EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

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While Existential Psychoanalysis in general, which has developed especially during the last twenty years, is still not well known in the United States, it has had, and continues to have, a wide impact in Europe. A sign of this is the fact that the 4th International Congress of Psychotherapy which will be held in Barcelona in September of this year will have for its main theme "Psychotherapy and Existential Analysis." In view of this, Professor Stern's paper becomes particularly timely.

Sartre's existential psychoanalysis is often regarded as the Parisian apostasy of the classical Viennese psychoanalysis created by Freud. Does this classification resist a closer examination? I doubt it. The question has recently been raised whether the so-called neo-Freudians (Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Franz Alexander etc.) would not more aptly be named neo-Adlerians (2, pp. 16-17). The same question may be raised with respect to Jean-Paul Sartre, and already several years ago I answered it affirmatively in my book *Sartre, his Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (12). In the present article I wish to broaden and elaborate the essential conclusions I reached there on the relations between Sartre's existential psychoanalysis and Adler's Individual Psychology.

When writing, during World War II, his main treatise *Being and Nothingness* (7), Sartre was already acquainted with Alfred Adler's work and referred to it on several occasions—sometimes in agreement with it, but mostly in order to point out differences between Adler's doctrine and his own. A more detailed analysis will show, however, that many of these differences are only apparent, and that Sartre is much more Adlerian than he might know or want to admit.

WHAT IS EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS?

"Empirical psychoanalysis tries to determine the complex, . . . existential psychoanalysis tries to determine the original choice" (7, p. 657). With these words Sartre defines the basic difference between Freud's psychoanalysis, which he calls "empirical," and his own. This does not mean that the French philosopher rejects the concept of complex. He himself introduced two new complexes which he called "Acteon complex" and "Jonah complex." Sartre does not even deny the existence of Freud's Oedipus complex or of Adler's inferiority

complex. In fact, as we shall see, he incorporates the latter in his own doctrine. He only denies that the Oedipus and the inferiority complexes are irreducible, that they constitute ultimate data. According to Sartre, Freud's and Adler's complexes can be traced back to something more fundamental, which is man's original choice, the choice of his being in the world, his attitude toward the world; in short: man's "fundamental project." But with his insistence on this project and its decisive significance for a person's whole behavior Sartre reveals, willy-nilly, the first basic Adlerian strain in his psychology.

While Individual Psychology was created by a practising psychiatrist, existential psychoanalysis is the work of a professional philosopher. It is based on a universal ontology, reflected in innumerable individual varieties. Let us, therefore, at first, remember some of the basic positions of Sartre's existentialist philosophy. Its fundamental thesis is: man's existence—i.e. his being "here" and "now"—precedes his essence, that is his being "something." At the beginning he is not anything. He will become what he has "projected" to become, and thus he will be responsible for what he is. His project expresses his "original choice," the fundamental choice of his being in the world and his attitude toward his fellowmen. Since, according to Sartre, a man *is* his choice, we understand why this philosopher had to establish a new discipline, existential psychoanalysis, which should try to determine man's original choice, his fundamental project, and its individual varieties, which constitute each person in his uniqueness.

Even this very abstract scheme shows that Sartre's position is much closer to Adler than to Freud. What he shares with the founder of Individual Psychology is, among many other ideas, the *finalistic* conception of man, the interpretation of man's life in terms of some basic goals, and the *individualization* of these general human goals in each personality. For both, Adler and Sartre, every man must be understood within the framework of his individuality, but only as a variety of a general human type and his goals.

Return of the Future Toward the Present

Sartre admits a part of his indebtedness to Freud, but rejects the deterministic character of Freud's doctrine. According to the latter, Sartre says, human actions are only ' an effect of the *past*," that is of "causes." And he exclaims: "The dimension of the *future* does not exist for (Freudian) psychoanalysis." Sartre concludes by declaring: ". . . If we adopt the method of (Freud's) psychoanalysis . . . we must

apply it in a reverse way . . . Instead of understanding the considered phenomenon by its past, we conceive the understanding act as a return of the future toward the present" (7, p. 536).

It is astonishing that Sartre presents this reversion as if it were a new feature of his existential psychoanalysis; for thirty years before him Alfred Adler had already achieved this return of the future toward the present, by showing that psychic phenomena cannot be understood by their past, their causes, but only by their anticipated future, as a preparation for some goal, even though the latter may only be fictional.

> Let me observe—Adler wrote—that if I know the goal of a person I know in a general way what will happen . . . If I am acquainted only with the causes, . . . I am aware of nothing that actually takes place in the soul of the man. . . . Every psychic phenomenon, if it is to give us any understanding of a person, can only be grasped and understood if regarded as preparation for some goal . . . . As soon as the goal of a psychic movement or its life plan has been recognized, then we are to assume that all the movements of its constituent parts will coincide with both the goal and the life plan . . . The properly understood part-movements must, when combined, give the integral life plan and final goal. Consequently, we insist that, without worrying about tendencies, milieu, and experiences, all psychical powers are under the control of a directive idea and all expressions of emotion, feeling, thinking, willing, acting, and dreaming, as well as psycho-pathological phenomena, are permeated by one unified life plan (1, pp. 3-6).

There is no doubt that Sartre's original choice is the counterpart of Adler's goal, and Sartre's fundamental project is the replica of Adler's life plan. And goal and life plan imply the dimension of the future, just as do original choice and fundamental project. Adler was little interested in the causes of certain mental illnesses, but very much in the purposes which the patient wished to achieve in "arranging" his symptoms. And it was from the viewpoint of the future, anticipated by the patient in his goal, that Adler explained the patient's present. This is exactly the "return of the future toward the present" which, according to Sartre, constitutes the main difference between his own and Freud's psychoanalysis.

If Sartre insists that men's project may be changed, Adler affirmed the same with regard to the life plan, when he wrote: "The psychotherapeutic treatment has for its object to show the patient . . . that he can change his life plan" (1, p. 50).

UNIFICATION OF THE PERSONALITY

We have seen that Adler paid little attention to "tendencies, milieu, and experiences," because not these data but the individual life plan dominates the psychical powers. Similarly, Sartre rejects

"heredity, education, milieu, physiological constitution" as the "great explanatory idols of our epoch" (7, p. 645) and finally states: "The irreducible unification which we must find . . . is the unification by an original project" (7, p. 648). How could he declare that one "never tries" to offer us such an irreducible unifying principle of the personality (7, p. 647) in view of the fact that Adler wrote thirty years before him these categorical words? "The goal of the mental life of man becomes its governing principle, its *causa finalis*. Here we have the root of the unity of the personality, the individuality" (2, p. 94). Quotations of this kind from Adler's works could be multiplied.

As soon as goal and life plan, choice and project, become the basic unifying factors of the personality and the explanatory principles of its behavior, the concept of character loses much of its importance. It is no longer the unchangeable, permanent "coining" or "stamping" which was the original meaning of the Greek word character. Referring to the variety of personalities, Adler declared: "Not their origin but their end, their ultimate goal, constitutes their individual character . . . The individual . . . wears the character traits demanded by his fictional goal, just as the character mask (*persona*) of the ancient actor had to fit the finale of the tragedy" (2, p. 94).

Sartre expresses the same idea more radically, when he declares: "There are no characters at all, there is only a project of oneself" (7, p. 637).

SARTRE'S THREE MODES OF BEING

In Sartre's philosophy we can distinguish three basic modes of being: being-in-itself, being-for-itself, and being-for-others.

The being-in-itself is that of the inanimate objects, a being which always coincides with itself, the only one which is truly subjected to the principle of identity.

The being-for-itself is that of human consciousness. It is always creating itself, becoming, developing, a perpetual projecting toward its possibilities, toward a future not yet realized. Thus it never coincides with itself and escapes the principle of identity. Sartre expresses this idea by saying: "Human reality (i.e., man) must not be necessarily what he is and can be what he is not . . . He posits . . an ideal of being" (7, p. 98). Sartre continues by explaining that this individual which I am not and which I want to be, this ideal of myself, is only "an idea for other people and for myself . . . I can only play at being it, that is to say I can only imagine that I am it" (7, pp. 99-100).

It seems to me that this Sartrean "ideal of being" has very much in common with Adler's "self-ideal" or "personality ideal." Both are placed beyond reality, both are projected toward the future as guiding ideas, both have a unifying function within the personality, both are compensations for a personal deficiency (*Mangel* in Adler, *manque* in Sartre) from which the individual is suffering. And if Sartre calls this ideal imaginary and affirms that one can "only play at being it," Adler, the disciple of Vaihinger, called it "fictional," which means the same. Thus the being-for-itself, as far as its psychological side is concerned, is closely related to Adler's conceptions. Ontologically, it has still other implications, but their analysis would go beyond the framework of this article.

Let us now examine the main aspect of Sartre's third modality of being, which he calls being-for-others. At first the other person I see appears to me as a mere being-in-itself, a phenomenon of nature, no different from all the inanimate objects I perceive around myself. It is through his "gaze" that the other person reveals himself to me as a being-for-itself, as a subject, a consciousness, a free project of itself, able to transcend itself and to transcend all given data toward its own possibilities, its own ends. But this means also that by his gaze this other person can transcend me and change me from a being-for-itself into a being-in-itself, from a free project into a determined thing, into a solidified object—as *I* can change *him* by *my* gaze. "The people I *see* are indeed congealed by me into objects, I am in relation to them what other people are in relation to me" (7, p. 324).

What Sartre seems to mean by this interesting observation is the following: the subject, or being-for-itself, *is* not, since it is always in the making, always becoming. But when I am looking at the other person, that is, when I am judging him, I do not judge him as far as he is becoming—since I cannot know his possibilities—but as far as he *is*, at the very moment of my judgment. By perpetuating this moment of his evolution I am changing him into an object which coincides with itself.

EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF INFERIORITY

Applying the distinction of these modalities to the interpretation of inferiority, Sartre thinks that a person's inferiority feeling is only the projection of his initial plan of failure. One who suffers from inferiority has chosen to be the executioner of himself. A chosen humiliation, like masochism, for instance, can be used as a tool for delivering

oneself from one's existence as a being-for-itself with all the responsibilities it entails. An inferiority feeling can be an initially chosen project to get rid of one's own anxiety-inspiring freedom—especially in the choice of values—for the benefit of other people. In choosing inferiority, our project may be to have our being-for-itself entirely absorbed by our being-for-others. The inferiority we feel may be the chosen tool to make us similar to a thing, a being-in-itself, free from responsibility.

However, the fact that a man chooses inferiority does not mean that he is content with the *aurea mediocritas*, for in so choosing he creates the revolt and despair which reveal that inferiority. I may, says Sartre, for instance, persist in doing a certain type of work because I am inferior to the task, while in another domain I would be able to do a satisfactory job. A man may choose a fruitless endeavor *because* it is fruitless, perhaps because he prefers to be the last one rather than to disappear in the crowd. "But it is clear that I can choose as my field of action the domain in which I am inferior only if that choice implies the deliberate will to be superior" (7, p. 551).

The man who chooses to be an inferior artist, Sartre says, necessarily chooses to want to be a great artist; otherwise the inferiority would not be felt or recognized.

This short outline of Sartre's interpretation of the inferiority complex shows how close he is to Adler, who wrote, for example: "A thoroughgoing study has taught us that we can best understand the manifold and diverse movements of the psyche as soon as our most general presupposition, that the psyche has as its objective the goal of superiority, is recognized" (1, p. 7).

This basic idea of Adler is expressed in various ways all over his work. "We should not be astonished," he said, for example, "if in the cases where we see an inferiority (feeling) complex, we find a superiority complex more or less hidden" (2, p. 259). That is also what Sartre tried to show. He recognizes, indeed, that at least this part of his existential psychoanalysis has been influenced by Adler, by declaring:

Thus, as one sees, our analysis allows us to accept the two levels where Adler locates the complex of inferiority: like he does, we admit a fundamental recognition of this inferiority, and like he does, we admit a vague, ill-balanced development of works and affirmations, destined to compensate or to mask this deep feeling (7, p. 552).

SARTRE'S POLEMICS AGAINST ADLER

Sartre raises, however, several objections against the way in which—according to his interpretation—Adler conceived the feeling

of inferiority. Sartre refuses to consider the recognition of inferiority as unconscious and totally rejects the whole concept of the unconscious. Not only is the complex of inferiority known but chosen. He who chooses inferiority and maintains it, is of "bad faith," Sartre declares, for he is running away from the acknowledgement of the true aims he has chosen; he tries to hide them from himself in order to escape the responsibility for his choice. "It seems to us", Sartre writes, "that the concept of bad faith . . . should replace those of censorship, repression, and the unconscious, which Adler uses" (7, p. 552).

But Adler's Individual Psychology does not use the concept of censorship, which is a Freudian concept.

As for the idea of repression, Adler practically discarded it. As early as 1911 Adler criticized Freud for using such unclarified constructs as repression and for considering it as the essential and preliminary condition for the development of symptoms. In fact, Adler replaced repression almost entirely by the "safeguarding tendencies" of the self. According to Ansbacher, "Adler accepted repression, if at all, only as one of the many safeguarding devices" (2, p. 264).

As for the unconscious, Sartre is closer to Adler than he realizes. He writes, for instance: "We do not establish between the two levels considered, the difference between the unconscious and the conscious, but the one which separates the non-reflective fundamental consciousness from reflective consciousness . . ." (7, p. 552). This means that, although the fundamental project is lived by the subject consciously, the latter does not understand it. The non-reflective consciousness "is penetrated by a great light without being able to express what that light enlightens," that is to say "to fix it by concepts" (7, p. 658). Now, Adler meant almost the same when he wrote:

Man knows more than he understands . . . . Man understands nothing about his goal but still he pursues it . . . The unconscious is nothing other than that which we have been unable to formulate in clear concepts . . . It is not a matter of concepts hiding away in some unconscious or subconscious recesses of our minds, but of parts of our consciousness, the significance of which we have not fully understood. We cannot oppose "consciousness" to "unconsciousness" as if they were two antagonistic halves of an individual's existence (2, pp. 232-233).

This is certainly not the language of the radical advocate of the unconscious, as Sartre tried to paint Adler when he insisted, against Adler, on the unity of consciousness which does not admit a split into a conscious and an unconscious part (7, p. 552).

In order to point out another basic difference between his and Adler's doctrine, Sartre insists that inferiority is not only conscious but

also chosen. As a choice it is a manifestation of freedom. Sartre writes: "Thus the inferiority complex is a free and total project of myself as inferior to the other person, it is the manner in which I choose to take upon myself my being-for-others, the free solution I give to the existence of the other person, that insuperable scandal" (7, p. 537). Now, since Adler did not affirm the unconscious character of our inferiority feeling and only, like Sartre, denied that the psyche understands its aim and means to overcome it, and since he was not an advocate of causal determinism in psychology, he did not deny that inferiority was, in a way, our free choice. Thus Adler wrote, for example:

In psychology we cannot speak of causality or determinism . . . Man makes one thing the cause and another thing the effect, and then joins the two. Much appears as causally determined although causality was only attributed to it. This goes so far that even organ inferiorities are effective only to the extent that we wish. Man can raise these inferiorities to rank and dignity; he can make them a cause (2, p. 91).

Freedom and Responsibility

In psychology, Adler thought, there is only inner causation. Philosophically speaking, the latter is identical with freedom, according to the classic definition given by Spinoza.[1] It is this freedom which is the main concept of existential psychoanalysis. Its corollary is responsibility; for if, as Sartre's existentialism teaches, man is the product of his free choice, he is responsible for what he is. Speaking of low characters, Sartre writes:

If, like Zola, we would declare that they are that way because of heredity, because of the action of the milieu, of society, because of an organic or psychological determinism, they would be tranquillized and would say: well, we are that way, nobody can do anything about it. But when the existentialist describes a coward he says that this coward is responsible for his cowardice (10, p. 59).

The same holds for inferiority. Since it is his choice, a man is responsible for it. To be sure, inferiority manifests itself in failures, but for that very reason "it is nothing but the organized totality of my attitudes of failures, as a projected plan . . ." (7, p. 537).

Now, this whole existentialist doctrine of planned failure and of the tendency to ascribe all personal shortcomings to heredity and other factors beyond control, in order to escape responsibility, is exactly what Adler taught. "The life plan of the neurotic demands categor-

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[1]*Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur* (That thing is called free which exists out of the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone). Spinoza, *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, pars prima, Defin. VII.*

ically that if he fails, it should be through someone else's fault, and that he should be freed from personal responsibility" (2, p. 270). This sounds as if it were a quotation from Sartre, but it was written by Adler, at a time when such a thing as existential psychoanalysis did not exist. And when Adler insisted that the patient "is intensifying his feeling of inferiority and yet freeing himself from responsibility by attributing this inferiority to heredity, the faults of parents, or other factors" (1, p. 104), he expressed an idea which, many years later, was taken up by Sartre, in his doctrine of bad faith.

In this connection Sartre introduces the concept of "distance."

> The choice of inferiority implies the persevering realization of a distance between the goal set by our will and the goal reached. The artist who wants to be great and chooses for himself inferiority, intentionally maintains that distance: like Penelope, he destroys during the night what he has done during the day (7, pp. 551-552).

This is certainly a very penetrating observation, but as we stated already in our book (12), Adler wrote a whole study on "The Problem of Distance" in which he insisted that the neurotic "at this particular stage is certain to interpose a distance between himself and the expected action or decision" (2, p. 274). Adler even used the example of Penelope. But he did all this in 1914, and Sartre, in 1943.

Thus we see that existential psychoanalysis incorporated, openly or in a hidden way, some of the most important conquests of Individual Psychology.

INDIVIDUALIZATION OF GENERAL HUMAN GOALS

At the beginning of our study we said that according to both Adler and Sartre, man must be understood within the framework of his individuality, but only as a variety of general human strivings. Meanwhile it became clear that for Adler individuality is constituted by goal and life plan and for Sartre by original choice and fundamental project. But what are the general human goals and projects of which the individual ones are only varieties? For Adler they are superiority, as far as the neurotic is concerned, and perfection, in the case of normal persons. He formulated this thesis by saying: "The neurotic strives toward personal superiority and, in doing so, expects a contribution from the group in which he lives, while the normal individual strives toward the perfection which benefits all" (2, p. 114).

For Sartre, man's general fundamental project is to become God. Being not what he is, man, the being-for-itself, is incomplete. We already know that human consciousness never coincides with itself;

that it never *is*, but is always becoming. Now, Sartre thinks that for this reason man has the desire—or better, *is* the desire—to have at the same time the coincidence with itself of the inanimate world, called being-in-itself, and the translucidity of consciousness, called being-for-itself. In short, man's fundamental project is to become an "in-itself-for-itself" (Hegel's "*an-und-fuer-sich*"), a self-conscious cosmos which would be the foundation of its own being, by the consciousness it attains of itself. Obviously this ideal is beyond human possibilities, and, in fact, this *ens causa sui* has always been identified with God. Therefore Sartre states: "To be a man means to endeavor to be God . . . Man is, fundamentally, the desire to be God" (7, pp. 653-654). Malraux gave the same definition of man (4, p. 271).

This philosophical doctrine also has its counterpart in Individual Psychology. The fundamental project of becoming God is born out of a lack, an imperfection from which the being-for-itself is suffering. In uniting with the being-in-itself it would become completed and perfected, also in an axiological sense. Adler, who believed that the normal man strives for perfection, considered his own doctrine as an extension of Pierre Janet's work with its emphasis on the feeling of incompleteness (2, p. 114). Besides, Adler declared that "we can find in all goals one common factor: striving to be godlike." While in normal individuals this goal is a useful fiction (in Vaihinger's sense), it is a dogma for the schizophrenic (2, pp. 246-247, 314-315). For both Adler and Sartre, God is "completion-promising" (2, p. 461); for both, he is not a reality but an idea.

Now, the individualization of the general human project—to complete his being-for-itself by the being-in-itself and so to become godlike—is the most original part of existential psychoanalysis. Sartre sees in each man's empirical desires a symbolization of his personal way of achieving that fundamental and general human project. The way in which a man tries in his concrete, empirical desires to realize the fundamental human project of becoming God, characterizes and even creates his personality. That fundamental desire expresses concretely in the world and in a person's definite situation an abstract structure, which is the general reality of man *in* a person. This allows existential psychoanalysis to state that there is a general human reality, in addition to non-comparable individualities. And freedom is expressed in the innumerable concrete forms in which humans manifest their choice of being and try to realize their being-in-itself-for-itself. Every concrete desire, that of eating, sleeping, creating a work

of art, or helping other people, expresses the personal project of a man to achieve his being-in-itself-for-itself, and thus characterizes, in an individual concretion, his whole personality. This is one of the basic ideas of existential psychoanalysis.

MAN, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL

Adler's Individual Psychology refuses to consider the individual as an "isolated human being" and regards him as embedded in the larger whole of society. He shares this idea with the leading existentialists. The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset who, as I have tried to show elsewhere (13), can, in many respects, be considered an existentialist, coined in 1914 the concise formula, "I am I and my circumstance" (6, p. 322), that is the whole of geographical, historical, national and social conditions of the sector of the world into which I was born. This forms, so to speak, the other half of my personality. Ortega also defined existence as "to live together" (5, p. 176). Years later Heidegger defined existence as "being-in-the-world," and as "being-together-with-others" (3, pp. 53, 118, etc.). Sartre follows Heidegger in considering concrete man as "man in the world" (7, p. 38). So far the agreement between the existentialists and Adler seems perfect.

However, Adler went far beyond the idea of the social embeddedness of man when he proclaimed that "Individual Psychology demands the unconditional reduction of striving for power and the development of social interest" (2, p. 114). Like Durkheim, he believed in the absolute truth of society. The development of social interest in the individual was to him a moral, a pedagogic, and a therapeutic necessity. The feeling of being useful to society by our contribution to its welfare is, according to Adler, also the only way to overcome our feeling of inferiority, our neurotic self-centeredness, our maladjustment.

This basic idea of Adler's Individual Psychology is also paralleled by certain conceptions of the existentialists. Ortega was convinced that the moral disintegration of Europe can only be prevented if the European nations become engaged in a great and inspiring project of a common collective future. Martin Buber insisted on man's moral need of being accepted by his fellowmen, etc.

How about Sartre? Personally, he has always shown a great deal of social interest. His philosophy and psychoanalysis do, however, not offer many elements for social interest, for they insist strongly on

"the impossibility for man to overcome human subjectivity." Sartre even designates this insight as "the deep meaning of existentialism" (10, p. 25). This total subjectivity is the source of anxiety, as soon as the individual recognizes his freedom in the choice of values. For, according to existentialism, the essences are not given before the existents, but after them. This means that in evaluating we are not determined by any previously given essence or norm, by anything outside ourselves. Besides, if God does not exist, man does not have presented to him any values or hierarchies of values to guide him, to legitimize his conduct, or to justify his preferences and repulsions. Consequently, each man has to choose in complete aloneness the ways of his conduct and the significance he will ascribe to things, with the entire responsibility for his choice of these values resting on his shoulders. Without values of universal validity, guaranteed by the authority of a supra-human being, there is no universally binding ethics. Thus each man has to act without a universal ethics to back him up: he has to act on his own responsibility, without excuse or justification, in complete solitude and dreadful freedom. It is by "ethical anxiety," Sartre says (7, p. 75), that man becomes conscious of his freedom.

But are there no transsubjective values even for the atheist? Did not Durkheim show us that in society the individuals find outside themselves a pre-established hierarchy of values which is not their work and to which they are forced to conform? Sartre would not deny it, but he rejects social values just as he rejects religious values—both in the name of the individual's freedom of choice which would be hampered by any kind of constituted, ready-made values (11, pp. 13-14). A critique of this point of view was presented elsewhere (12, chapts. ix and x).

As the source of all values, freedom is the highest of all values, although it can only be bought at the price of anxiety. Sartre declared on several occasions "we are condemned to be free" (7, p. 515; 8, p. 249; 10, p. 37). Yet, the ideal of the "authentic" man presented by his existential psychoanalysis is that of one who recognizes and accepts his freedom, in spite of all the terrifying anxiety it entails. This ideal is most impressively incarnated in the character of Orestes in Sartre's powerful tragedy *The Flies*.

In my book (12) I came to the conclusion that, while Freud's empirical psychoanalysis tries to deliver us from anxiety, Sartre's existential psychoanalysis tries to give us anxiety, the anxiety of an authentic life. Consequently, existential psychoanalysis is actually not a psycho-

therapy, but a moral therapy, which tries to cure man from the infantile disease of unauthenticity and lead him to the age of reason of maturity, where he can stand alone, able to assume his freedom and the responsibilities it implies.

At the end of World War II Sartre depicted the image of a man who has reached that age of reason in the following words: "War leaves man naked, without illusions, abandoned to his own forces and having finally understood that he can rely only on himself"(9, p. 167).

And yet, Sartre's existentialism is not an anti-social doctrine. It preaches engagement in social action, according to the formula "it is not necessary to hope in order to act." In this sense it inspired the men of the French Resistance, by teaching them that freedom consists in surpassing and transcending any given situation, that man is not a thing, a being-in-itself, entirely subjected to the "facticity" of a historical condition. Man is rather a being-for-itself, who, as long as he exists, can project himself toward an open future. And finally, Sartre's doctrine taught the young underground fighters, that in choosing freedom for himself, each of them chose the freedom of all Frenchmen, and of all men.

Thus, Sartre's existentialism also recognizes the truth that engagement in social action is the only means of freeing the individual, to a certain extent, from the narrow limits of his subjectivity. Of this deep insight Alfred Adler has been one of the greatest pioneers.

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