicts with her son and his relations with women. The remainder deal with Jenny's accommodation to her son's death and her increasing infirmities. As she grew older, her early suspiciousness turned into a paranoid isolation from society.

A cardinal question for the psychological scientist is this: How valid are the different interpretations, or, more generally, how do theories, seen as analytic tools, contribute to a systematic understanding of a person? Allport is appropriately humble at this stage of the limited research base for theory. Of the many possible theories, he has chosen to apply three: those of existentialism, "depth approaches," and his own structural-dynamic approach.

The existentialist approach, in some ways, is the most appropriate to the data, which are largely phenomenological reports of Jenny's experience. Yet, when all is said about alienation and self-pity, the accomplishment is mainly a feeling of empathy for Jenny's personal view of life combined with a descriptive and summarizing construction of her personality. The account fails to satisfy the scientist's detailed curiosity about how a person got to be what he is.

The depth approaches add hypotheses about the early life and the unconscious thought processes of Jenny. Freudians would propose an anal character's avoidance of the dirtiness of excretion and sex and of unrecognized homosexuality and incest. Ego-oriented psychoanalysts point to basic distrust of others and ego-defensive maneuvers. Jungians describe the dominance of the thinking function as compared with the feeling function, leading to the sharp categorization of experiences and logic-tight paranoid compartments. The depth theories have added to the terminology and suggested some interesting hypotheses about Jenny's early life. Unfortunately there is very little information against which to test ideas about early experience or genetic predispositions. A short Adlerian inter-

¹A heading by Allport in the present book.—Ed. note.
pretation points to fictional finalism and the lack of social interest, but makes nothing of Jenny's position as oldest child in a family of 5 younger sisters and a brother.

The Allportian structural-dynamic interpretation leans heavily on the structural description of Jenny's traits, but provides little in the way of hypotheses about antecedent conditions or environmental interaction. Allport sees his theory as being close to the existential approach, particularly in its tendency to rely heavily on the individual's present conscious experience. As with existential theory, the assumption is that styles of selective perceiving and interpreting of the world (Adler), once initiated in early life or through inheritance, become functionally autonomous determinants of present behavior.

Allport could have gone further in applying theories. Most notable by their absence are the field approaches: general systems theory, role theory, and transactional theory. The behavioristic and cognitive-linguistic analyses are also limited. The approach of General Semantics, with its concern with reification of concepts, black-white stereotyped thinking, and the idealization-frustration-de-moralization sequence could find much support in Jenny's life. A person's life appears, like the Bible, to be open to a multitude of interpretations.

In addition to theory, the other leading question for the psychological scientist is methodology. How might data about individual lives best be collected and analyzed? Allport, in discussing his point of view, has shown the way for some forms of analysis of structure and content. He reviews two major pieces of research: Baldwin's 1942 report on a statistical method for recording the associative context and favorability with which Jenny wrote about the principal persons, and Paige's 1964 coding of the letters for many varied computerized retrieval operations. The eight factor-traits Paige found were very similar to common-sense groupings of free-response descriptions by judges in another study. Although at the present time, computerized analysis of content produced no startling results, the potentialities of automated analysis would seem to be far from trivial. We can expect imaginative methods for testing hypotheses produced by various theories, the derivation of unforeseen relations, and the simulation of thought processes based on earlier periods which would predict reactions of the person to later situations.

Before ending this review, a word about the implications of this book for problems of mental health is in order. What impressed me was the implication for the current attempts to foster greater community responsibility for its deviant persons. The function of Glenn and Isabel in Jenny's life seems relevant. As with everyone else, Jenny overidealized them, and Glenn probably served as a duplicate of the positive part of Ross in her life. However, because she rarely saw them, she was able to maintain her ideal conception. They served as a kind of blank screen on which she projected her own affiliative needs and expressed her feelings; they responded with support but not interference. Their help to Jenny suggests that such friendly but otherwise neutral relations are very important in society.

This is a book to be highly recommended to those interested in the development of a science of individuality. It would also be of interest for undergraduate courses. How surprising it is that there are not more such books available—and no organization for collecting information on life histories. If the human side of psychology is to prosper, there is much to be done.

University of Oregon

Norman D. Sundberg
BOOK REVIEWS

PHENOMENOLOGY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE


Each time he accepts a referral, the practicing clinician decides, either explicitly or implicitly, how he shall come to know the one who has been referred. It is not merely a question of which tests or what interviewing techniques he will use. Such selections are made only after a prior frame of reference has already been adopted. It is the frame of reference itself which determines the manner and extent to which the individual in question will become known to the psychologist.

In an effort to reveal all the implications and meanings of the clinician's decision, Dr. Lyons has written the present volume. As he states at the conclusion of the first chapter, "This is a book about clinical situations, and specifically about the bases and uses of certain kinds of instruments and procedures in clinical psychology. The instruments and procedures, particularly in their common form as clinical tests, are avenues toward apprehending certain kinds of data which, I will maintain, can be dealt with satisfactorily only within a poeticizing orientation." But what exactly constitutes a "poeticizing orientation" and how does its adoption effect a radical alteration of the traditional clinical standpoint? The author attempts to answer these questions through a thoroughgoing critique of psychological theory and the presentation of several thought-provoking analyses which, he asserts, are only possible when one looks at the situation from a phenomenological perspective.

In his examination of the history of psychological theory with its expressed and unexpressed assumptions, Dr. Lyons, often with biting sarcasm, points to the unrelenting commitment of most psychologists to the perspective of natural science. With only a few notable exceptions, our predecessors and colleagues have chosen to grasp the person, the patient, the subject, and the client as "the other." As such, he, she, or it is conceived of as a solipsistically encapsulated ego, psyche, mind, or consciousness whose "real" foundations are to be discovered at a physical-physiological level of analysis. All actions are understood as reactions to internal and external physical agents called stimuli and these behaviors are explained as deriving from the interplay of present forces and past history, all somehow acting within the individual. Finally, "the other" is essentially worldless, that is, since he is in effect locked up inside his body, he is not necessarily related to any one or thing. With such a conceptualization there is no need to discuss the psychologist's relation to the person; there is no call to ask "What does this situation mean to this person? How does he see me and the tests which I'm going to administer? What do his test answers mean in terms of his relation to me?" A few simple "behavioral observations" and/or a statement to the effect that rapport was established usually suffices.

In contrast to the above, Dr. Lyons proposes "an anthropological psychology, which presupposes phenomenology as a method and takes as its subject matter the hyphenated creature: the-whole-man-as-an-experiencing-being-caught-in-the-human-world." In spelling out the meaning of such a proposal, the author suggests the following basic principles:

First, the goal of psychology is not to explain man, but to understand him in his constant, yet ever-changing relations with the world. Second, all human acts
are understandable as meaningful attempts to alter the macroscopic situations in which individuals find themselves. Third, everything that happens in the therapy or testing session must be analyzed and comprehended in terms of the existing relationship between the psychologist and his partner in that session. Finally, "A clinical science has to start with the straightforward statement that its concern is with people and their relations with one another . . . its data are nothing other than perceptions of other persons."

In summary, Dr. Lyons presents in this book a somewhat incomplete, though incisive critique of contemporary clinical theory and the outlines of a phenomenologically-grounded alternative. Those in the field who consider themselves already disabused of the traditional theories with their pseudo-mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic models will, as they read this volume, stand on the sidelines and cheer as David slays Goliath. Those who are already involved with or have more than a passing knowledge of phenomenological psychology will read and, for the most part, smile approvingly. Those who are still unquestioningly committed to the natural scientific conception of psychology will probably find themselves insulted and/or confused and will put the book down without having read half of it. As for myself, I intend to assign sections of the work to my next semester's class in psychological testing.

Duquesne University

WILLIAM F. FISCHER

CAN PSYCHOANALYSIS IMPROVE THE LOT OF MANKIND?


Insight and Responsibility consists of six addresses delivered at various ceremonious occasions in three continents over a period of eight years.

We have all grown to expect of Professor Erikson profound and provocative reflections; these are ours in full measure in this work. Also, Erikson the artist shines through in Insight and Responsibility—so brilliantly indeed as to disarm anyone tempted to begrudge an artist the tradition-honored prerogative of elusiveness and ambiguity if not obscurantism. The reader will also re-encounter Erikson's systematic attempt to interpret data within his own epigenetic scheme; two dreams of Freud and the case of Dora are so reinterpreted quite masterfully if not always parsimoniously. Expanding the theme that the organism is more than a bundle of libido and destrudo Erikson goes on to introduce a schedule of eight virtues—hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care and wisdom—that correspond respectively to his "eight stages of man." In so doing there is much speculation and arbitrariness but this should not be surprising for an uncharted field is always an invitation for conjecture.

Underlying the diversity of the addresses is the central theme—which will be our concern henceforth—that psychoanalysis can and must, through its insights, contribute to improving the lot of mankind. Without in the least detracting from the probity and earnestness of Erikson's plea, and indeed because the world situation is critical, we all must care enough (to make Erikson's seventh virtue a part of our working vocabulary) to express our differences with a man, even one of dedication and distinction.

This reviewer believes that a hypothesis contrary to the one entertained by Erikson is more tenable: to wit, that psychoanalysis, as technique or theory,
classical or otherwise, cannot help advance the cause of world peace or foster goodwill. Psychoanalysis has had six decades of existence and has yet to prove its worth as a catalyst for the attainment of mental health. If several hundred hours of client-analyst intimate contacts, or "brainwashing" to use the language of the cynic, are of so questionable an outcome as to result in nothing more substantial than the farce that only the psychoanalyzed can appreciate psychoanalysis, humanity will probably be doomed if it links its fate to such odds.

As a way of looking at things, a theory, psychoanalysis does not fare much better: It has an affinity, too firm to be severed, to the pathological. It preaches the dominance and primacy of irrationality. It is so much a psychology of the past and backward-looking that in viewing the overclothed child—known as adult in non-psychoanalytic theories—as a slave to his childhood experiences, it qualifies as a fatalistic doctrine. As a prophylaxis, psychoanalysis has so much decried the "tyranny of the 'should' " that the public has come to regard it as the apostle of self-indulgence rather than the advocate of social responsibility, let alone the reincarnation of St. Francis. The gloom which these attributes inspire can only be matched by the distrust in the brotherhood of man which Totem and Taboo can create.

Does psychoanalytic insight, to use a much battered term, offer greater promise for world understanding and reconciliation when viewed within Erikson's framework? It is doubtful for several reasons. First, Erikson apparently accepts the five basic postulates of Freudian theory—structural, dynamic, economic, topographic, and genetic (p. 42)—as well as other major concepts (chapters 1 & 2). Without a fundamental revision of the basic credo, in the light of reliable and valid evidence, one would merely perpetuate what may simply be no more than a quixotic edifice. Secondly, while Erikson disclaims the classical theory's "fatalistic dominance" of childhood over contemporaneous events, as revealed in his use of existential wordage as well as by explicit statements (pp. 78 & 201-202), his disavowal is betrayed by his interpretation of the dream of the "face and the buggy," Freud's dreams, and the case of Dora, and other statements (pp. 44 & 53-54). Finally, in what seems like a disillusionment in science Erikson embraces non-parsimony (p. 40) and cavalierly exploits every occasion to attack "objectivity." There is of course nothing venerable about these two canons of tested wisdom except that they have been found powerful instruments for furthering knowledge and their observance is vital if psychoanalysis is to join the behavior sciences for a concerted effort to make the world a better and safer place. Clinical intuition and subjective impressions are legitimate and invaluable tools when properly checked against independent observations and used with an ever-present watchfulness lest the clinician be tempted to arrogate for himself the qualities of the gods. By sanctioning non-parsimony and what seems like undisciplined subjectivity Erikson shakes the hope for the rapprochement between psychoanalysis and scientific psychology which another eminent psychoanalyst, Franz Alexander (1) has inspired in a paper that is indeed an apt finale for a distinguished career.

University of Missouri

M. Mike Nawas

Reference

Doubt or Confidence in Striving for Mastery and Participation


The name of Andras Angyal will always sound with magic for me. My acquaintance with his work began in the early 1950's, when I was preparing to teach my first class in the psychology of personality. Few recent systematic treatments of the subject were available then. *Foundations for a Science of Personality* was one of them. The book was a revelation. With one magnificent stroke it cut the knot that my dim-witted picking was succeeding only in tightening, namely, how to conceptualize the life process. But my indebtedness to Angyal goes beyond the gain in understanding given by his principle of biospheric events. More generally, and perhaps more importantly, he furnished me my first real insight into what could be accomplished by the holistic approach to personality if one was not content simply to wave the word about as a shibboleth.

Angyal died in 1960. Left incomplete was a book developing a theory of neuroses and their treatment. Working from manuscripts, notes, and tape recordings, and utilizing case materials from their own practice, Eugenia Hanfmann and Richard M. Jones, both of whose therapeutic work had been supervised by Angyal, have brought the statement to fulfillment. The result is a treasure house for both professional and layman. One cannot read the book without recognizing, as Maslow has expressed it in his foreword, that Angyal "has been there."

*Neurosis and Treatment* is divided into three parts. The first is a shortened, revised version of the material in Angyal's earlier book relevant to his theory of neuroses. Paramount here is the clarification introduced into the discussion of homonomy, "the wish to be in harmony with a unit one regards as extending beyond his individual self" (p. 15). The achievement is stunning, marked as it is by such pregnant formulations as the following:

The true human problem is this: in a sense that matters to us above everything else, we are nothing in ourselves. All we have is a profound urge to exist and the dreadful experience of nonexistence. A poem written in a language that no one can read does not exist as a poem. Neither do we exist in a human sense until someone decodes us. A man in the most crucial way is a symbol, a message that comes to life only by being understood, acknowledged by someone. Otherwise, his existence has no more meaning or reality than an inscription on a rock on an uninhabited planet. William James said that there could be no worse punishment for a human being than to be unnoticed by everyone. Starting with the small child who urgently wants to be noticed, we all want to have a life in the thoughts and feelings of others, to have them reflect our individual existence, and reflect it in an understanding affectionate way (p. 18).

Part 2 is concerned with the theory of neuroses itself. Angyal's nuclear construction is the theory of universal ambiguity. Personality, he argues, is a dual organization, an ambiguous Gestalt. Each of us evolves two patterns of living, one "based on isolation and its derivatives: feelings of helplessness, unlovableness, and doubts about one's prospects"; the second "on the confidence that a modicum of one's autonomous and homonomous strivings may be realized more or less directly" (pp. 99-100). The latter, the Gestalt of health, is the primary orientation, from which the former, the Gestalt of neurosis, issues as a "distortion" or
“distant approximation.” No item of behavior belongs independently to either of these systems, but rather any item belongs to both of them. The two patterns, both of which are total organizations, vie for control over the life of the person. Each seeks “to realize the general human tendencies toward mastery and participation” (p. 220). Since “the parts in a system function as such not through their immanent qualities but through their positional values” (p. 102), every personal tendency has a different meaning and function, depending on which system is currently dominant, i.e., on whether it occurs within the Gestalt of neurosis or the Gestalt of health. “Everything in life has a double meaning—hence universal ambiguity” (p. 103).

Dominance is an “all-or-none” affair. One cannot be simultaneously healthy in some features of life and neurotic in others. There may be shifts between the two orientations, in either direction, brief or permanent, but at any particular moment the individual is either healthy or neurotic. Neurosis is not a rotten part of a healthy apple ... a limited segregated growth within the person, a plant that can be pulled out by the roots without disturbing or changing the rest of the personality. The neurotic person is neurotic throughout, in every area of his life, in all the crannies and crevices of his existence. Conversely, one cannot say that there is in anyone only an element or segment of personality that is healthy. One is healthy throughout and this health extends over one’s entire existence, down to the most distorted forms of behavior and the most troublesome symptoms. The so-called “healthy core,” the patient’s real self, will not be found stuck away in some distant or hidden region of his personality; it is to be found right there, where it is least expected. Health is present potentially in its full power in the most destructive, most baneful, most shameful behavior (pp. 103-104).

Neurosis is grounded in traumatic events that are “generalized into a set of diffident and pessimistic expectations which are then elaborated in various ways and organize all future experience” (pp. 203-204). Two developmental sequences are claimed by Angyal to be present to some extent in all instances of neurosis, “although the way in which they are articulated and combined varies from case to case” (p. 190). The first is represented by hysteria, conceptualized as “the pattern of vicarious living”; the second by the obsessive-compulsive condition, “the pattern of noncommitment.”

Part 3 takes up the therapeutic process. Since in the neurotic the secondary system with its feelings of helplessness has achieved powerful dominance, the aim of therapy is to reverse this growth and re-establish the primary pattern of confidence as dominant.

Therapy neither eliminates what is there nor creates anything new in the person. It prepares a rearrangement of his inherent traits. No personal characteristics are destroyed when their neurotic meanings and uses are discovered and the origins of the distortions understood. They will eventually find their place in the pattern of health when alternative constructive solutions are found to the early traumatic situations which twisted them out of shape. Therapy is not surgery but a gradual transplanting of the patient’s attitudes and traits from one pattern to the other; the analysis of the healthy core of a given behavioral item serves to convert it back to, and to anchor it in, the latent system of health (p. 229).

Andras Angyal was a humanist in the richest sense of the word. His book is an important contribution to the development of a humanistic psychology.

University of Alberta

Paul Swartz

It is always saddening to read what Alfred Kazin so precisely named "the tensely inarticulate essays of Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan" and realize that no psychiatrist ever had more insight into the significance of language and less facility in his own use of it. Unhappily, Sullivan runs true to form in the latest volume of seventeen papers compiled by Helen Swick Perry—and The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science just misses fusing the elements of English into an impenetrable lump. Sullivan cannot possibly be read with enjoyment. That he must nevertheless be read for instruction by every serious student of social science and mental health is clear judgment of the importance of his ideas.

The present work continues the program of The William Alanson White Foundation for the posthumous editing and publication of Sullivan's works. More specifically, this book is a sequel to Schizophrenia as a Human Process, also edited by Mrs. Perry, in which she sampled important writings from the first half of Sullivan's career. The present book contains essays from 1934 till his death in 1949. Their content ranges from a brief exercise in history and definition ("Psychiatry") through specific social problems ("Anti-Semitism"), including race relations ("Memorandum on a Psychiatric Reconnaissance" and "Discussion of the Case of Warren Wall") before they were popular, to discourses on the contributions psychiatry could make to the conduct of World War II ("Psychiatry and the National Defense" and "Psychiatry and Morale"), and mostly, of course, on Sullivan's theory of personality as a social process.

The title suggests a more coherent purpose to the book than could possibly be served by collecting isolated essays published over twenty-five years, especially by a man with Sullivan's wide scope of interests. Mrs. Perry's commentary preceding each essay establishes some bridges between them, however, and illuminates difficult parts of them, as her footnotes also do, but her remarks generally better serve the purpose of relating the historical events of Sullivan's career than the conceptual ones. This is an altogether valid purpose, however, for despite the difficulties of his literary style, Sullivan's concepts do come through to the reader in the essays themselves, and Mrs. Perry's contribution combines with some of the essays to give the total work more significance.

As it stands, the book is an important contribution to the history of psychiatry and mental health. Several of the essays and commentaries demonstrate Sullivan's pioneering interest in the applications of psychiatry to social problems, including those of war and international tensions, his contribution to the establishment of the World Health Organization, and his early concern with promoting preventive mental health work in the community and rejecting the office practice of individual psychotherapy as a model for the field. Mrs. Perry's introduction is itself of value, in describing the historical development of an important part of American social science in the first third of the century and Sullivan's relation to the people and problems who were central to it.

The historical value of the book does not gainsay the real conceptual purpose which it serves. The very juxtaposition of the essays draws attention to some of
the ideas which Sullivan considered most emphatically important in his own work. These are all known to students of Sullivan’s work, but they are seldom emphasized as much as they evidently should be. Three themes which appear most striking here are: (a) the significance of “operationism” in the study of personality, (b) the virtual identity of psychiatry and social psychology, and (c) the firm rejection of the individual as the “primary entity” of personality.

Briefly, (a) Sullivan makes clear that the only methodology he values for the formulation of psychiatric theory, as in the processing of information for it, is the operational one which, in fact, characterizes all experimental science (“The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry and in Life,” “Beliefs versus a Rational Psychiatry”). (b) The only conceptual distinction he permits between psychiatry and academic social psychology rests in the modal source of data; social psychologists tend to sample the center areas of the normal distribution and psychiatrists the disordered extreme (“Psychiatry and Morale”). (c) When he says that psychiatry is the study of “interpersonal processes,” he means just that, all of that, and only that!

The latter point, which is perhaps less important than the others, is also more widely misunderstood, especially I think by psychotherapeutically oriented admirers of Sullivan who are troubled by his extremely social and community-minded orientation. Even Mrs. Perry has trouble swallowing Sullivan’s denial of “individuality,” dubbing his “actual expression . . . unfortunate” (p. 196). But Sullivan himself, often an unclear writer, could hardly be more clear than when he says “Persons (personalities) are the entities which we infer in order to explain interpersonal events and relations” (p. 64) or when he repeatedly asserts that it is useful “to talk about individual specimens of man” only to “human biologists” (p. 219).

The parallels both of personality theory and practical application between Adler and Sullivan are so many and clear that they need not be belabored here. It is of some interest however, to observe that the technical language of their respective inventions sometimes is as closely paralleled as are their general positions. Sullivan’s “career line” seems quite exactly to be Adler’s “life style,” “security operations” appear identical with “safeguarding devices,” and “optimum interpersonal process” the same as “social interest.” Considering the closeness of view, it is surprising that Sullivan makes so little direct reference to Adler’s work—but this may reflect a difference of generation and cultural backgrounds more than anything else.

It is unfortunate that as incisive a thinker as Sullivan should have written so poorly, a fault which may make his work less widely read as the memory of his living presence recedes. Good editing helps, and Mrs. Perry has been a good, if cautious editor. And the scope and vitality of his concerns should itself help perpetuate his work. As Mrs. Perry says: “His concern was with . . . fear, wherever it was found . . . in the schizophrenic patient . . . or in a nation or ethnic group. In the pursuit of some way to free men from their ancient fears, he was basically hopeful . . . It was a hope based on science; and it sought for answers wherever they could be found” (p. 292).

University of Southern California, Los Angeles

Perry London
BOOK REVIEWS

UNITY THROUGH MEANING


Those of us who believe that all points of view in any discipline should be readily available to the interested public have a real and continuing debt to the Northwestern University Press for its excellent series of well-produced books, "Studies in Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy." The latest in this fine series under the general editorship of John Wild of Yale is an excellent translation by Richard McCleary of the late Maurice Merleau-Ponty's collection of essays, Signs, originally published by Gallimard in 1960.

Merleau-Ponty's over-riding concern in his writings has been to overcome what he considers to be modern manifestations of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, whether it be in the "scientism" of positivism, or of the "pour soi" "en soi" dichotomy of Sartre. Sartre views the individual as existing over against the world of inert matter in almost an antagonistic fashion. The world itself has no meaning but that which man in the exercise of his freedom chooses to give it through action. Man, according to Sartre, is condemned to freedom. According to Merleau-Ponty, man is condemned—but to meaning. Here is the essence of Merleau-Ponty's attempt to deal with the dichotomy between mind and matter. Through a concept of meaning which unites what has hitherto been considered the subjective and the objective, mind and body, myself and the existence of other beings, etc., Merleau-Ponty attempts to present, especially in his Phenomenology of Perception, the unity of the individual with the world as it is given in lived experience, before analysis. This concern is well brought out in Merleau-Ponty's introduction to the present work:

Everything rests upon the insurpassable richness, the miraculous multiplication of perceptible being, which gives the same things the power to be things for more than one perceiver, and makes some of the things—human and animal bodies—have not only hidden faces but an "other side," a perceiving side, whose significance is based upon what is perceptible to me. Everything depends upon the fact that this table over which my glance now sweeps, probing its texture, does not belong to any "space of consciousness" and inserts itself equally well into the circuit of other bodies. Everything depends, that is, upon the fact that our glances are not "acts of consciousness," each of which claims an invariable priority, but openings of our flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh of the world... The whole enigma lies in the perceptible world, in that television which makes us simultaneous with others and the world in the most private aspects of our life.

These and other themes are taken up in the three parts of Signs. As the author notes in his introduction: "How different—how downright incongruous—the philosophical essays and the ad hoc, primarily political observations which make up this volume seem!" And indeed, the first part of Signs, the lengthy introduction, reflects this richness since it is concerned with three separate topics: the present state of Marxism, reflection on the author's philosophy, and the author's estimate of the relation between Sartre and Communism over the past decades.

Part Two shows Merleau-Ponty's thought concerning the phenomenology of language in two brilliant articles, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," a dialogue of sorts with Malraux on the latter's book, The Voices of Silence; and "On the Phenomenology of Language." The other essays in Part Two are ap-
lications of his approach to some of the leading figures in the history of philosophy: Machiavelli, Montaigne, Bergson, Einstein, and Freud.

The third part of *Signs* is somewhat more topical, and deals primarily with contemporary political issues, which range widely from "The U. S. S. R and the Camps" and "The Yalta Papers" to "On News Items" and "Paranoid Politics". But all these writings attest to Merleau-Ponty's quest for significance on all levels and aspects of human experience. For him the philosopher has no privileged position above the world of experience, but is himself immersed in its ceaseless flux and flow. Philosophy is not, he remarks, "a higher point of view' from which one embraces all local perspectives. It seeks contact with brute being, and in any case informs itself in the company of those who have never lost that contact."

Merleau-Ponty was one of the few philosophers of today who never lost that contact with "brute reality"; and it may be that *Signs* will be read with regret in bringing to mind his untimely death, yet with gratitude for the humanity and depth of philosophical insight into the world of lived reality which it offers.

*University of Vermont*

**Robert W. Hall**

**Meaning Through Perception**


Merleau-Ponty was one of France's leading phenomenological philosophers who died not long ago. All of his major works have appeared in English. The present one is a collection of the remaining seven more important untranslated articles. His major work lies within phenomenological psychology and philosophy. Central to him is the living act of perception in which the world of meaning comes into being.

By these words, the "primacy of perception," we mean that the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent Logos; that it teaches us, outside of all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality (p. xv).

Perception is used in its widest sense, and in these essays we see it related to child psychology, art, history, politics, and the philosophy of science. When Mearleau-Ponty is examining the implications of perception one sees his greatness as though one could look through his eyes and understand more in the intersubjectivity of the seer and the seen. His comparison of Husserl to his own position is unnecessarily difficult and abstract. When he tires to examine the world of the child one sees this great philosopher at a disadvantageous distance from the child. He has to call on the work of psychologists to provide him material. When he looks at art or literature he seems freer, richer and more understandable as he unmasks their human implications. When he enters Marxist politics he sounds like merely another intellectual interested in politics. These essays are fragmentary if one sees them just as the work of a phenomenologist. Rather he appears here in several roles which include that of critic and social commentator.
Even though I count myself a phenomenologist my major reaction to this book and many in the same field is that phenomenology is promising and interesting in so far as it stands in human experience and makes human meaning of it. But it easily wanders into very abstract thought where it is difficult to find its living meaning except by a complete retranslation back down into human experience.

The book is not recommended for a first look at Merleau-Ponty. His *Phenomenology of Perception* or *Structure of Behavior* would be more appropriate for this.

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_Wilson Van Dusen_

**THE JEWISH CONCEPT OF MAN**


The author concludes from his studies that Hebraic literature, especially the Bible and the Talmud, constitutes a complete science of man, the main characteristics of which are: (a) In interpersonal relations the aim is a blending of love (love thy neighbor) with justice. (b) Justice is essentially aimed at protecting the innocent. (c) “The main function of Hebraic monotheism has been to humanize that which is holy.” (d) “Morality, far from being opposed to life and repressing the instincts, associates itself with life and with the instincts in such a way as to allow them to blossom without damage to social harmony” (p. 67). (e) The idea of unity is stressed—unity of body and soul, of the subjective and the objective, of the individual and society, of communities and of the world.

Baruk considers that the interest of Hebraic civilization for modern psychology lies precisely in the principle of unity whereas Freud conceived of the individual as in opposition to society (p. 69). Logically, Baruk should then turn favorably to Adler with his emphasis on the unity of individual and society. Instead Baruk holds that Adler falls in the error of not doing justice to the individual: “Adler ... tends to subordinate the individual to society” (p. 69). Without such misunderstanding Baruk would undoubtedly arrive at the conclusion Trude Weiss-Rosmarin reached in her discussion of “Adler’s Psychology and the Jewish Tradition” (this Journal, 1958, 14, 142-152) that “There is virtual identity between the basic insights of Adlerian psychology and the wisdom of Judaism.”

Aside from this shortcoming Baruk’s essay would seem to be well suited to extend the historical perspective and cultural value of any holistically oriented course dealing with personality, theoretically or clinically.

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_Heinz L. Ansbacher_

**A THERAPEUTIC CLASSIC**


To me Alfred Adler is the layman’s psychologist. Those of us whose training lies outside the field of formal psychology frequently feel overwhelmed by what appear to be the esoteric complexities of many schools of psychological thought.
One has the notion that without a very special brand of training of an indefinitely long period one can do nothing to assist the mental sufferings of another. A friend of mine expressed to me his conviction that the Freudian influence in mental hospitals had led personnel to withdraw from patients for fear of doing them harm. One person, the doctor, is thought to hold the only key in helping the patient. In contrast, Adler, in the first paragraph of the present book, advocates as the proper goal of psychology "the understanding of human nature by every human being." As he himself points out in the very next sentence, "This is a sore point with academic investigators who consider their researches the exclusive property of a scientific group."

As a sociologist I do not feel qualified to analyze Adler's psychology step by step but I am convinced that what he has set forth in his *Understanding Human Nature,* and in his other works, represents the essence of realism in today's world. This is why we regard the 1965 printing of a 1927 translation a worthy occasion to consider this book anew. It is perfectly clear to those of us who work daily with the legions of the mentally ill that understanding of human nature must really be the province of everyone if we are truly to make progress.

A therapeutic mental hospital today makes full and human use of all resources, which includes attendants, patients, and all other levels of personnel from top to bottom. There is no longer any stuffy belief that only specially trained individuals can be therapeutic or can engage in specific therapeutic activities. This is not to disparage professional training but rather to recognize that mental illnesses include the gamut of human emotions and thinking and can therefore be administered to, in some way, by all people.

Regarding the present trend toward therapy for the masses which utilizes all the resources at hand I am aware that others besides Adler have seen the need for such therapy. But this is hardly the point. As far as Adler's role is concerned we need only to understand that some forty years ago he was presenting his ideas not to a limited professional audience but to the people of Vienna of both sexes and of all ages and that he was in fact freely working, as were his students, with the children of the city. This is the tradition which is today spreading the therapeutic community within the mental hospital and developing the community mental health movement with its emerging variety of treatment and preventative facilities.

I feel that the most important contribution Adler has made and will continue to make is not to be found in any particular idea, although, e.g., the concept of life style certainly ranks in my mind as a major contribution. It is to be found in the spirit which underlies his ideas, the conviction that the human race, rather than being basically evil, is capable of social interest; that man can know; and that knowledge properly applied can mean freedom from psychic ills. These are the areas which I feel will keep Adler always among us even though the specifics of his thinking may someday be forgotten, or be said better by someone else.

As a last point it is heartening to note that occasional psychiatrists in private practice encourage their patients to read *Understanding Human Nature.* This is in sharp contrast to the usual practice of discouraging reading in psychology on the grounds that it confuses the patient and hinders therapy!

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