response which the first dynamic psychiatry found in literature and philosophy, from Balzac and E. T. A. Hoffmann to Nietzsche and Maupassant. But its sudden rise to academic respectability after 1880 was followed by an equally sudden decline around 1900.

Ellenberger then describes in detail the political, scientific, social, and cultural milieu of the fin de siècle in which a new dynamic psychiatry arose. He points especially to the enormous influence of Nietzsche, the traces of whom are also clearly visible in Freud, Adler, and Jung.

The interest in sex was widespread in the reportedly prudish Victorian milieu, and reached a climax in the works of Weininger and Krafft-Ebing. Sexual deviations were frequently explained psychogetenically, and traced to childhood experiences. There was also widespread interest in dreams as shown in the works of Strümpell and Volkelt which appeared in the 1870s, or the works of Popper and Delage in the 1890s. There was also much concern with the unconscious, not only by the philosophers Schopenhauer and von Hartmann but also such experimentalists as Fechner, Chevreul, and Galton.

Only against this background does the appearance of “the four greats” of dynamic psychiatry—Janet, Freud, Adler, and Jung—to whom two-thirds of the book are devoted, become intelligible.

It is one of the great merits of Ellenberger finally to have saved from complete and undeserved oblivion the data on Pierre Janet (1859-1947). Janet was originally a professor of philosophy but was from the start interested in psychology. His Habilitationsschrift on “Psychological Automatisms” (1889) deals primarily with observations of psychopaths under hypnosis and reports on the first cases of “psychological analysis” in which he “dissolved” in hypnosis “unconscious fixed ideas.” Then Janet studied medicine, became a practicing Neroenarzt in Paris, and professor of psychology at the Collège de France from 1902-1935. The most important ideas which Janet developed are the concepts of psychaschienia, nervous tension and energy, and psychotherapy as “increase in psychic income, reduction in expenditures, and liquidation of debts.”

Ellenberger attempts to explain why Janet, so famous until the first World War, has been so thoroughly forgotten. We believe one of the main reasons to be that Janet not only considered himself a scientist, but also acted accordingly, i.e., he did not consider it necessary to found a sect, since the right ideas will prevail in science without these.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) began his medical studies in 1873. Originally a neuroanatomist he became a practicing neurologist after 1882. In 1885 he became a Privatdozent and went on a grant for several months to Charcot in Paris. In 1889 he went to Bernheim in Nancy. During this period he gradually developed from a somaticist to a psychotherapist. Freud’s life, according to Ellenberger, is surrounded by legends, and he analyzes on the basis of documents one of these in detail, Freud’s appearance before the Society of Physicians in Vienna in 1886. In 1893 Freud published with Breuer a preliminary communication on the therapy of hysteria which, under the name of catharsis, recommended analytic therapy under hypnosis, which had been described already by Janet. In 1895 he published the book on hysteria with Breuer—and broke with him. Breuer was an outstanding physiologist and physician and an unusually peaceful, harmonious person.
In the following years Freud developed his system which, by the name of psychoanalysis, became world-famous—to no small degree because of his great talent as a writer. During these years he suffered from a neurosis, as is easily seen from his *Dream Interpretation* (1899). Ellenberger gives much attention to this “creative illness,” examples of which can also be observed in Fechner and Jung, and are a part of the normal development as a healer among shamans in South Africa and Siberia.

The isolation and hostility to which Freud considered himself exposed around this time were obviously largely creations of his imagination. I should like to trace primarily to this trait Freud’s feeling of being isolated as a Jew, although he did become professor. Neither Breuer nor Adler, to whom a career like Freud’s was denied, had such feelings. Only long after the publication of the reputedly shocking sexual theory can a growing opposition against Freud and his very aggressive pupils be objectively determined.

Ellenberger is justified in investigating the problem of the sources of Freud’s theory. Already his theory of hysteria contains considerable elements from Breuer, Charcot, Herbart, Benedikt, etc. Similar lists of ancestors could be made for the libido theory, symbolism, or the so-called cultural writings. Ellenberger expresses himself very tactfully when he says, “much of that which is attributed to Freud was at the time diffusely existing thinking, and his role was to crystallize these ideas and to give them an original form.”

It is quite grotesque that Freud, who almost never gave his own sources, was so oversensitive toward so-called plagiarism. Ellenberger’s lists of ancestors are, in spite of their length, admittedly incomplete. Thus the unquestionable relationship of Jackson’s neurological theory of three planes to Freud’s pyramid of super-ego, ego, and id, is not mentioned as Ellenberger is altogether less concerned with the connections between Freud and medicine proper.

*Alfred Adler* (1870-1937) also spent the larger part of his life in Vienna. In 1932 he had to emigrate to the United States. He completed his medical studies in 1895, and established himself as a general practitioner. Only 15 years later did he specialize as *Nervenarzt*. In 1897 he married a Russian socialistic student. He was himself at times a member of the Social-Democratic party.

In 1898 he published a *Gesundheitsbuch für das Schneidergewerbe*. This and other articles which he wrote subsequently show that his later basic ideas were already developed when he joined the psychoanalytical circle in 1902. He had already stressed the role of organ inferiority which, later expanded to the inferiority feeling, became for him a main cause of neurosis. He already called attention to the child’s position in the family constellation. Courage and education were for him the chief means of therapy. The latter also points to his subsequent concept of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*.

In 1911 Adler, with his adherents, left the psychoanalytic circle and founded his own society. He could not accept Freud’s libido concept, and replaced it by that of aggression. After 1920 he played a large part in Vienna in public education. Ellenberger rightfully describes him as the ancestor of present-day social psychiatry and group therapy.

This chapter, dealing with Adler, was reviewed in detail in this *Journal*, 1970, 26, pp. 178-182, by the editor.
Adler never made a secret of the numerous influences on him, as for example those of Nietzsche, Smuts, Vaihinger, etc. Ellenberger also points to the numerous writers who before Adler made observations similar to his.

One of the most fascinating sections of the entire book is that on Adler's influence, one which became as enormous as it has become anonymous. Ellenberger shows that Adler has most strongly influenced not only the neo-Freudians, but also the orthodox psychoanalysts and a large number of independent contemporary psychiatrists. Ellenberger says truly, "it would not be easy to find another author from whom so much has been borrowed from all sides without giving the source."

The reasons for this are difficult to determine. Perhaps it has to do with the fact that Adler was a thoroughly rationally oriented person which is also reflected in his system. His goal was understanding human nature, not mystical depth-investigation. Besides, he was not a good writer, and built only a very loose organization.

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), grand-son of a famous professor of medicine in Basle, and son of a minister, already was interested in dreams and spiritism as a student. His doctoral dissertation was concerned with the latter. Already as a student he was critical of science as such. In 1900 he became assistant to Bleuler in Burghölzli, and soon became internationally recognized through further development of Galton's word-association test. In 1906 he became Privatdozent and joined the psychoanalytic movement in which he soon became prominent. In 1909 he rather suddenly limited himself to private practice and started his great mythological studies from which there developed the concepts of the collective unconscious, the archetype, etc. In 1913 he separated from Freud whose fundamental views on libido and Oedipus complex he had never accepted.

He, too, now began a period of self-analysis which lasted approximately until 1919. He himself underwent "individuation" and developed his "analytical psychology" with the views of the anima, the self, etc. It is not an accident that he developed a special inclination toward gnostics who equated their fantasies with knowledge. Ellenberger considers these years of Jung's likewise as a creative illness. In 1921 Jung published his work on psychological types.

In 1933-1934 there is the ugly episode of Jung's approach to the Nazis. Ellenberger attempts to excuse Jung's behavior and statements at this time. If he had rendered the material in question verbatim, it would quickly become evident that Jung's mistake was not "in talking with the Nazis," but in talking like the Nazis. What made matters worse, not better, was that after the German defeat he discovered, on top of that, the "collective guilt of the German people."

In view of the mystic theories of Jung, his psychotherapy was in many respects surprisingly realistic. He even went so far as not to exclude the analytic treatment for a number of cases. He, himself, used the synthetic hermeneutic method. Jung was a strange combination of sober, practical sense and romanticism.

The last third of the book is given to "Dawn and Rise of the New Dynamic Psychiatry." In a gigantic fresco the author once more presents the four systems in the context of the psychiatric total development and the European cultural and political development from 1880-1945.
In all this one must ask oneself how these systems are related to the scientific basic tendency of our culture. Ellerberger also raises this question, but is rather careful and evasive in the answer. The question of the scientific soundness of these theories will not be decided either by the scientific intent of their authors (which was undoubtedly strong in Freud, but only very limited in Jung) nor by the effectiveness and, thus, usefulness of the treatment (many unscientific methods are effective on the basis of suggestion and confession), nor by the fact that some of these ideas will survive because they are in fact empirically founded.

The author himself describes in his final considerations the contrast between modern science and dynamic psychiatry very vividly in the following.

Modern science is a unified body of knowledge in which each separate science has its autonomy and is defined by its object and by its specific methodology; the field of dynamic psychiatry, in contrast, is not clearly delineated, it tends to invade the field of other sciences, if not to revolutionize them. Freud insisted that "the founder of psychoanalysis must be the person best qualified to judge what was psychoanalysis and what was not." Such a point of view is foreign to modern science; nobody would imagine Pasteur, for example, declaring that he was the one to decide what was and what was not bacteriology, whereas it would be perfectly normal if Heidegger would assert that he is the one to define what is and what is not Heideggerian philosophy (p. 895).

The question is actually also answered by the observation which the author makes repeatedly, namely, "Persons analyzed by a psychoanalyst will have 'Freudian' dreams and become conscious of their Oedipus complex, while those analyzed by Jungsians will have archetypical dreams and be confronted with their anima" (p. 891).

I do not share the author's belief that the solution of these contradictions will rest in a cooperation between psychologists and philosophers. I rather believe that it will come through the fact that ultimately this area will also be permeated by science which, although today frequently smiled at, has in the past solved so many "insoluble" problems.

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The Child As Agent


Wenar's book is not only unusually readable and erudite on the highest textbook level; it is also particularly exciting for us because of two, probably not unrelated, aspects: it is a transsectional humanistic approach to developmental psychology, and it makes explicit, important use of Adler's work. We shall deal with these two features in some detail after giving a general appraisal of the book.

The problem of organizing the enormous field from infancy to adulthood is carefully and skillfully handled. Wenar uses the longitudinal approach, and his lines are original and logical, and deserve mention: attachment and affection; initiative, willfulness, and negativism; self-control and judgment; values, ideals, and conscience; cognition, reality contact, and cognitive styles; anxiety, sex,
and aggression; social relations; play and work; constitutional factors and the body. The interrelatedness of these aspects of the personality, in time and function, is often crucial, and is fully dealt with.

The many threads which must be kept in mind—and kept untangled—make any global study extremely difficult, especially when they include not only the varied aspects of the subject matter but also the methods for studying it. The broader one's outlook, the more complicated the task is likely to become. Wenar succeeds in it, not by limiting his scope, but by taking the reader into his confidence. He points out that where there is no consensus among psychologists regarding how a problem should be solved, it is still instructive to examine their disagreements (pp. 1-2); for instance when different observers come up with two incompatible parental images which enhance initiative in the child, there is no reason to assume that only one can be effective (p. 75). He reminds us that similar behaviors can have different meanings when underlying motivations are taken into account" (p. 164), but the same motivation can be expressed in many different forms of behavior; and a single bit of behavior may serve multiple purposes (p. 257).

Wenar gives a simple formula for his presentation: it covers the what, the why, and the how. The what is the developmental picture of a particular area; the why, the heart of his discussion, is the explanation for the development; and the how refers to the varying styles of individual behavior. To answer these questions Wenar "utilizes ideas and evidence from two investigative approaches," the objective and clinical (p. 7), looking in a general way to the clinician for hypotheses, and to the objective investigator for validating evidence. He warns the reader that "conceptually rich terms run the risk of shrinkage when translated into observable behavior" (p. 8), and that, among other shortcomings, the clinician's picture of normal development is largely an extrapolation from non-normal populations" (p. 10). The reader, having been appraised of these attendant difficulties, is better able to appreciate, and evaluate, the findings which Wenar has selected on the basis of advancing our understanding of personality.

Probably the outstanding feature of this work is the perceptivity with which Wenar points out the interaction of factors in determining development, what Dewey and Cantrel would have called the transactional events. For example, the baby's smiling response has always been a duly reported item in his social repertoire. But Wenar is now able to add to this observation certain equally important facts: "... Adults prove malleable pupils, freely setting aside mature behavior in order to engage in any antic necessary to please [the baby ... This shows] how strongly adults are motivated to elicit a positive response from the infant and how pleased they are with their success. The simple fact that delighting the infant is highly rewarding to the adult is one of the strongest guarantees that an attachment will be formed" (p. 18). "While formerly the mother was regarded as the active agent and the infant the passive recipient, the current picture is of the two human beings actively accommodating to one another in the context of the caretaking situation" (p. 26). Further aspects are brought out in the section—a particularly enlightening one—on constitutional factors.

The majority of studies of parent-child relationships . . . show only that a high (or low) degree of X in the parent is associated with a high (or low) degree of Y in the child. Correlations say nothing about causation. If secure parents have
well-adjusted children, we cannot say whether parental security produced the
cad's good adjustment or the child's basic adaptability, good humor, and
resilience reassured the parents that they were doing a good job” (pp. 368-369).
Recent research into the infant's differing reactions to cuddling furnishes material
for the view that “good mothering cannot be conceptualized in terms of maternal
feelings, attitude, and behaviors alone; rather it is a product of the interaction
between mother and infant (pp. 365-366). Thus parental behavior actually
needs to be defined in terms of its effect on the infant (p. 371).

Wenar clarifies many complexities in heredity and environment, and believes
behavior to be the result of both heredity and environment and their interre-
latedness (p. 364). Actually he seems to move in the humanistic direction of
postulating a third determinant, for this book might well be subtitled, “Growth
of the Child-as-agent.” It contains an impressive number of examples and terms
for this feature of development, as in the following:

The child does more than conform to his environment; he is appraising...cal-
culating... He has his own vested interests—pleasures he wants to attain,
activities he wants to pursue—which serve as a counterforce to conformity. He
is a decision maker... He continually strives to integrate his developing self
with... changing requirements (p. 5). The infant begins to take matters in his
own hand... His motivation seems intrinsic (p. 317).

Soon this self-direction becomes reflexive, and thus strengthened, as the
child begins to evolve a concept of himself, he sees himself “as doer” (p. 54);
as a “causal agent” (p. 60); as “the agent of change” (p. 59). He believes that
“his behavior influences outcome,” Bialer (p. 70). Some successful children
challenge themselves to master a next higher step, Sears (p. 71); ultimately the
child becomes his own legislator, and evaluator, Rogers (p. 93); “the four-year-old
has developed the concept of an ‘I’ or a self which acts;” Heckhausen (p. 144).
Even when he joins a gang, “he appraises the role he is carving out for himself,”
Campbell (p. 296).

The child-as-agent is the term which Wenar adopts for coming closest to
describing the fact that the child evaluates, integrates, decides, and manipu-
lates his environment (p. 408). The array of evidence for the child's “taking
matters into his own hand,” for the many forms of self-determination, seem to
us beyond being understood in terms of heredity or environment, or even an
interaction of the two. Wenar is of course aware of this difficulty but he depends
upon multi-determination to resolve it, as we see in the following:

We have [here] another example of behavior which is multi-determined. Be-
cause cultural, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and historical factors are involved
in the adolescent's attitude, a tall gawky, sixteen-year-old girl may be lively and
popular and unself-conscious, while her physically attractive, feminine con-
temporary is humped or hobbled by some inner terror of sexuality. We rarely
deal with inevitabilities in personality development; rather, we deal in successive
probabilities (p. 384).

But is not the self-as-agent, itself, the source of unpredictability and of the
probabilistic outcomes? To us it would seem a better theoretical course to
postulate a clear-cut, third determining force. This, of course, what Adler did,
calling it the “creative power of the child.” One might also call it the self-as-
agent, but whatever its designation, it has advantages over the concept of multi-
determination. It is more specific; it lends itself more directly to the construction
of experimental hypotheses; and, most importantly, through its integral con-
nection with purposiveness it offers concrete leads to influencing the course of development, and to changing deviant behavior. Furthermore, in a general way, a forthright acceptance of even limited self-determination on the part of psychologists is bound to have a beneficial effect on prevailing notions on child care, placing both more responsibility and more trust in the individual self.

Although Wenar does not go quite as far as Adler in this position, he does support Adler on many points throughout the book, and shows an unusually sound understanding of Adlerian theory. The Individual-Psychology-oriented reader, as he makes his rewarding way through these pages, will have the experience—as rare as it is heartwarming—of being among friends. Perhaps the best example of this is in the section on deviant development of initiative, where Wenar gives the Freudian interpretation of the problem, and follows it with the Adlerian. He says in conclusion: “We have chosen Adler as the more fitting clinician to introduce us to deviant behavior, since ‘self-reliant enterprise’ exactly captures the Adlerian spirit of healthy psychological functioning” (p. 82). Further on he describes the development of the pampered and neglected child, saying that these concepts have “a compelling face validity, and [Adler’s] observations concerning undermining initiative have been reasonably well documented by objective studies” (p. 85). Wenar has a fine understanding of social feelings (which he uses in the plural) as innate, not in the sense that they will appear inevitably, but in the sense that the human young is so constituted as to respond vigorously and positively to social stimulation (p. 268). [With a] good “Adlerian” mother . . . and father . . . the child will naturally expand his social interest. More important, he will feel at home with his fellow men. This does not mean that he will be happy or well adjusted in any stereotyped sense; it means that he will be able to participate fully in the experience of being human (p. 82).

In a summary statement on the development of conscience, Wenar says:

It is encouraging to find evidence that socialization . . . can be assimilated and utilized constructively, and, even more important, congruently. Freud thought otherwise . . . . Murphy (1937) and Hoffman (1964) have shown us preschoolers who are well socialized but at the same time spontaneous and well-adjusted. Peck and Havighurst (1960) offer a similar picture of adolescents. All of which would not surprise Adler who . . . would argue that we have every reason to expect personal fulfillment through learning to live with others. The only question is how to go about it (p. 177).

In the section on social relations Wenar brings out the basic incompatibility between Freud and Adler. He points out that Freud overlooked the “vast area of human relations which include friendship, cooperation, status within a group, and that sense of being a member of the human race . . .” and even loving one’s neighbor (p. 234)! Wenar concludes the comparison as follows:

It would seem that Freud has won the day . . . Yet, victories in psychology tend to be temporary. Changes within American society itself, rather than the academic and clinical community, are causing a shift . . . The child no longer waits until he is six to face a group of his peers . . . Those who care for [the preschooler] are being forced to face problems . . . which are Adlerian in spirit rather than Freudian . . . But the case for Adler can be made in more concrete, more human terms. [As one mother put it] “after all, there’s nothing more important for a child to learn than how to get along with another human being.” That is the essence of Adler’s message (pp. 264-265).
Wenar also notes that Adler and Sullivan agree, as opposed to Freud, in believing the "need for human contact does not have to be derived from a biological substrate" (p. 272).

In view of this, it is with some disappointment, and reluctance, that the only critical reaction we have to Wenar's treatment is with reference to Freud. In some cases this was because we were not clear about his stand; in others, we felt we could not accept it.

As an instance of the first case, in his concluding evaluation Wenar maintains that Freud's conception of socialization is generally not valid because of its emphasis on No, Don't, Bad Boy (p. 412). But then we do not understand how, on the next page, Wenar can accept the psychoanalytic approach according to which "Freud clearly regarded the child as an agent whose primary function is to manage the basic antagonism between society and impulses" (p. 413, italics added). Again, when Wenar "presents an outline of the psychosexual stages of development," it is not clear whether he is presenting the psychoanalytic view as such, or also endorsing it as his own (p. 235). He supplies illustrative material of his own; states that "castration anxiety has some basis in reality" (p. 237); and cautions: "Remember, the boy in the phallic stage derives his most intense feelings of pleasure and pride from his penis" (p. 237); but then he explains, "we have dwelt upon castration anxiety not because it is more important than other aspects of psychosexual development, but because it illustrates the basic 'inward' orientation of Freudian theory" (p. 237).

In the conclusion of the section devoted to sex, Wenar does make what seems a pretty definite judgment to which we cannot subscribe: "Regardless of its ultimate validity . . . Freud's psychosexual theory, because of its comprehensiveness, its insights, and its impact on psychology, stands as the single most important contribution to the study of personality development" (p. 240). Is importance to be construed quantitatively, in terms of the number of references to Freud in today's developmental literature? And is comprehensiveness to be considered an important contribution because of introducing Freudian, "rock-bottom" sex into areas which we regard as predominantly cognitive, social and non-erotically affective? Furthermore, granted that ultimate validity is hard to come by, are we therefore to disregard the intrinsic criteria of good theory such as parsimony and self-consistency, let alone justification through usefulness?

Wenar comments knowingly: "Psychologists offer a number of conflicting answers, and constructive dialogue between opposing points of view are rare" (p. 249, italics added). Be that as it may, such a dialogue would be inappropriate here. Wenar recognizes, as we have seen, that one must at times choose between opposing points of view rather than slide both into a loosely eclectic stand. This we respect even though we regret his choice when it favors a Freudian alternative. He continues the preceding quotation by saying: "Fortunately there are also areas of agreement which are impressive just because they grow out of different theories, independent investigation, and different kinds of data" (p. 249). And fortunately for us, Wenar has presented a great number of such areas of agreement and a wealth of material from different theorists and investigators, together with his own views and clinical experience, and according to his own categories. Though this review has for the most part singled out items and
aspects which were related to our main two points of interest, we must emphasize that there were many others which we found of great value: the significance assigned to work as well as to play; the clarifying treatment of Piaget’s findings, especially regarding cooperation; appreciation of the child’s unique understanding of his environment, and of the power of his self-evaluation; emphasis on the cognitive; findings on the activity levels of infants; reference to “unhappy mothers” in varying happy circumstances—literally too many topics to mention. It should be noted also that Wenar has supplied numerous footnotes recommending more detailed readings, and lists some 350 references. Whatever their approach, the serious reader and the advanced student are certain to find this book fascinating and an excellent source for the many important questions and answers which are informing the field of personality development today.

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A German Introduction to Individual Psychology


A special distinction of this book is a foreword by Alfred Adler, written for the first edition which appeared in 1933 under the title, *Einführung in die Individualpsychologie.* One misses the introduction by Dreikurs to that edition, to which Adler specifically refers at the end of his foreword. Perhaps the publisher could consider this for another edition.

The clarity of this revised and enlarged edition has not suffered from its doubling in size. Its importance is shown in its influence, for in the short time since its appearance—just two years—it has become indispensable for German-speaking countries as a textbook of Individual Psychology, not only for the institutes, seminars, and study groups of the Individual Psychology societies, but also for their psychotherapists who like to put it in the hands of their clients.

Where the author takes a stand toward Freud’s psychoanalysis, it becomes surprisingly clear that difficult psychic processes, for which psychoanalytically oriented interpretations often seem like an intellectual exercise, can be explained so much more simply on the basis of Individual Psychology. At any rate, those who are of the opinion that being scientific shows itself in the use of difficult words and associations of ideas will find the simplicity of Individual Psychology challenging—as for example, the author’s statement, “presently we are working on making the entire personality of a person recognizable within a few minutes” (p. 126), no matter how correct this may be in our experience.

It is a fact that Dreikurs has contributed much to make Individual Psychology and its methods still more systematic and teachable. In this he is only following his teacher, Alfred Adler, who had already begun 50 years ago to educate laymen (*horrible dictum*) in psychotherapy (p. 123). It is greatly to the author’s credit that he has taken up the latest findings of the natural sciences and the development of democratic society. This corroborates the thoughts and findings of Adler, and brings them closer to being generally understood. Another essential addition is that of the four near goals which in their systematic applications are one of the most widespread contributions of the author to education,
educational counseling, and the treatment of children. Entirely new is the "hidden reason" for an action (p. 75) which gives the client a strong feeling of being understood and thereby opens him up to therapy.

In these things Dreikurs shows himself the unsurpassed practitioner, so that one pardons his risking disapproval or even rejection when he treats problems of world philosophy. For example, critics could take exception when he speaks of religion but means the churches. One could also see slight conceptual blurring where such concepts as social interest, the feeling of belonging-together, and the feeling of belonging are not sufficiently differentiated from one another. On the other hand, just because of his efforts at conceptual clarity, the author brings out new thoughts, as when he suggests instead of the unclear term "Individual Psychology" the name "holistic" or "teleanalysis" (why not "teleotherapy"?)? Nor should we overlook his enlarging the classical three tasks of life by a fourth task, the relationship of the individual to himself; and the further task of the "relationship to the universe, through the meaning of human existence in the transcendental and spiritual realm."

What makes this book so valuable is that the author does not only explain the basic concepts of Individual Psychology logically and combine them in an enlightening way, but that he continuously points out that this knowledge can be turned to practice, and shows how. Thus he advises setting up study groups and counseling centers in order to "allow the new and often confusing thoughts to become the common possession of mankind." There is an urgency in his pointing to the meaning of and necessity for therapeutic groups which the author describes as the precursors of a future mankind. In this connection one may miss a closer treatment of Individual-Psychoanalytical group therapy. The author emphasizes group counseling as an aid to building a new democratic society.

In conclusion one can say the work herein reviewed is not only a significant but also an authoritative and indispensable book, bright, clear, and well organized—a book that has much to give.

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Erik Blumenthal

NONE SHALL BE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS


The author states that we are entering a new "cultural era." Possibly David Macle's phrase, "the third cultural mutation," is not putting it too strongly. Dr. Dreikurs points to the technical and scientific progress that man has made in his establishment of his mastery on earth, and too, in spite of this advancement, man's inability to get along with himself or his fellow man. As individuals in our present competitive society we dislike ourselves, and turn increasingly to introspection. The current fad of sensitivity training groups is another such frantic effort to find self-worth. But these are a waste of time. To find out who and what we are, we need to forget ourselves. By doing so, we will find ourselves; through our actions we state what we are.

The present urban-industrial complex requires democratic principles which recognize that every one is equal; no one is superior to another as was the case
in the past. Alfred Adler recognized the problem and set forth basic guide lines for democratic living, and Dreikurs says his present book may be considered a sequel to Adler’s *Social Interest: A Challenge to Mankind*. In the tradition of Adler, Dreikurs has a genius for reiterating a few basic principles in a variety of contexts. Their writing is meaningful to both the sophisticated and naive reader, a quality difficult to achieve. To those who already are familiar with their teachings, there will be an appreciation for the skillful wording and application; to those who are unfamiliar, the ideas presented will be unique, bold, and startlingly appropriate.

Basic Adlerian tenets indicate that man has worth and a place in society merely because he exists. He does not have to achieve to earn this position of dignity. We need only to respect ourselves and others. Dreikurs begins this book with sound guidance for learning to accept one’s self. This section is essentially an expansion of the author’s previous writing on “How to Get Along with Oneself.” The text then carries guidance into child rearing and the other basic institutions of marriage, education, vocation, industry, and religion. It is always solidly grounded in the golden rule: “do unto others...”

We typically treat children as inferiors, or so overindulge them that they fail to develop feelings of self-worth. But parents need to accept the child as he is. They must allow him to accept responsibility which will lead to feelings of accomplishment and pride. This entails letting the child experience logical and natural consequences for his actions. Mothers particularly feel that unless they are continually doting over their child, they are not being a good parent. They often carry these problems into the marital relationship. They do everything for their husband and sons and wonder why men are so helpless.

Present-day marriages usually operate on the 50-50 proposition: you give me some love, and it is only fair that I give you some love in return. All the while both partners are afraid that they may be giving 51%, whereas only when we give to our mate without expecting something in return, are we building a sound relationship.

Our educational institutions reflect similar disastrous, competitive, selfish, disparaging interpersonal relationships. Our grading system, for example, insures that some will always fail. Teachers, not knowing what to do, pit each student against the other. Equality in the classroom where all pupils are treated as members of the group, not as individuals, is necessary before this competition can end.

On the job, one is likely to continue to fear failure just as he did in school. With each task, he lays his personal worth on the line. He distrusts those with whom he works since they are seen as competitors for a better position. He especially distrusts his employer who, in turn distrusts him. Until employee and employer can, with mutual respect, sit down together as equals in discussion, there will continue to be mounting industrial disputes. In like fashion, school administrators, representatives from the faculty, student body, boards of regents, and nonacademic personnel need to come together as equals to set school policy in both academic and nonacademic areas.

Possibly the church comes closer than other institutions today in attempting to extend social equality in striving for a perfect society. These were the ideals upon which this country was founded. However, due to political events democracy has lost its egalitarian basis and has been replaced by the notion of “equal
opportunity.” By saying that we all have equal opportunity, it is possible to maintain our vertical society in which some are more equal than others. No one can be sure of his place and each begrudges the success of another.

Dreikurs offers a book which can serve as a blueprint for functioning in the many institutions of a democratic setting. It is invaluable reading for professionals in the behavioral sciences as they seek to help others find their place in society. It is also for the layman who can gain much for his own life. It is written in a straight-forward manner drawing upon individual cases and clever anecdotal stories so as to read like a novel and yet be a factual, pertinent text.

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**James W. Croake**

**BABIES: LOVE 'EM AND LEARN 'EM**


There should be a great many more happy children, mothers, fathers, families, and even teachers, when this book gets bought, borrowed, and begged for by young parents, as it is sure to be. This is because Dr. Painter has introduced a truly new aspect in bringing up a baby—relatively simple for the parents, pleasurable for all concerned, and worthwhile for the future as well as the present, for the child's ever widening world as well as for himself.

The new concept is that “serious but happy 'educational play' replaces 'aimless play' as the major activity of childhood” (p. 220). From the earliest months on, the parent—which can mean mother or father—should set aside a certain time every day, through the preschool years, for a period of individual attention to the child, helping him to learn to do some of the many things he is capable of doing, and to know some of the many things about himself and his world that are important to know. Naturally, this time is at first very brief, 10 to 15 minutes at age four-to-five months, increasing gradually to an hour at 30-to-35 months, while enlarging the scope of activities. Dr. Painter suggests that four-to-five months is a good age for starting a regular scheduled educational playtime, in a special teaching place. Activities begin with mainly motor and sensory stimulation, and branch out into spacial relations, speech, imitation, social and self awareness, imagination, problem solving, finer motor coordination, self-care, concepts of cause and effect, time, weight, numbers, and so on. For instance, beginning items would be attaching a bell to the baby's bootie, gently pulling him to the sitting position, placing a rattle in his hand; they might continue with listening to a clock ticking, pointing to his eyes, nose, etc. in the mirror, “talking” into a toy telephone; and then go on to matching colors, rhyming words, drawing, climbing, counting, taking turns, etc. The parent may make up his daily schedule from a wide selection of suggested appropriate activities. Since Dr. Painter’s approach is to “structure the baby’s world for maximum development,” she also includes planning for activities that he can do by himself.

But equally important with the educational “structuring” is the way in which it is to be undertaken. The parent does not impose training on the child; he offers him the opportunity to learn what he is ready for. Dr. Painter emphasizes that her suggested activities must be adjusted to individual differences;
that every period should be just challenging enough to maintain interest while never so difficult as to be discouraging. Over-tiring, frustration, or any anger must be avoided. If they should occur, the activity involved should be dropped immediately (though one can, of course, return to it at some later time). Any attempt at forcing the child to do something is counterindicated—simply because learning cannot be forced. “Encouragement is the key to good teaching” (p. 55) because it helps to keep the child trying, even after doing poorly, and it is important to give him the experience that if he keeps trying, he will do well (p. 91). These learning sessions are all play periods, with parent and child having fun together. The child experiences the satisfactions of learning and competence, and of a close, cooperating, happy relationship with his parent.

In addition to the actual teaching program and the spirit with which it is to be implemented, this book fits both of these into the larger whole of the child’s life, and sees that life in relation to the larger community of which it will become a part. Such wider relevance is rarely found in educational innovations, probably because it is the function of a larger value system. Dr. Painter indicates that she has such a system, and that it is based on the psychology of Alfred Adler. Her opening words are: “Babies are born active” (p. 18), affirming their spontaneous and individual movement into life. Her next heading reads: “Teach him how to become a family member,” affirming that from the start the baby becomes aware of not being alone, with both the joys and the restrictions which pertain thereto. In view of this, “it is far better for the child to enter the family group as a sharing rather than as a receiving member. He should not be allowed to... feel that he is the hub of the universe” (p. 21). A good atmosphere for learning will be found in a relaxed, comfortable, orderly home where each family member knows that certain things happen at certain times, when an overall schedule is understood to be for the common good. This requires that the child learn he always have his way. For instance, if he should cry at the end of his lesson time, “do not continue just because he demands this. Just put him in his playpen and give him a toy to play with by himself. He will gradually learn that there are times that he plays with you and times that he plays alone, and both are pleasurable” (p. 54). If he touches something he should not disturb, simply say “No” once, and quietly separate him from the object. “Use words sparingly, and show by your actions what you mean” (p. 121). Above all, do not get angry.

If Dr. Painter’s suggestions are followed, at the age of three a child “should be able to sit still for longer periods of time and work with interest and courage to try to solve difficult tasks. He should feel that he himself is in control of his learning, and that learning new things is exciting” (p. 193). The various competencies he has acquired give the self-esteem which comes with being a useful, contributing person. His many hours of patient play have given him an attitude of trust and cooperation toward a teaching partner, and the democratic approach to orderliness for the good of all in the family has taught him the way of mutual respect. In closing Dr. Painter says: “Education must not only include the acquisition of facts, but the sensitivity to understand others by identifying with them... Adler wrote ‘Only a person who is courageous, self-confident and at home in the world can benefit both by the difficulties and by the advantages of life’” (p. 222).

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