BOOK REVIEWS

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING


This is an excellent, scholarly and immensely broadening book which is passionately concerned with mending the "radically broken self-image" (p. vi) left us by classical mechanics, replacing its "mechanomorphism" with the humanism appropriate for the social sciences. Part 1 presents in three chapters the mechanistic, materialistic and deterministic concept of man and its effects in psychology and sociology. Part 2 discusses the alternatives that have emerged in "the new physics," "the biology of freedom," and "new directions in psychology," the titles of the three chapters here. A closing chapter gathers under the concept of Dilthey's "understanding" psychology those who have been developing the new image of man. This can perhaps be best epitomized through saying that here we are not dealing with "determinate causes" but with "self-determined reasons" (p. 157).

Thus the book is, of course, very "Adlerian" in spirit. But not only this. It assigns to Adler central significance for the new psychology. After characterizing Freud as a "romantic mechanist," Adler is identified with "the great departure."

The influence of Adler... seems in retrospect to have been scarcely less extensive than that of Freud... The lonely course Adler embarked upon in 1911 has either anticipated or encouraged such vigorous developments as neo-Freudianism (or "neo-Adlerianism"), psychoanalytic ego psychology, client-centered therapy, existentialist psychology and contemporary personality theory. From the perspective of our own day, it might even be argued (with conscious heresy) that it was the turn first taken by Adler some fifty years ago which has come to be the "mainstream" of the psychoanalytic movement—and that taken by Freud which has been in fact the "deviation" (p. 194).

Matson's scholarliness is attested with regard to Adler in that he is acquainted also with Adlerian writings by others. Thus he refers to the volumes by Louis Way and by Kurt Adler and Danica Deutsch, refers to papers by Lucia Radl and H. L. Ansbacher, and quotes from Rudolf Dreikurs that "Individual Psychology was meant to indicate the indivisibility of man" (p. 316).

In view of all this, we are, of course, interested in the author's background. He received his Ph.D. at Berkeley in 1960, has been at various times a newspaper reporter and editor, a resident administrator of the University of California's Far East College for GIs, and a lecturer in speech at the University of California. Presently he teaches political science at the University of Hawaii. He acknowledges his debt to three political scientists, a physicist, and four further social scientists, among these Ashley Montagu and, as the only psychologist, the late Gordon Allport.

The book was published originally in 1964 (by George Braziller, New York), and we are amazed that we did not learn of it before. After all, it is concerned with basic issues of the theory of Individual Psychology, and probably no course on this subject has been taught which did not try to deal with these issues. Matson's book does this so well and in a manner so particularly endearing to Adlerians that it is highly recommended for inclusion on any Adlerian reading list.

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HEINZ L. ANSBACHER
In his charming, witty and straightforward preface to this book of selected readings, O. H. Mowrer tells the following anecdote: “As late as 1963, when I wrote a world-famous clinical psychologist for permission to include one of his recent papers in this collection . . . his response was: ‘No, I would not permit any work of mine to appear in a book with morality in the title’” (pp.vii-viii). Mowrer then describes how he gave serious consideration to the advice of a “distinguished social scientist” that the term “morality” should be replaced by the word “ethics.” The former, Mowrer was told, implies “force and coercion and lack of human compassion and understanding,” while the latter, “ethics,” suggests “reason, objectivity and detachment.” But Mowrer does not want detachment and is not interested in the philosophical problem of good and evil. He does not like the term “values” either because: “Everyone, I suppose, values something, regardless of how perverse or self-defeating it may be. So the term, unless extensively qualified, verges on meaninglessness, and certainly lacks power and precision” (p. viii). Morality, on the other hand, “is intent upon creating and preserving conditions which promote human comfort, security, pleasure, freedom, and meaningful existence. . . . [Morality] calls for concern, commitment, and courage, for action and, when necessary, the legitimate use of power” (pp. viii-ix).

Mowrer, for the past 20 years research professor at the University of Illinois, a past president of the American Psychological Association, member of the American Society of Adlerian Psychology and originator of Integrity Therapy, has collected in this book papers from which he “has learned and continues to learn.” Aside from the preface, Mowrer did not add any personal commentary or any of his own papers to the volume. The selections are grouped in six parts, according to the field from which they come.

Part I contains 8 “popular protests” against psychoanalysis, published in magazines between 1961 and 1965. Dr. Benjamin Spock deserves to be quoted: “The most impressive evidence that standards have slipped in a maladaptive way comes from guidance clinics. The children who are growing up with too little restraint, too little sense of moral obligation, are likely to be miserable in childhood, to get into trouble in adolescence, and to be unhappy and ineffectual in adulthood” (p. 42). But it should be pointed out in fairness to Freud that he himself did not advocate complete lack of restraint.

The 15 papers in Part II are from psychiatry. I was glad to find here the famous paper by Percival Bailey, “The Great Psychiatric Revolution” (Amer. J. Psychiat., 1956), a model of objective, humorous, and wise criticism of psychoanalysis, a pleasure to read. I would wish it would be read and re-read widely. Most of the authors in this part are well known to many of us, with Dreikurs, of course, outstanding. His paper is on “Psychotherapy as Correction of Faulty Social Values” (this Journal, 1957). Two papers by N. S. Lehrman, one by Wolf and Schwartz, and others stress the importance of values and responsibility. W. Glasser fits in nicely with his Reality Therapy:
Therapy which advocates the uncovering of unconscious conflicts seems to work in many cases, especially with people who are not too disturbed and who are already moderately responsible. With mental hospital patients and severe behavior disorders, we have never seen it work. When traditional therapy does work, however, we believe it is because of the therapist's involvement and the kind of person he is, not of the theory. We think that therapy needs to be directed to conscious responsibility, that unconscious conflicts necessarily accompany disturbed behavior but they do not cause it (p. 133).

Camilla M. Anderson, under the title, "The Pot and the Kettle," states that the cause of functional mental illness is grandiosity—and that both psychiatrists and the clergy are prone to a maximum of it!

Part III contains 20 papers by clergymen on "The Cure of Souls," with a lot about sin and confession. I must confess it was not easy for me to go conscientiously through these papers; but, because of my sense of responsibility as a reviewer, I not only read them, but also tried to identify with some of their ideas. From a paper by W. A. Clebsch and C. A. Jaekle the following quotation may be illustrative of the clergymen's problem and the clarification they have been receiving from Mowrer's ideas:

In response to the church's dilemmas in regard to the reconciling ministry, a provocative voice has been raised recently by O. Hobart Mowrer, a research psychologist, who stands horrified at what he believes to be the church's captivity to Freudian understandings of human troubles, especially guilt. Mowrer believes that guilt is the major affliction of man today, and that in and behind the troubles which men experience with each other lie the profound realization and the reality that one has broken his responsibility and trust for his fellow human beings (pp. 227-228).

In a paper on "Sin and Salvation" (1936) A. T. Boisen writes: "I retain the word 'sin' because none of the proposed substitutes carries quite the same idea" (p. 295). The essential features in any plan of salvation may be summed up as follows:

1. Commitment to that which is supreme in the hierarchy of loyalties. . . . The individual must find his way through the teachings of tradition to some first-hand vision of his own. 2. Thoroughgoing honesty in the facing of facts . . . and the consequent finding of justification and satisfaction in the sense of inner peace and fellowship. . . . 3. Progressive unification on the basis of accepted loyalties and standards . . . toward that transformation of personality which the physician calls maturity (pp. 296-297).

In another paper I found the following quotation from an Adlerian friend, Lee R. Steiner:

Through the ages ministry has been the force that has at least attempted to keep morality alive. It would be a pity if, in one of the eras of greatest moral crisis, the clergy should suddenly abandon its strength for something that has no validity, no roots, and no value. It is my impression that they would do far better to cling to what they have. Judaism has endured for almost 6,000 years. Christianity for almost 2,000. Where will psychoanalysis be even 25 years from now? . . . I predict it will take its place along with phrenology and mesmerism (p. 301).

"Parson" A. W. Clark, in an autobiographical sketch, makes a comment on professional grandiosity, a phenomenon mentioned already by Dr. Anderson: "There is a common bond between clergymen and psychiatrists—the temptation to 'play God' " (p. 352).
Part IV, 16 papers by psychologists, is called "Psychology in a New Key," with the oldest contribution, dated 1951, by W. H. Clark on Buchmam's Moral Rearmament movement, the Oxford Group. Here I should like to voice a mild criticism about Mowrer's statement in the Preface that his volume mirrors "the history of ideas" (p. x). Though it is true that "scientific interest in the ethical dimension of psychopathology has steadily mounted," it might have been worthwhile—perhaps in a commentary by the editor—to acknowledge that this revision of psychoanalytic thought started at the beginning of this century and is not that new. The seeds of a revision of Freudian theory which are bearing fruit in an ever-increasing harvest were planted by Adler over 60 years ago.

One of the most stimulating contributors to the book is the late G. A. Kelly whose delightful paper on "Sin and Psychotherapy" deserves careful study. His Personal Construct Theory assumes that man builds personal constructs by apprehending similarities as well as distinctions (or contrasts) between objects. Man, in the biblical story of Eden, makes a choice between loneliness and companionship, choosing companionship. Confronted then with the choice between innocence and knowledge, man prefers knowledge. Then he was faced with the construct of good versus evil. "He is still hung up on that issue." Neither psychologists and psychotherapists, nor their patients can avoid this choice. Conformity to law and rules and subordination to authority will only simplify this crucial issue into one of obedience and disobedience. "Reliance upon conscience places the responsibility for distinguishing good from evil squarely on the shoulders of the individual man" (p. 371).

Psychotherapy, better called according to Kelly "psychological assistance," should not stifle man's quest for morality.

The moment man gives up the enterprise he is lost. The psychologist who attempts to assist his fellow man should keep this truth central to his system of practice. The task is to assist the individual man in what is singularly the most important undertaking in his life, the fullest possible understanding of the nature of good and evil. This is not to say that man must always steer clear of sin; it is to say, rather, that he should learn from it, and not blindly allow himself to repeat it" (p. 379).

E. J. Shoben, Jr., says the same in his own words:

The examined life is the informed life, the critical life, in the sense that the person ... proclaims himself as responsible for his own actions, i.e., he acknowledges himself as a selective, choosing being. ... It is still sheer romanticism to argue that neurosis is a product of the inherently free human spirit's encounter with a nay-saying society. Uncommon men are most frequently those who are most concerned with the world of their fellows, those for whom the concept of communitas, whether narrow or broad, whether elaborately rationalized or held quite simply, is nevertheless vital. ... If this contention has any merit, then our perspective on mental health is fruitfully altered; and like education, the enterprises of remedial and preventive psychiatry assume a different focus—one in which a disciplined personal autonomy and dreams of a better world are fused and encouraged as the hallmarks of modern manhood (pp. 386-387).

W. E. O'Connell, an Adlerian, deals with the curability of the hospitalized patient through socialization, through humanistic identification with staff members who care and become models of personal responsibility.

Several papers explain that the Freudian term "repression" stands for concealment of damaging information and deceptiveness in interpersonal relations.
W. A. Mainord writing about "Uses of Symptoms" finds guilt real and deserved. "Therapy that ignores guilt is only palliative and therefore could accurately be called symptomatic and superficial" (p. 445).

There is a report of interesting research by C. H. Swensen, Jr., to test Mowrer's hypothesis that "neurosis is caused by the individual behaving in a way that is contrary to the behavior that is approved by his conscience" (p. 455). In another research study D. R. Peterson found support with "insecure" children for Mowrer's hypothesis that, contrary to Freudian theory, "neurotics are under-socialized" (p. 470).

Part V consists of 11 papers from social science, law, and philosophy. Some of these are quite anti-psychiatry and anti-psychiatrist because (a) they consider the psychiatric establishment still a fortress of Freudian thinking and (b) the terms of mental health and especially mental sickness seem to absolve the neurotic, psychotic, and the delinquent from guilt, from responsibility, and negate his potentiality of striving for betterment. Most impressive as examples of how and by what means this striving can be enhanced, are the descriptions of Synanon by L. Yablonsky and of Daytop Lodge by J. A. Shelly and A. Bassin. The miraculous successes of these institutions in rehabilitating drug addicts are the best proof against neutrality, detachment, and privacy as therapeutic factors.

The final Part VI brings 8 contributions from literature, biography and art. *Morality and Mental Health* will teach a lot to anyone interested in psychopathology and psychotherapy; it will, hopefully, influence those who still are under the spell of Freudian theory and will stimulate and sustain Adlerians who have much in common with Mowrer's propositions. The necessity of reconstructing morality, of strengthening conscience, of the importance of guilt and responsibility in mental health, all these tenets fit in well with our viewpoints on the "iron logic" of man's social embeddedness and man's capacity for social feeling and cooperation. There may be disagreement between our belief in the unity of personality and our emphasis on one life goal, and Mowrer's concept of the "repressed conscience" which is Freudian language, but reversed. However, we shall have to study Mowrer's own writings to clarify this issue and to understand his viewpoint (*J. Communication Disorders*, 1967, 1 [2]). In the volume reviewed here we have to expect inconsistencies which are after all not only unavoidable in a book with over 80 authors but also helpful in clarifying our thinking.

The major unifying themes are evident and most valuable. We recommend this book to everyone interested in the change and progress of psychological thinking in an Adlerian direction. It has been compiled by a very recent but outstanding Adlerian. We take real pride in it and should introduce it as reading material in our training courses.

New York, N. Y. Helene Papanek, M.D.

**The Pragmatism of F.C.S. Schiller**


Although the English pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937) is little known, he is of great relevancy to Individual Psychology and humanistic psychology in general. This will become immediately clear by the following from the editor's
introduction. Professor Abel describes as the core of Schiller’s position his conviction that (a) all thought is inescapably associated with the purposes of man, (b) all truths and axioms are not a priori verities but man-made postulates or working hypotheses, and (c) man takes an active role, and thus “our ‘data’ are not ‘what is given’ but ‘what is taken’” (p. 8).

The book presents twelve essays selected from two main works published in 1903 and 1907, arranged in three parts: “Humanism, Pragmatism, and Metaphysics”; “Truth and Meaning in Logic and Psychology”; and “Faith, Ethics, and Immortality.”

For Schiller pragmatism is “the application of humanism to the theory of knowledge” (pp. 24 & 68). It is a method which “is empirical, teleological, and concrete. Its spirit is a bigger thing, which may fitly be denominated humanism” (p. 65). Humanism is based on the axiom of Protagoras, “Man is the measure of all things.” “Fairly interpreted, this is the truest and most important thing that any thinker ever has propounded” (p. 21). Pragmatism and humanism are joined in the statement: “To say that a truth has consequences, and that what has none is meaningless, means that it has a bearing upon some human interest” (p. 59).

In Schiller’s opinion, a workable philosophy “ought to be every man’s concern” (p. 20) and humanism “may fairly claim to be the philosophic working out of common sense” (p. 21). On this basis Schiller offers many propositions expressed in straightforward, relatively simple language, which are currently being restated, often in a much more cumbersome manner, by our present-day operationalists, phenomenologists, and existentialists.

Determinism is shown to be a scientific postulate which “reduces itself, like all such ultimate assumptions, to a matter of free choice” (p. 109). On the other hand, “Voluntarism is the metaphysic which most easily accords . . . with the experience of activity with which all our thinking and all our living seem to overflow” (p. 65). A man’s personal life contributes largely to his data and this must color what he experiences. The resulting personalism leads to the requirement of “toleration, mutual respect, and practical cooperation” (p. 71).

These samples may suffice in support of the conclusion that we should indeed be grateful to the editor and the publisher for having brought back to us the work of such a salutary thinker as F.C.S. Schiller.

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HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

THE SYSTEMATIC SIGNIFICANCE OF F.C.S. SCHILLER


Winetrouth identifies three dimensions in pragmatism: an analytical, represented by Peirce; a social reformist, by Dewey; and an existentialist, by James and Schiller. While “Dewey was the main part of pragmatism,” he is also considered “in some ways . . . the most ‘dated’ . . . We find no sense of anxiety or loneliness or anguish in Dewey” (pp. 146-147).

James has, of course, been recognized as having many similarities with existentialism, e.g., by Rollo May (Existential Psychology, New York: Random House, 1961, p. 12). But this is not known about the English pragmatist F.C.S.
Schiller (1864-1937), close friend and esteemed colleague of James, who has altogether been neglected in the literature. That this is quite unjustified and that Schiller actually has still much to contribute, is the message of Winetrout's book.

Like James, Schiller leaned toward subjectivism, voluntarism and personalism (p. 29). But Schiller particularly anticipated the existentialist axiom of “Existence precedes essence” (p. 30) with his own personalistic statements of “There is no thought without a thinker, no observation without an observer, not even a dream without a dreamer, and no object without a subject” (p. 118). Schiller was invertebrately opposed to the priority of any abstraction over concrete incidents.

In the absence of any absolute truth man has the “right to postulate” which expression Schiller offers in his “Axioms as Postulates” as superior to James's “will to believe.” “The organism cannot help postulating ... because it must act or die... It therefore needs assumptions it can act on and live by” (p. 119). But, also according to Schiller, “An infinite variety of truths may be valid relatively to a variety of differently constituted and situated persons” (p. 94). This expresses Schiller's pluralism, through which toleration replaces infallibility.

Winetrout concludes, “In renewing acquaintance with the existentialist content in the work of James and Schiller, we can, in effect, update pragmatism” (p. 159). The work of Schiller is considered particularly well suited for this purpose. “Precisely because he is relatively unknown ... people have not made up their minds about him” (p. 146). In fact, “There may be quite a large audience of undergraduates for Schiller. He reads easily. He is witty. His remarks continue to have relevance” (p. 68). We hope that this small, stimulating book will indeed have the effect the author would like to see realized.

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Heinz L. Ansbacher

Personality Theory in Progress

Robert W. White. Lives in Progress: a Study of the Natural Growth of Personality


Because the first edition of Robert W. White's Lives in Progress of 1952 was so significant a contribution, the appearance of a second edition in 1966 was necessarily an event of great interest. A new edition affords the opportunity for a renewed appreciation of the book's high quality of scholarship and expression. It also reveals what White has selected as significantly relevant to it from the psychological output of the intervening 14 years.

The book is, as it was, “a study of the natural growth of personality,” concentrating on three case histories of relatively healthy and able young people, “designed to constitute a groundwork of carefully observed facts on which to anchor the discussion of concepts and theories” (p. iii). Data from follow-up interviews with two of the original subjects have been added. White does not inform the reader about changes except to say that the chapters dealing with research and theory “have been refashioned ... to reflect substantial progress in their respective areas” (p. iii). It is certain, however, that this has been a most painstaking revision, as indicated here and there by a change of single terms or of a presentation sequence. The discussions on cultural influences take into account many modifications in our immediate scene, and there is new material
from research on learning, social roles, group therapy, infancy, the development of interests, cognitive maps, and proactive aspects of behavior, among other topics.

There is less Freudian content in this edition, and the dynamic concepts retained are liberally interpreted. To take the case of the psychosexual stages, White points out that these may have "remained more or less intact, but the meaning of the stages has been the subject of substantial disagreement" (p. 328). In a choice sample of his phrasing, he says: "It can be argued that Freud's stages will break like old bottles from receiving so much new wine" (p. 329). White's references to Freud sound like the deferent appreciation accorded an elder statesman, as, e.g., "the concepts of the phallic stage and the Oedipus complex have a certain value even if we do not give them, as Freud did, an adultlike sexual interpretation" (p. 334). Perhaps White's view is best summed up in a statement at the end of the chapter on "The Biological Roots of Personality": "In the recent past, psychoanalysis and its related schools of thought had a virtual monopoly of the more complex aspects of personality. This is no longer true" (p. 259).

On the other side of the coin, as it were, there is new mention of Sullivan and—particularly gratifying to readers of this Journal—considerable attention to Adler who was not included originally. A new section in the chapter on "The Psychodynamics of Development," is titled, "Inferiority Feelings and Compensatory Strivings." The concept of life style is also used in this edition, and, in general, interpersonal relations seem to assume greater centrality. In the final chapter on "Natural Growth during Young Adulthood," a new, fifth, "Growth Trend" is introduced: "The Expansion of Caring." White notes, "Something of the sort was suggested in Adler's description of social interest... 'sense of human solidarity' and 'fellowship in the human community'" (pp. 400-401). The similarity of these to "caring" is brought out by White's explication. Its "true hallmark is in the sphere of feeling," (p. 402) yet there must be cognitive elements in its growth as well, and "there must be action and interaction if caring is to reach full development" (p. 404).

But White's new concept of competence with its accompanying "efficacy" has probably added the most to the new edition. Perhaps the greatest tribute to this schema is that it takes its place unobtrusively, always in harmony with the original basic principles, supplementing limited understanding, enabling further syntheses of views and aspects. Competence is involved in "the task of bringing behavior in accord with the complex requirements of reality" (p. 359), and in all learning.

Some of the child's activity is in the service of drive satisfaction, but some is rewarded simply by feelings of efficacy in dealing with the environment... Even identification can be interpreted in these terms: the child who imitates a model is trying to produce in himself the efficacy he perceived in the model... His conception of himself is nourished partly by the way others treat him... but the heart of his self-feeling is in what he feels himself able to do (p. 360).

Perhaps the best evaluation of this edition is to say that it is like the first, only more so. The focus on natural growth in healthy individuals; the wide grasp of determining influences and the perceptive emphasis on the subjective use of these; the appreciation of change and continuity; the inter-relating of the bio-
logical, dynamic, and social viewpoints—all these excellencies, among others, impress one anew, making this a basic book in the study of personality, even more than before.

Rowena R. Ansbacher

MAN'S POLARITY


To read Rollo May is a thoroughly rewarding experience because he is humanistically erudite, socially oriented, clinically experienced, and courageously creative with respect to the evidence he has gleaned from these positions. This volume is a collection of essays, written mostly in the four years before publication, which cover the wide field of May's interests as an existential, post-Freudian psychotherapist.

May explains his title as referring to the paradoxical nature of man, in the sense of the polarities of its dimensions. The human dilemma—which is at the same time the unique distinguishing characteristic of man (p. 158)—"arises out of man's capacity to experience himself as both subject and object at the same time" (p. 80). This brief, clear-cut definition involves nevertheless a very complex and comprehensive set of implications. May explains that our consciousness is a process of oscillation between being subject and object, which process "gives me potentiality—I can choose between them, throw my weight on one side or another... My freedom lies in my capacity to experience both modes, to live in the dialectical relationship" (p. 9).

May is concerned with all the aspects of freedom—and the gap between the two sides of the dilemma—throughout. He quotes a provocative statement from Hegel, "The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom," and applies it by declaring this progress could also be the measure of the progress of therapy (p. 174). "Freedom is the individual's capacity to know that he is the determined one, to pause between stimulus and response and thus to throw his weight, however slight it may be, on the side of one particular response among several possible ones" (p. 175). And of course May recognizes that "freedom always involves social responsibility" (p. 177). It also means "to face and bear anxiety" (p. 179)—and anxiety, too, together with its close associate, death (p. 103), are recurrent themes of these essays.

Many Freudian concepts are well refuted by May. But he does hold fast to the conception of repression into unconsciousness, taking both these terms quite literally at times, even though he approaches a levels-of-awareness position in his own perceptive view, and recommends a therapeutic stand toward repression, different from the traditional Freudian. In the name of unity, he says, "the patient has to block off, refuse to actualize, some potentialities for knowledge and action" (p. 97). And yet he disputes the possibility of unity if one assumes a "repressing portion" of the ego (p. 91). All this, whether truly inconsistent or not, does challenge one's theorizing about the generally acknowledged inability of persons to accept what is inconsistent (as we would say) with their life styles. Similarly, it is obvious that wholesomeness implies a unity of all of oneself.
But is not “experiencing subconscious and even unconscious powers in yourself” (p. 196) a contradiction in terms?

The reader is sure to find stimulation in many further points, such as May’s views on the meaning of the Oedipus drama, the use of tranquilizers, the goal of therapy, “becoming,” the ability to use symbols, the significance of the individual in a democracy, and the prospects for a science of man.

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Rowena R. Ansbacher

NEW AND OLD WAYS OF JOY


Since Schutz’s work with “encounter groups” has received such colorful recognition, this black-on-white description of his theory and practice is welcome reading. To recapture joy—as Schutz defines it, the feeling that comes from the fulfillment of one’s potential—he employs many original means. The reader is referred to the book itself for their adequate description, as this review will point out the older, more familiar aspects of Schutz’s work. The reader is also referred to the author’s earlier book, FIRO, for his useful treatment of the three interpersonal needs: inclusion, control, and affection.

Schutz takes the traditional view that most non-optimal functioning is the result of emotional blocks (“unresolved” relationships to authority, parents, etc.; hostile feelings which “have never emerged”). However, he finds that these blocks can be removed without insight. This can occur with fantasy methods, psychodrama, and especially a variety of non-verbal techniques. Although Schutz’s clients often achieve the joy of release after complete catharsis, he again departs from traditional views in finding catharsis not enough, and that one must go further to the actual experience of coping successfully with a difficult situation, lest the feeling of release dissipate in time.

Once blocks are removed, emphasis is on increasing awareness of oneself and a sensitivity about other people and the world around one, on honesty and openness. “A man must be willing to let himself be known to himself and others” (p. 16). Openness is a two-way quality implying what W. E. O’Connell calls “outsight.” Significantly, Schutz’s criterion of properly resolved interpersonal needs is the appropriateness of the feelings to the situation (p. 155). He does specify that achieving the most joy “means functioning in such a way that human interaction is rewarding for all concerned” (p. 18). This comes close to the concept of developed social interest.

There are other similarities to Adler. Schutz uses the holistic approach, which includes the body and its posture in an understanding of the person. Sometimes he regards a particular organ as the seat of a problem, even speaking of body-language, where Adler spoke of organ dialect. Schutz finds that the power-seeking individual is compensating for his underlying feelings of incapability. In each interpersonal need-area the basis for positive change is an increase in feeling personal significance and confidence in one’s ability to succeed, whether arrived at through fantasy, drama, or actual experience of overcoming something one could not previously face (p. 220). Schutz suggests that “the place to con-
centrate for making useful changes is not so much on the traumatic historical events as on the individual’s perception of himself” (p. 220). And finally, he feels that he “has turned the corner” in beginning to use the school class as a facilitating device for the individuals within it (p. 213)—a most promising approach pioneered by Adler’s colleagues some 40 years ago.

It is good to see Schutz’s original techniques reaching so many people, and we await with interest their long-range results. It is also good to see his support of some not-so-modern psychological experience.

_Burlington, Vermont_  
Rowena R. Anscher

**Parental Self-Help**


There is in several parts of the country a rapidly growing movement toward self-led parent study groups. It had its starting point in courses given by Rudolf Dreikurs at the University of Oregon and in Chicago, mostly to teachers, on the application of Adlerian principles to the problems of bringing up children in the home and the classroom. With the publication of the book, _Children: the Challenge_, by Dreikurs with Vicki Soltz (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1964) the interest in this approach increased markedly and the practicability of studying it in lay groups was proven by the experience of many participating parents. One instance of this is described by Statton in “Lay mental health action in a community” (this _Journal_, 1968, 24, 94-96).

Now an excellent manual for leaders of these groups has been brought out by Mrs. Soltz who has written over two-thirds of the material herself and selected the remainder from other sources—much of it from study group leaders in Oregon, Chicago, Wilmington, Toronto, and elsewhere. The manual includes specific suggestions for procedures, questions to be discussed for each chapter, and supplementary statements and illustrations.

Mrs. Soltz describes the nature of this whole approach with appropriate, yet eloquent, simplicity: “_Children: the Challenge_ is almost a self-help book... frankly a primer... designed to reach as large an audience as possible and is equally appreciated by and effective in the homes of parents in all walks of life” (p. 1). The manual describes the leader not as a teacher, authority, or counselor, but as the one who is responsible for organizing and presenting the material in the book. “The book must be the source of authority” (p. 5). But we should hasten to add that it is the source of principles. Principles are examined to see which ones can be useful in given problem situations. In the manual, two such principles are neatly and reflexively applied directly to the leader: “Have confidence that you are doing the best you can to meet the needs of the situation” (p. 8); and “The first attitude to be adopted by a successful leader is one of relaxation... We cannot _make_ people learn... It is up to the members of the group to make the choice of whether or not they will accept the new approach” (p. 5).

This manual will surely encourage the formation of further study groups and aid in their effectiveness.

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Rowena R. Anscher