About this book it may be said that it is almost as important to know who wrote it as what is written in it. Lou Andreas-Salome, as the translator tells in his introduction, was born in St. Petersburg in 1861, the sixth child and only daughter of a former Russian general. By the turn of the century she had become a well-known writer, poet, and philosopher, and for the last 25 years of her life practiced psychoanalysis in Goettingen where she died in 1937.

“All her life she resisted the position of domesticity and motherhood,” and although she was married to Professor Andreas from 1887 until his death in 1930 the marriage was never consumated. Considering unqualified devotion to one man physically repugnant, she wanted the devotion of an unlimited number of men. “The lover of many men had at times an oddly condescending attitude toward maleness” (p. 24). We would say, she was a classical example of the masculine protest. Her own formulation was, “A woman has no other choice than to be unfaithful or to be only half herself” (p. 124).

Her brilliant mind permitted her to find her lovers and male friends among the elite of the writers and thinkers of her time. Chief among these were Nietzsche and Rilke, but there were also such names as Gerhart Hauptmann, Jakob Wassermann, Martin Buber, Richard Beer-Hofmann, Frank Wedekind, Arthur Schnitzler, and many others.

The present diary, which includes also exchanges of letters, covers the period from September 1912 to November 1913, a time when she was interested in psychoanalysis and had become a friend of Freud.

At the same time she was on good terms with Adler, attending his meetings as well as those of Freud, a quite unique distinction. She gives numerous accounts of meetings with Adler and of discussions of his views. At one place she comments, “Naturally I could not convince Adler when we debated about it. We fight like mad” (p. 87). At another time, “We had a passionate debate, finally going down all the streets at a run; he went along faithfully and touchingly” (p. 63). However, it is clear that she does not really understand Adler, and she herself admits, “Adler’s ‘as if’ confuses me” (p. 45).

Her parting from Adler was in a letter to him, dated August 12, 1913, in which she compared his larger synthesis to “those investigations of altruism, which correctly asserted that even altruism is only egoism” (p. 158), which would still leave one with the problem of dealing with what is ordinarily understood by altruism. “I cannot perceive how the psychic can be comprehended so negatively—as rising from a deficiency and preserved by fictitious devices” (p. 159). “So I would take my stand just where I did at the start, beside Freud’s Ucs. and beside the causal explanations which lead me to find his explorations in the depth... more conclusive than all brooding about them” (p. 160).
To this Adler replied on August 16: "I would reproach you above all for being so unwary." Then he went on: "There is a hitch in your analogy regarding altruism and egoism. I have maintained plainly enough that the nervous person has just that kind of sexuality and that degree of libido needed to rescue his feeling of individuality [self-esteem]. And the same holds for his verbal modes of expression. . . . They are . . . but constructs which the body creates as it presses to expand. That is how I can account for the libidinal transformations and even the teleological significance of the libido itself. But the expansive tendency can be accounted for on the basis of the libido only if the libido itself is assumed to have a yen for expansion" (pp. 160-161).

This is followed by a formulation which summarizes rather well Adler's position as of this period. "Psyche is a name for the life-potentiality of an inferior creature. And it comprises the aggressive instinct, the tendency toward expansion, and a reaching out for that which is more highly valued culturally—the male" (p. 161).

With regard to Freud's "causal explanations" which Lou Andreas-Salome accepted as facts he had discovered, Adler commented: "Every single patient of mine makes discoveries of that sort" (p. 161), meaning he "discovers" "objective" causes in the past to explain his difficulties, thus escaping responsibility for his actions and preserving a clean conscience. But such explanations are fictions or devices, and "Freud has taken his device for a reality. . . . And now perforce he invents more fictions to cover up his deficiencies" (p. 161).

With all that went a certain tone of bitterness in Adler. "Why is it that that school [Freud's] attempts to treat our views as common property, whereas we have always insisted on the errors of their opinions? . . . To me this is all proof that Freud's school does not believe in its own doctrines and really only wants to safeguard its investment" (p. 160). "My opinions might be wrong! But is that a good enough reason to steal them too?" (p. 161).

The author's discussion with Adler regarding his interest in Marx is also worth mentioning, because our knowledge of this topic is still sketchy and the account found here appears to be valid, in the light of other information we have. Thus we find: "Conversing with Adler I was much enlightened by the history of his development as a student of Marx, primarily interested in economics and philosophic speculation. Just as with the proletariat, social utopianism is supported on the basis of envy and hate, so, in Adler's view of the child, the exalted utopian ideal of personality arises on the basis of social comparison. Hence his rationalistic milieu therapy—and between it and the doctrine of organ inferiority . . ., the Freudian Ucs. falls to the ground—as it were between bodily defects and the formation of ideals" (p. 42).

In view of her personality, it is not surprising that Lou Andreas-Salome favored Freud. Even from her first meeting with Adler she went away with the notation, "To me every neurosis appears to be mutual conflict between ego and sexuality" (pp. 34-35). Accordingly she arrived at the final conclusion, "Freud is right" (p. 132). But the translator raises the question "whether she has anything to offer the student of psychoanalysis—anything beyond the history of an exceptional personality . . . or is she to be thought of only as one of our hypothetical patients?" (p. 25).

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HEINZ L. ANSBACHER
Repression: Observation or Inference?


This book was stimulated by an academic psychologist's keen puzzlement about the gap between the experimental laboratory and the clinic, focussed around the key concept of repression. While the contents of the book itself would make excellent reading requirement for all graduate students in psychology, the unusual effort of the author to straddle the worlds of controlled research and viable practice is even more admirable.

The author's first step was to seek the thread of implication and consistency in Freud's writings. Freud's vacillations between usage of repression in a specific and a generic sense are handled by dividing defenses into repressive and non-repressive reactions. For Freud defense came "to refer to all forms of ego-protection against dangerous inner impulses" (p. 29). Inhibitions of emotion and behavior, sometimes seen as part of the repression concept, are included by Madison among the nonrepressive reactions. So are successful defenses, which should be of particular interest to the Adlerian; sublimation, destruction in the id, condemnation, and absorption are the specific successful mechanisms discussed. One quotation seems to reflect the author's feelings on this topic, "Judgmental repudiation or condemnation appears to be the main mechanism of cure in therapy . . . . It is an interesting fact that this rational intellectual mechanism is, in a theory of psychology that is widely considered to be a psychology of unreason, the ultimate means by which man's irrationality is overcome" (p. 83).

The laboratory analogues of academic psychologists are described as overly concerned with motivated amnesia of nonsense syllables as the hallmark of repression. A more appropriate alternative is seen in studying the patient's content of consciousness through time in the psychotherapy paradigm. Psychologists often fail in their studies to note the difference in quality and intensity of the motives they utilize. Psychoanalysts are traditionally concerned with the repression of primal motives and various associative connections, whereas experimenters are not. In the spirit of the optimist psychologist, everything which exists in theory should be measurable by specifying correspondence rules which link the concepts to real events expressed in an observational language. Madison compares repression and defense with the physical concept of heat, doing so in theoretical and observational languages (types of indicators and specific techniques for quantification). Five subtypes of resistance, the repressive defenses, affect inhibition, ego restriction, primal repression, and successful defenses, are handled in this fashion.

Some of the author's suggestions for measurement, in his chapter on "Observational Language," have been attempted by others. A few are quite fanciful in our stage of institution fixations, e.g., "A 'real' estimate of the therapist could be derived from one-way screen observations of the therapist in action by experts . . . ." (p. 160). Madison makes no attempt to discuss "resistance due to secondary gain of illness" because it does not "readily suggest many possible observational procedures" (p. 161). Perhaps an Adlerian view would have been of assistance here. The author ends this chapter with the words: "Successful defense appears
to be a purely theoretical concept in Freud's scheme; there are no observational correlates that would indicate the presence of successful defense" (p. 179). An interesting riddle is how does a hospitalized patient ever convince a psychoanalytically-oriented staff member of his recovery?

The author saves his most direct attack for the last. The sexual translation rules (via the dream work tools of omissions, condensations, and symbolisms) work against observational measurements. "One has to distinguish between real sex, which is a motivation that is stagable in an observation language, and translation-rule sex [inferred sex], which is not" (p. 196). "At any point where the translation rules have to be used, Freud's theory becomes unstagable in an observational language" (p. 195). "Insofar as analysts only infer the Oedipus complex...it is...not measurable even in principle" (p. 190).

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WALTER E. O'CONNELL

A NOTE OF HOPE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS


As an Adlerian, one finds much to appreciate in this latest book by Karl Menninger and two co-workers, even though one cannot help feeling baffled that it is hailed as "a new, unitary concept of mental health and illness."

The Vital Balance offers a holistic view of the human being. The individual is seen as a unit in his social group which is, in turn, a part of other social groups. Each person is said to have specific physical, chemical and psychological equipment with which he interacts with other individuals in his society. When he becomes a mental patient, it is not because he is afflicted with certain diseases. Rather, he is a human being, who, because of excessive internal or external stress, is "obliged to make awkward and expensive maneuvers to maintain himself. His reactions are intended to make the best of a bad situation, and at the same time, forestall a worse one; to insure survival even at the cost of suffering a social disaster." In other words, mental illness "is in large part what the victim has done with the world and himself".

Diagnosis, then, is seen, not as a necessary procedure for identifying classical syndromes in the traditional manner. Instead, the authors assert that mental states "are all variant appearances of one stage of one process, a process continuous with the phenomenon of ordinary everyday human living." Diagnosis becomes a method of understanding the way in which a patient has been taken with a disability, namely, just how the patient is ill, how ill he is, how he became ill, and how his illness serves him.

In treatment, the guiding rationale of the authors is explained as follows: "The establishment or re-establishment of relationships with fellow human beings is the basic architecture of normal life; hence, it is not only the index of recovery but one of the methods of recovery, one of the forces making for recovery."

The authors approach the whole problem of mental illness with an optimism that is firmly sustained by their conviction that the human psyche contains con-
This is a major work by a famous psychiatrist and two co-workers which is being acclaimed by some as a breakthrough in medical and psychiatric thinking. However, in the interest of historical accuracy one must point out that these views are not entirely new. It is regrettable that the authors have not themselves acknowledged this. Alfred Adler, for one, has previously paralleled some of these “new” formulations, as for instance, with his holistic approach, his concepts of the style of life, the creative power of the individual in influencing the events of his personal destiny, and the vital role of social feeling in the development and maintenance of mental health, to name but a few.

The authors view the use of drugs as having some merit in relieving anxiety, but as possibly having destructive effects when they lull both patient and doctor into a false sense that all is as well as can be. Not being a psychiatrist, drug prescription is not my responsibility. However, my experience as a therapist in a clinical setting includes drug treatment for the purpose of making the patient more amenable to psychotherapy. We agree with Menninger that it is essential, in addition to prescribing pills, that we spur the sufferer into reaching out to another human being for help in working out a constructive resolution of his problems.

Menninger’s insistence that the old conventional method of “labelling” the mentally ill is sterile and not applicable to the thousands of people who crowd the physicians’ offices today certainly requires consideration if the labelling is done automatically and rigidly. However, in a clinic, we do find that the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders proves useful in both diagnosis and treatment. There is a sufficient variety of interpretations and nuances contained within these diagnostic terms to make possible creative treatment that fits the specific patient. The advantage of the official terminology is that it provides the team of psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker with an effective and essential “shorthand” in communicating with each other. Incidentally, the authors, while rejecting the traditional jargon, construct a new one which, in their own saying, “takes a lot of words to define what they really think.”

We cannot agree enough with Menninger’s emphasis on the need of hope in the therapist’s approach to his patient. As we know, it can make the difference between recovery and failure in more instances than are dreamed of in the philosophy of too many contemporary psychoanalysts.

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A CLASSIC ON PSYCHOPATHY


This classic work was first published in 1941, and in new editions in 1950, 1955, and now in a fourth edition issued in 1964. It was when it first appeared and it still is the best book ever written on the psychopathic personality, and the most
BOOK REVIEWS

literate. It is, indeed, the outstanding work that modern American psychiatry, or shall we say, that a modern American psychiatrist, has produced. It is a work of art as well as of science.

The book reads like a novel, and in addition to this one of its great charms is its modesty and frank avowal of the author's inability to offer an effective therapy. The psychopath or sociopath (as some prefer to call him) is a disjecta membra of society. Dr. Cleckley makes a strong plea for a more realistic approach to the problem he represents. Contemporary society simply refuses to acknowledge his existence, until he has committed some serious crime. Even then, whatever it is that ails him tends to be wholly disregarded, and his crime punished. 'Tis a mad world, my masters, and one has only to read the pages of this book, and the illuminating case reports they contain, to become aware of the frightening number of human automobiles without brakes among us.

For the family with a psychopathic problem, and for the serious student of contemporary society, this is an indispensable volume.

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ASHLEY MONTAGU

ADLERIAN DREAM THEORY


The purpose of this thesis is to give a systematic view of Adler's dream theory, and to show his specific contribution. This is the third thesis on Adler carried out under the direction of Professor J. Nuttin. The previous ones were by Cammaer and by the present writer (reviewed in this Journal, 1960, 16, 218 and 1963, 19, 97-98).

In part one, three chapters give the broader frame in which Adlerian dream theory is to be understood; the basic personality dynamism of striving for superiority or perfection, social interest, and style of life; a brief historical account of Adler's dream theory from his own viewpoint; and, since one cannot overlook Freud in the history of dream theory, the relationship to his position. Adler severely criticized Freud's viewpoint although recognizing him positively as being the first to combine a psychologic and scientific interest in dreams.

Part two deals with the Adlerian dream theory in greater detail. In the first chapter special attention is paid to the integration of dreams with the total personality system. Their meaning is outlined with respect to the personality theory characteristic for the various periods in the development of Individual Psychology. Perhaps one can regret that in the rest of this study, the author does not similarly take more into account the fundamental changes in Individual Psychology in the course of time. It seems to me that this would have contributed to the clarity and exactness of the presentation since citations of very different periods are easily mixed, e.g., those before 1914 and later ones.

In the second chapter the function of the dream mechanism is examined. The main function is one of orientation when, confronted with a life problem, a person's social interest is deficient and he feels threatened in his personal striving. Although
the conditions of waking and dreaming are both motivated by the same striving, and as such are expressions of the same style of life, they can be differentiated in so far as in his dreams the subject is in search of a solution for his problems in which he disregards social interest. The dream is directed by a striving for personal superiority, which is concealed. Thus dreams are essentially self-deceptive, in the same sense as neurritic symptoms. This makes it clear that a dream not only is incomprehensible for the dreamer, but must be so, to accomplish its purpose. This is done through the use of metaphors and images. These bring the dreamer in a state of affect or emotion, create a mood, that is oriented towards problem solving in accordance with the dreamer's life style and not likely with common sense.

No new insights are brought out in this thesis; its value lies in the attempt to systematize what Adler published here and there on this important subject. A bibliography of 94 titles completes the study.

Louvain, Belgium  
Godelieve Verbruysse

BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOKS NOTED

ACKERKNECHT, Lucy K. “Life-meanings” of future teachers: a value study. New York: Phil. Libr., 1964. Pp. xi + 160. $4.00.—420 men and women students in a San Francisco teachers' college wrote unsigned essays, under 500 words, on “The Meaning of Life” and “What Life Means to You.” The essays were given an “impressionistic analysis” and then quantitatively arranged in categories and in relation to data obtained from questionnaires. “Among these future teachers competitiveness and pursuit of material and personal success is lower than customarily thought of ... They are eager to live ... a rich full life with others and not at the expense of others” (p. 152).

BAB, W. The uses of psychology in geriatric ophthalmology. Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1964. Pp. x + 94. $5.00.—The book is written by an ophthalmologist with psychiatric training as a guide to his co-specialists and to general practitioners. A positive approach of suggestions and education is recommended for treatment.

BARUCH, DOROTHY W. One little boy (1952). New York: Dell, 1964. Pp. ix + 242. $1.65 paper.—This is a case history which reads like a TV script: every bit of evidence fits into the final resolution; every quirk of the present is explained by flashbacks to scenes since repressed; the unconscious demons are all routed by recognition and acceptance; and there is a happy ending. It is a story of a “little Hans” set in today's suburbia, enhanced by the addition of the cases of both his parents, each with his own “classical” Oedipal syndrome. The Freudian example is followed also in generalizing to the universal: “All children's intimate thoughts about life and sex and love and hate are basically similar” (p. viii). Even while rejecting the author's approach and interpretations, however, one must appreciate her marked therapeutic, personal skills, which, apparently, are independent of her theory.