BOOK REVIEWS

HUMANISM VERSUS BEHAVIORISM


It is something of a principle in the literature of polemics that humanists attack behaviorists while behaviorists ignore humanists. A humanist's critique of behaviorism becomes a point of departure for demonstrating how a mechanistic determinism fails to account for that which is most characteristically human—the consciousness of individual freedom, creativity, spontaneous behavior, autonomy and self-actualization of motivation, and growth and differentiation in perceptual and personality processes. The behaviorist's ignoring of the humanist is based partly on ignorance of what humanism stands for (behaviorists often make devout humanists once they learn more about it!), and partly on his determination rigidly to exclude from science anything which cannot be reduced to mechanical, mathematical or neurophysiological models.

Bertalanffy's book is a polemic against behaviorism and a plea for reconstruction in psychology that is likely to be ignored by behaviorists. True to principle, the book as a polemic is an impassioned denunciation of behavioristic systems of the Thorndikian, Hullian and Skinnerian varieties. The author accuses the behaviorists of creating 20th century man in the image of a mindless robot. He sees as the dominant academic psychology of the first half of the century, rat psychology—a zoomorphic system whose basic motivational principles are homeostasis, need reduction and tension relaxation, and whose scientific orientation is a mechanistic determinism blind to autonomous activity, play, exploration and any form of creativity.

In the second half of the book Bertalanffy proposes that to be saved psychology must be reconstructed along more humanistic lines—the key concepts of the new order being symbolism and system. "Man", he points out, "lives in a symbolic world of language, thought, social entities, money, science, religion, art—and the objective world around him, from trivial surroundings to books, cars, cities and bombs is materialization of symbolic activities" (p. 22). It is this world of symbolism, uniquely human, which has largely been ignored by the behaviorists.

The reductionism of behavioristic psychology is based on a closed system modeled after the second law of thermodynamics and the principle of equilibrium. Bertalanffy's general systems theory, after which he would model psychology, is an extension of his concept of the open system which he proposed over a quarter of a century ago in opposition to the concept of the closed system. The open-system point of view holds that spontaneous activity, the ability to maintain states of disequilibrium, to act on and not merely to respond to stimuli are primary. Cognition is creative, not a tabula rasa; a man is not a little black box with input and output; behavior is "something more" and not merely "nothing but." The general systems theory extends Bertalanffy's views from the biological to an analysis of culture, education, history, and philosophy and values. General systems theory offers mainly a new perspective—that of holism—that all forces acting upon the organism (or by extension an institution or even a nation or an empire) must
be taken into account along with the autonomous factors if the organism is to be understood. In short, analysis must always be multivariate, never unidimensional.

By way of evaluation, it may be noted that Bertalanffy, like all polemists, overdraws the picture of academic psychology in the first half of the century. Holism is not a new perspective. The Gestalt school long argued for holistic systems. He ignores the fact that behaviorists like Tolman, Spence, and Mowrer championed a cognitive approach to learning theory; that functionalism and the dynamic psychology of Robert S. Woodworth were broad enough to leave room for organismic, evolutionary points of view. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how Bertalanffy can ignore Adler completely and scarcely mention the neo-Freudians even as he condemns psychoanalysis for its reductionism.

On the credit side, Bertalanffy has once more forcefully reiterated the still fundamental division of psychology into two broad systems—the behavioristic and the humanistic. Moreover, general systems theory is finding applications in engineering, medicine, political science and economics. Considerable credit for these developments must go to Bertalanffy for his pioneer work in this field.

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WILLIAM JAMES AS PHENOMENOLOGIST


We might well determine a man's importance by his capacity to be related to movements occurring after his death. By this criterion William James would fare especially well. James who died in 1910 has recently been revived as an existentialist philosopher (see Barrett's Irrational Man, 1958); as a religious existentialist (see Winetrout's F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism, 1967); and as an existentialist psychologist (see Rollo May, editor, Existential Psychology, 1961). And now in this book we note James brought back as a phenomenological psychologist. Surely all of this suggests a remarkable and rare viability.

According to Linschoten, although James never explicitly developed a phenomenology, he came very near to some of its fundamental notions. It is James's emphasis on experience which brings him into the mainstream or near-stream of phenomenology. Linschoten lists five qualities of experience as seen by James: (a) experience tends to be an integral part of personal consciousness; (b) within each personal consciousness experience is constantly changing; (c) experience is a continuous stream; (d) our thought is directed to objects that appear as independent things; (e) consciousness chooses among its objects.

We catch something of James's pluralism in this book. "He who studies the work of William James is astonished when he quickly notices how unsystematic he is. . . . And yet one cannot help being captivated by his originality, and we gradually develop also the feeling that James's seemingly unsystematic approach is an attempt to reach a more comprehensive system."

Few American philosophers or psychologists have been so European as William James. It is his great merit that he continues to show a peculiar talent
for relating with waves of European thought. And it is the merit of Hans Linschoten, who taught at the University of Utrecht, that he has taken a fresh look at James within the context of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others.

Linschoten died in 1964 at the age of 38. Amadeo Giorgi of Duquesne University has edited the present volume. A particularly tragic note in the case of Linschoten's early death is that we Americans need Europeans who can take an American thinker and relate him critically and meaningfully to the European scene. This book indicates that in Hans Linschoten we had a person with the background, concern, and sensitivity to do this very thing.


Kenneth Winetrouth

Visit in Vienna, 1908-1910


On the occasion of the appearance of the long-awaited second volume of the minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society we can essentially only repeat what we expressed regarding the first volume (this Journal, 1963, 19, 90-91), but are doing so with increased emphasis: Everyone interested in the early history of Freudian and Adlerian psychology must be infinitely grateful to Otto Rank who took such careful minutes of the meetings (which is actually not sufficiently acknowledged in the published volumes), to fate and those who helped preserve and publish these minutes, and to the editors Nunberg and Federn who have made the material available in such usable and very scholarly fashion.

Let us, from the Adlerian viewpoint, give an example of how we were recently able to use this volume. A news release on the first annual National Conference on Suicidology in Chicago last spring stated that the meeting constituted “a reconvening of the 1910 Vienna Symposium on Suicide presided over by Sigmund Freud.” The Minutes show that the meeting on April 20, 1910 was indeed devoted to suicide, with D. E. Oppenheim as the main speaker. However, not Freud, but Adler is recorded as the chairman who opened the discussion which followed (p. 491) and which was continued the following week, April 27, when Stekel was chairman (p. 506).

This was just two weeks after Adler had been elected president of the Society, April 6, 1910, “following Freud’s suggestion . . . by acclamation” (p. 470). This happened at the end of a meeting at which Adler had pleaded, “We must give up our seclusion and seek to bring suitable persons to our meetings and to let them take part in our work” (p. 464). Regarding Freud’s nomination of Adler to succeed him, Adler at first demurred, “in his opinion this would be a superfluous act. Freud ought to retain the leadership, but should be relieved by a committee from the oppressive troubles of administrative duties” (p. 465). Freud then was “elected scientific chairman by acclamation” (p. 470).

The volume contains numerous discussion comments by Adler on such subjects as dreams, hysteria, the situation of women, psychological significance of the devil, dynamics of lying, sex and love, homosexuality, depreciation tendency,

It is interesting to note how independently Adler spoke, even a year before he was elected president, emphasizing that to establish the “connection [Zusammenhang] is the most important aspect of an analysis.” "If one looks into the literature of the Freudian school, one does not often find the connection [between the separate elements] brought forth in an analysis; one has to be content if connections come forth in a fragment. . . . The best of the publications do no more than take up once again things that Freud emphasized, and affirm that ‘it is all there’” (p. 126). We see here the beginnings of Adlerian psychology as one of context rather than so-called depth, forerunners of the concept of life style.

Among the other main participants, in addition to Freud, were Ehrenfels, Federn, Ferenczi, Friedjung, Furthmüller, Häutler, Heller, Hitschmann, Rank, Reitler, Sadger, Steiner, Tausk, and Wittels. Spending some time with this volume, in addition to the information one can find, is like visiting these meetings some 60 years in the past.

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IN MEMORY OF KURT GOLDSTEIN


This book, ably assembled and edited by Dr. Simmel, professor of psychology, Brandeis University, is a work of rather unique character. Much more than the usual assembly of memorial tributes by students, coworkers and friends, it presents, in keeping with the greatness of Kurt Goldstein, almost an overview—remarkable, though naturally not complete or systematic—of basic problems as Goldstein saw them in modern psychology and, in part, in biology and also phenomenological philosophy.

Of the 18 contributors the following may be of special interest here: Gardner Murphy; Erich Fromm, on crisis in psychoanalysis; Rollo May, on the Delphic oracle as therapist; David Shakow, on methods of observations of schizophrenics; Eugenia Hanfmann, on Vigotsky and Goldstein; and Aron Gurwitsch, on Goldstein and phenomenology. The editor herself presents Goldstein’s vita and contributes a paper on phantom phenomena; Walter Riese writes a most illuminating chapter on the man and his work; while Egon Weigl writes on Goldstein’s revolutionizing theme of abstract and concrete behavior. The remaining chapters deal with neurological and epistemological topics.

Finally, in the way of an author’s abstract, the concluding contribution should be mentioned: the bibliography of Goldstein’s over 300 papers, books, films, etc. It also includes writings about Goldstein since his death in 1965 and special anniversary issues.

New York, N. Y.

Joseph Meiers, M. D.
BOOK REVIEWS

SCHIZOPHRENIA — THE DISCARDING OF COMMON SENSE


This is an eminently practical, common-sensical book. It is also full of creative, original ideas. The author, an outstanding and leading Adlerian, explains in his introduction that he is committed to a holistic, teleologic, phenomenologic viewpoint. His concern with the "private world of the schizophrenic" is based on his acceptance of a field-theoretical approach. The schizophrenic's behavior is related to his social field and its meaning has to be understood in his social context. Especially clear and concise is Dr. Shulman's explanation of indeterminism: "The organism would seem to possess a self which elaborates a subjective psychological field of action in which it perceives itself to be living and to which it tries to accommodate itself. Thus, schizophrenia is not only a reaction, it is also an action, a decision, a choice" (p. x-xi).

Numerous and impressive case histories and clinical examples serve as illustrations and amplification of this theory of schizophrenic ontology: peculiar and unsatisfying kinds of human interaction in childhood contribute experiences which lead the child to wrong assumptions. On the basis of these biased assumptions the child chooses to respond with schizoid or schizophrenic behavior patterns.

Shulman does not get involved in the etiological problem of either heredity or environment as causes of schizophrenia. His theory "is independent of any constitutional or genetic theory, without necessarily being in conflict with it" (p. 8). Faulty training in responding to life's demands results in convictions and values which discard common sense. The person who will become schizophrenic "decides to quit living in the consensual world. This is the decision which constitutes the 'psychotic break.' It is at this point that the patient discards the obligation to function like other human beings" (p. 10).

Much of this book is devoted to describing, exemplifying, making understandable for people dealing with schizophrenics, the patient's private, personal, rigid life goal. He prefers and has trained himself "to ignore what others see and to see what others ignore" (p. 13), and is oblivious to socially accepted forms of behavior and communication. Psychosis has the purpose to protect the self-esteem, to maintain a fictitious superiority and to escape from responsibility. Either the whole existence of the schizophrenic is devoted to "what Adler calls the high-flown goal, and what Binswanger terms the extravagant ideal" (p. 22), or a reactive psychosis is a temporary response to an especially stressful situation.

The value of Shulman's book lies in his empathetic description of the schizophrenic's development and of the phases through which his life style evolves. This is covered in the chapter which he calls "Paradigm of Schizophrenia." In three following chapters he elaborates on theory, practical procedures, and some special techniques in individual psychotherapy. It is impossible to summarize these chapters. They are replete with examples which all show the therapist's unusual amount of understanding and empathy coupled with respect for the patient, firmness, and hopefulness that the patient can improve and find better, more common-sensical ways to deal with life. Most enjoyable is the author's originality and intellectual alertness in guiding the patient towards these "better
ways." There is also a great deal of realistic modesty in Shulman's approach, none of the "savior quality" which so frequently disturbs the therapist's usefulness in treating these difficult patients. On the contrary, Shulman shows much objectivity and ability to learn from the view of other psychotherapeutic schools and personalities.

In his sixth and last chapter Shulman discusses among various issues "therapeutic despair" in the treatment of schizophrenics. Therapy may become unsuccessful if the therapist does not win the patient's trust and does not understand under what condition the patient will be able and willing to relate to the therapist. Understanding the covert purpose of the patient's symptoms, may unlock the therapeutic stalemate. Again, the clinical examples show the excellency of Shulman's teaching.

The book is full of practical suggestions and reflects a most praiseworthy attitude of therapeutic understanding and optimism. Selective and valuable reference lists at the end of each chapter further enrich the volume.

These two hundred pages should be read by everybody interested in this "disease in psychic and social function." They are also a most valuable aid for therapy, teaching, and supervision.

New York, N. Y.

HELENE PAPANEK, M. D.

COMPULSION — THE ESSENCE OF NEUROSIS


In commenting on Adler's 1931 paper on compulsion neurosis the present reviewer was able to say that for Adler this type was "apparently the prototype of all neuroses" (1, p. 112). Later on he found confirmation for this conjecture in a statement by one of the important early coworkers of Adler, Leonhard Seif, who wrote in 1926 that the dynamics of the compulsion are so essential to all neuroses that "one could call virtually any neurosis a 'compulsion neurosis' " (2, p. 509).

In the light of the present book these words by Seif are quite prophetic, for the author, Leon Salzman, professor of clinical psychiatry, Georgetown University, and past president of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, opens his book with the statement: "The obsessive-compulsive personality type is today's most prevalent neurotic character structure," whereas "Freud used the hysteric as the paradigm of his conceptualization of psychoanalysis and therapy.... There is now good reason to believe that... the obsessional defensive mechanism provides the most widespread technique for enabling man to achieve some illusion of safety and security in an uncertain world" (p. vii).

But beyond their ascribing prime importance to compulsion among neurotic disturbances, there is far-reaching agreement between Salzman and Adler regarding the nature and cure of the disorder. In describing the obsessive personality Dr. Salzman speaks of an "obsessive style" which is characterized by grandiosity, omniscience, indecision, doubt and ritual. Adler described "the life style of the compulsion neurotic" (1, p. 137) in terms of striving for godliness and the hesitating attitude, and the compulsion itself as a safeguard of the self-esteem.
For Salzman the obsession or compulsion is a technique to avoid "the awareness of imperfection, fallibility, and humaneness" (p. viii).

For Salzman the cure consists in the patient giving up his ideas of perfection and grandiosity and being "satisfied with being able to do the best we can—provided we exert the effort to do just that... To be happy, one must risk unhappiness; to live fully, one must risk death and accept its ultimate decision" (p. 274). Similarly Adler concluded, "The cure must consist of reconciling the patient with the problems of life. He must be made to see the defects in his life style, and he must develop his social interest, important elements of which are active social contribution and a generally courageous attitude toward life" (1, p. 138). Within this framework the reader who knows Adler will find himself very much at home with this book.

Some of the most astute observations of Dr. Salzman are about time and the obsessional (pp. 67-72). Among the noteworthy further aspects are a description of the "obsessive spectrum," ranging from normal obsessional behavior to the obsessional personality and finally to obsessional neurosis. The author also extends his conception of obsession to such syndromes as depression, phobias, and addictive states. Finally there is a detailed section on treatment with numerous specific suggestions. This is altogether a very good and useful book which is certainly to be recommended.

The author considers himself a post-Freudian and the contrast with Freud is shown throughout. Among those with whom the author expresses affinities are Rado, Horney, Alexander, Sullivan, Strauss, Goldstein, Bonime and others. Adler is conspicuous by his absence, which is surprising and regrettable.

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References


Elementary School Guidance


This book, designed as a basic introductory text, is certainly a useful addition to a field developing rapidly in terms of philosophy, techniques, and training problems. The book is concerned with the definition of various guidance roles; training programs for counselors; vocational guidance; the reconsideration of teacher role; the trend toward a consultant function for guidance team-members working with parents, teachers, and administrators; and the need for research. Also included are some "how to" articles aimed at small-group, parent, and teacher counseling, new fields where there is great interest and some anxiety on the part of guidance personnel already in the field who must implement the program.

There are 49 papers altogether which should stimulate student interest, and
will be helpful to workers already in the field who are experiencing changes in their roles. Readers must be prepared, however, to search for further details elsewhere.

Dinkmeyer has supplied an excellent preface, has written introductions to each chapter, and has contributed four of the papers. He hints at a much broader perspective about the problems of guidance than he articulates clearly.

To an Adlerian guidance worker the Dinkmeyer papers were especially welcome, as were the papers by Dreikurs and Sonstegard, while the absence of Bernice Grunwald's material on classroom discussion seemed an obvious omission.

With a few notable exceptions—Faust, Kaczkowski, and Patouillet—the contributors to this book are preoccupied with "content" problems such as goals, techniques, and labels. They ignore the "process" level of considerations and skills that turn a well-trained guidance technician into an effective member of a school team, where human relations and group-process skills are often more crucial to professional success than traditional guidance know-how. Perhaps the readings which discuss parent, teacher, and consultation oriented programs can be utilized to introduce some of these underlying personality problems and training needs to beginning students who will be called upon increasingly to give up their one-to-one and diagnostic emphases in favor of group and human relations activities. If some of the concerns of those of us involved in training and consultant services to teachers and guidance workers have found scant representation in Dinkmeyer's book, it is probably more our failing than his. He can only publish what we are writing, and many of us are too busy in the field to find our expression in the literature. But it is encouraging that someone has taken the trouble to organize what is being written and share it with the professional community.

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FEELINGS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD


When a book has been on the best-seller list for almost a year, it is hardly necessary to say that it is extremely readable and many parents are finding it helpful. Even so, no review would be fair without pointing to these very assets. Ginott knows today's parents. And he has the skill of presenting their foibles as well as his own matched advice in terms of simple, striking examples. He expresses his generalizations in well-turned aphorisms. His readers will not miss the message of: "the niceties of the art of living cannot be conveyed with a sledgehammer" (p. 64); or, "to a discerning ear, lies reveal what they intend to conceal" (p. 59); or, "in setting limits, he who hesitates is lost in endless arguments" (p. 100).

Ginott submits a new code of communication between parents and children. This holds (a) that there must be mutual respect, and (b) that "statements of understanding must precede statements of advice or instruction" (p. 21)—admirable principles which we should all accept. The feeling of being understood is a universally positive human experience, and we should recognize that a child caught in an unfavorable situation, angering or disappointing to himself as well as
his parents, is in no mood to profit from instruction or to take abuse. Ginott expresses excellently the sad effects of criticism and name calling on the child’s attitude toward himself and others. If Ginott has helped parents to stop-look-and-listen before expressing their displeasure, and to try to put themselves in the child’s place in a moment of crisis, he has made a tremendous contribution.

Ginott’s understanding is for the most part limited to the feelings, i.e. the negative ones. He believes it of the utmost importance that these be identified and not be denied. Thus the parent should infer the feeling and name it for the child if he does not accept it, and should redirect the feeling when necessary. Admittedly it may in many cases be good to have negative feelings expressed, and sometimes this does take care of them altogether. Ginott advises: “When you get angry, come and tell me.” Ways of redirecting these feelings are also suggested: “You may be as angry as you want at Sis… but there will be no hurting . . . You can throw stones at the tree and pretend it’s your sister” (p. 102).

However, we believe that parents should not express the feelings of the child for him. At one time Ginott says these expressions should be the reflections of the child’s feelings, without distortion, as in a mirror (p. 35). But certain of his examples show the importance of revealing hidden feelings, which goes beyond “reflecting.” He believes that some feelings can be predicted, and a parent should at times express these in advance of their happening, which also goes beyond “reflecting.” E.g., “to be on the safe side, parents need to assume that jealousy exists in their own children even though it is not visible” (p. 126); a mother is wise in saying to her child before a new baby is born, “you may feel jealous. You may even say to yourself ‘she does not love me any more’ . . . Be sure to come and tell me, and I’ll give you extra loving” (pp. 124-125).

Although we know that feelings of jealousy and hostility are common, we deny their inevitability. We give much weight to the influence of the transactions between siblings on their personalities—which Adler was the first to point out—but we see such results as depending on identifiable and often modifiable factors. We would therefore find it “safer” before the new baby comes, to make preparations for greater independence and cooperation on the part of the child, for extra attention from the father or older sibling, and for the mother herself to ease the displacement experience, without waiting for the child to come to ask for “loving.”

Ginott’s certainty regarding the occurrence of particular feelings stems from acceptance of psychoanalytic psychosexual and psychosocial assumptions, most of which can only be substantiated by those who have been indoctrinated to look for the same. Surely predicting a negative reaction is a self-fulfilling prophecy! It is difficult for this reviewer to understand how so keen an observer as Ginott should at the same time maintain inferences which are wholly unsubstantiated. Examples of such inferences which are in addition unnecessary and complicating are: it is the infant’s desire to be his mother’s “dearly beloved” (p. 127), and “every young boy wants his mother all to himself” (p. 170); “Though not in an adult way, the infant’s enjoyment of his body functions is sexual in nature” (p. 148). Why not stick to what we can observe, and simply say the infant enjoys his body functions and enjoys functioning with his body? “In their subconscious, every messy substance [used in play] represents the real stuff [body products], which brings substitute satisfaction as well as consolation for the loss of the
original pleasure” (p. 150). Why not say, children enjoy acting in a creative way upon and with everything in their environment?

Emphasis on inference might be expected to cluster with emphasis on feelings, and with the intrapersonal, more elementaristic aspects of identifying and repressing them. On the other hand, feelings become of subordinate interest, when viewed as being in the service of the whole person, a function of his style of life. Adler wrote: “Feelings always agree with the individual's viewpoint of his task: they strengthen the individual in his bent for activity. We always do that which we would do even without feelings, and the feelings are simply an accompaniment to our acts” (*The Science of Living*, 1929, p. 42). From our point of view, then, while it is necessary to understand one's child, and show him that you do, in order to have a close relationship with him, the prime function of parents is not to reflect the child's feelings but to make him more aware of the people, objects, and demands of the world around him and how he can best respond to these, behaviorally.

It is not surprising that Ginott's observations and concrete suggestions which are relatively independent of his psychoanalytic orientation are in many cases almost identical with those of Adler and Dreikurs: e.g., the importance of encouragement, the dangers of favoritism, “hands off homework,” the natural right to an allowance, the futility of “battles of the will,” the discouraged child's escape: “If I don't try, I won't fail my parents” (p. 84). There are also many other, original contributions from which any parent might profit. Hopefully it will be these common-sense, realistic principles and practices that Ginott's many readers will test out for themselves rather than the unsubstantiated assertions of universal, preordained responses which we view as unhappy self-fulfilling predictions.

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**BOOK NOTES**

**Alexander, F. G., & Selesnick, S. T.** *The history of psychiatry: an evaluation of psychiatric thought and practice from prehistoric times to the present.* New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xvi + 471. $11.95.—This is a work of major scope, and it is most regrettable that death has deprived both authors of the fruit of their labor. It affords the reader a wealth of history of recent developments, and, of course, of the work of Freud, his followers, dissenters, and other contemporaries. The authors say, “Freud's contribution . . . cannot be overestimated” (p. 181)—but they do precisely that, and this constitutes the book's weakness. E.g., they acclaim Freud as scientist, on the basis of his “scrupulous, systematic” (p. 5) “solid” (p. 184) observations; they ignore the question of the therapeutic effectiveness of his techniques; and they credit him with all sorts of post-Freudian changes and developments without acknowledging the corrections in his original formulations that this calls for.