Pragmatism as a label is currently in favor as a terminological convenience in philosophy. This convenience must not obscure the fact that pragmatism is not at all a monolithic system either in its origins or in its present concerns. Charles S. Peirce disavowed pragmatism and adopted the term pragmaticism. William James thought of himself as a radical empiricist. John Dewey seemed to favor instrumentalism. F.C.S. Schiller came onto the scene as a scientific humanist or a personal idealist. George Herbert Mead has avoided on the whole either an imposed or self-selected label; more often than not we find him called simply a social psychologist. George R. Geiger has shown a preference for experimentalism because "the name 'pragmatism' has not really been philosophically useful, except for purposes of abuse" and "'instrumentalism' already has fallen out of favor" because of unflattering connotations (20, p. 137). Nor have we mentioned the various naturalisms which have been permitted to pass as synonyms or near-synonyms for pragmatism.

The anthologists and historians of pragmatism have given us a picture which only intensifies the complexities which inhere in its origins. Milton R. Konvitz and Gail Kennedy declared that pragmatism is a misnomer. "The pragmatists as a group are not adherents to a doctrine but proponents of a method . . . it is a 'corridor theory': people have come to it with widely disparate backgrounds, and because of the diversity of their interests, they have interpreted and applied the theory in many different ways" (25, p. 7). From the Konvitz-Kennedy view of pragmatism as essentially a method, we are given the following names as members of this school: Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, Charles S. Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Percy W. Bridgman, C. I. Lewis, Horace M. Kallen, and Sidney Hook. Konvitz and Kennedy felt obligated to qualify their list by adding: "Perhaps most striking is the omission of F.C.S. Schiller" (25, p. 7).

Morton White in his discussion of American thought used "the revolt against formalism" as his frame of reference. This approach made for a wider perspective than that of method, "a certain style of thinking which dominated America for almost half a century—an
intellectual pattern compounded of pragmatism, institutionalism, behaviorism, legal realism, economic determinism, the 'new history.' . . . the illustrious names in these traditions—John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, Justice Holmes, Charles A. Beard, James Harvey Robinson” (32, p. 3.) In the White context, pragmatism as a historical movement becomes primarily American liberalism in the large sense. White has also placed pragmatism in the context of what he called the “de-Hegelization” of philosophy. This designation would give us still another “history” of pragmatism and another list of philosophers as pragmatists.

John L. Childs took the position that pragmatism is not so much a reaction against as a growth out of.

The movement in philosophy variously known as “pragmatism,” “instrumentalism,” and “experimentalism” is in a real sense an expression of American culture. The outstanding feature of this philosophy is its empirical character. It accepts ordinary human experience as the ultimate source and test of all knowledge and value. Its four founders [Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead] were all born in the America of the open frontier. During the course of their lives they witnessed the conquest of the West, and the transformation of this vast, virgin territory through the use of the resources of science and technology (10, p. 3).

Others would urge us to see pragmatism as the American response to Darwinian evolutionary theory, the American expression of British empiricism, and a later development of Emersonian transcendentalism. In each example a somewhat different cast of characters would emerge on the scene; a somewhat different climatic concern would come center stage.

It is evident that pragmatism was not seen in a single light by those we think of as its leading originators and primary protagonists. Likewise, the anthologist and the historian in review have seen pragmatism as possessing now this and now that essential emphasis.

As a further indication of the disparate qualities within pragmatism, Bertrand Russell could look at one phase of James’s pragmatism and accuse James of giving “a specious but sophistical defence of certain religious dogmas—a defence, moreover, which no whole-hearted believer could accept.” A few pages later Dewey’s pragmatism became in Russell’s words “a power philosophy” and “a cosmic impiety” (30, pp. 814, 828).

Pragmatism as seen by its founders, its anthologists and historians, and its critics is a peculiarly non-monolithic historical movement or philosophical disposition. However, for all of this and much more which could have been brought in, pragmatism was and is no mere terminological convenience. It has been and is a viable
philosophical attitude and method. It may not be all of a piece, but neither is it a shambled hodge-podge. It has few if any peers in terms of influence. Charles Frankel has commented:

If we do not measure the importance of a philosophy by the number of its adherents, but rather by its success in stoking the flames of philosophical discussion, pragmatism was the most important philosophy of the “golden age” of American philosophy. It seemed radical, whether it really was or not. It chose the themes that were debated. And it gave to the most adventurous minds of two generations, in politics, law, history, and economics as well as in philosophy, the sense that old delusions had been cut open and discarded, and that the human mind could now address itself to what really mattered (18, p. 13).

Only Marxism can be considered a rival to pragmatism in the matter of impact beyond the academy. To accept present signs of debilitation and various obituary notices as a true index to the viability of this philosophy is an invitation to error. Many professional philosophers have assigned pragmatism to a sort of academic doghouse, but over the years pragmatism has survived greater troubles, and we assume it will survive its current ostracism.

Origins are at best uncertain matters, but it is reasonably safe to think of Freudian psychology as beginning in 1893 with the publication of Breuer and Freud’s On the Psychic Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena. The origin of pragmatism is usually given as 1878 with the publication of Peirce’s essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” This was not a very vigorous beginning, and it was not until 1898 when James re-introduced the term pragmatism that we get some sense that a new intellectual movement had gotten under way.

We may think of the two movements as having made their start in the same decade. Both had dissections, but the dissections in the pragmatic ranks never quite reached the level of acrimony that took place in Vienna. For a time we could speak of a Jamesian school and a Chicago school. Peirce left the “party” as it were. Schiller felt obligated to write an essay “Must Pragmatists Disagree?” There were times when James was considered a liability by the orthodox, and Schiller was sent packing into exile from time to time. Withal, pragmatism never experienced the splintering which is so evident in Freudian psychology.

Two Inventories of Concerns

It is Adler’s Individual Psychology which parallels the development of pragmatism and shares many of the same emphases. The reasons underlying Adler’s break with Freud in 1911 and his con-
continuing differences with Freud constitute tenets in pragmatic philosophy. Adler found Freudian psychology too reductionistic. Freud’s answers were too simplistic. That sex or that instinct could become such all-embracing explanations was unacceptable to Adler. Freud overplayed the biological and the animal. His aim was to develop a psychological science that would emulate the objectivism of the physical sciences of chemistry and physics.

We should be unfair to Adler if we were to assume that his work was essentially a reaction to the work of Freud. His contributions are both creative and positive. We readily realize this when we examine Heinz L. Ansbacher’s summarization of Adler’s Individual Psychology. Ansbacher’s original summary listed twenty-six axioms and postulates (5, pp. 340-342). It is possible, I believe, to reduce these twenty-six to nine.

1. Life is characterized by movement and growth.
2. Each human being is unique and develops his own life style.
3. Creativity (creative power) is basic to man’s uniqueness.
4. Human life is goal-oriented.
5. There is an existential confrontation with self and world. “Actions are determined by the opinion of oneself and the world as well as by the goal.”
6. Striving “from a feeling of inferiority to superiority; a striving for perfection or totality, for success.”
7. The individual-social complex. “The individual cannot be considered apart from society.”
8. Social interest, social feeling, socialization.
9. Concept of truth. “The logic which follows from human interrelatedness is the closest approximation to an ‘absolute truth.’ ”

In a recent study of F.C.S. Schiller which incorporates aspects of the philosophies of Peirce, James and Dewey, I assigned the following dimensions to pragmatism.

1. The acceptance of the method of science as the procedure for understanding man and for solving problems in any area. One will find an elaboration of this dimension in Reuben Abel (2, pp. 45-54).
2. Pluralism as the attitude most in keeping with the nature of man and the world and most likely to effect humane relationships among men. “It suggests that the future may be different; the die has not been finally cast” (33, p. 152). Pluralism is not at all to be confused with atomism.
3. Subjectivism as the position that we can never escape from ourselves however we may try to do so.
4. Social reformism as the legitimate concern of philosophers.
5. Consequences as constitutive of truth and morality. Or as William James put it: “The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”
6. Existentialism as displayed quite directly in the work of James and Schiller.

7. An analytical dimension which is especially strong in the work of Peirce but which is found in the other pragmatists as they attack the problem of meaning.

8. A concern for man as a religious and spiritual being as exemplified in the thought of James and Schiller (33, pp. 13-32, 160-161).

Some of these dimensions have been rather thoroughly buried beneath an excessive monopoly of pragmatism by the scientific orientation of John Dewey and spokesmen who have followed in this emphasis. But a survey of pragmatism from 1890 to 1916 indicates that these eight dimensions were very much a part of this philosophy as it began and matured in this country. A philosophy so diverse in its inception is bound to show this face and then that face to the world: in a time of economic depression the reformist dimension will tend to surface; in a time of personal alienation the existential will tend to come forward. We need to learn to live with this philosophy as a diffuse and dynamic contribution to modern thought. If one would capture the spirit of pragmatism, then one has no choice but to follow the counsel of William James: to drive with loose reins and to know the benefit of moral holidays.

It would be convenient if these two inventories of concerns, the eight dimensions of pragmatism and the nine points made regarding Individual Psychology, could somehow be matched with each other. But more significant than any facile alignment of one list with another is the condition of how acceptable would a pragmatist find these nine axioms based on the work of Alfred Adler. If Ansbacher’s original twenty-six items are a reasonable distillation of Adler’s psychology, if the above nine items are a reasonable distillation of Ansbacher’s summary, then, it seems to me, one can only conclude that a pragmatist would in a general sense find himself in rather full accord with Individual Psychology. The enthusiasm of one’s agreement with any one item would depend upon his location on the pragmatic continuum. The Deweyean-oriented would experience a warmer affiliation for the Adlerian emphasis upon social interest; while the Jamesean-oriented would so react to the uniqueness of life and the individual life style. This difference in enthusiasm does not imply a contradiction in principle.

In fact as I survey these axioms from Adler, it seems that only one has a slightly unpragmatic tone about it; and that is the one dealing with striving as occurring as a result of moving from a sense
of inferiority to a sense of superiority. The pragmatist would be inclined to think of this level of activity as being prompted by a desire to remove doubt and move toward at least a temporary state of non-doubt.

Adler was aware of this particular fine difference and thought it could be reconciled under the larger denominator of desiring “to overcome difficulties.” “John Dewey refers, very rightly, to this tendency as the striving for security. Others call it the striving for self-preservation. But whatever name we give it, we shall always find in human beings this great line of activity—this struggle to rise from an inferior to a superior position, from defeat to victory, from below to above” (6, p. 104).

**Organismic Orientation**

Pragmatism is identified with a method, the method of science. Peirce and Dewey wanted a method which would do for human affairs what had already been done in the physical realm. Dewey held that philosophy “must undertake to do for the development of inquiry into human affairs and hence into morals what the philosophers of the last few centuries did for the promotion of scientific inquiry in the physical and physiological conditions and aspects of human life” (15, p. 18).

Some might want to hold that Dewey’s pragmatism bears a good deal of resemblance to the simplistic reductionism found in Freud. It is possible that this is the case in Dewey’s early statements on science, but whereas Freudian psychology could escape its reductionism only through the development of Adler’s Individual Psychology and other rejections of orthodox Freudism, Dewey lived long enough to effect a correction, if indeed a correction was necessary, within his own work. To me, the clearest explication of this evolution in Dewey occurs in his last book. It is an evolution in three stages.

Let us now set down in broad outlines three levels of the organization and presentation of inquiry in the order of their historical appearance, understanding, however, as is the way with evolutions generally, that something of the old, and often much of it, survives within or alongside the new. We name these three levels, those of Self-Action, Interaction, and Transaction.

**Self-action:** where things are viewed as acting under their own powers.

**Interaction:** where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection.

**Trans-action:** where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to “element” or other presumptively detachable or independent “entities,” “essences,” or “realities,” and without isolation of presumptively detachable “relations” from such detachable “elements” (16, pp. 107-108).
Dewey’s language here as elsewhere is not the most helpful. For
the moment, let us say that the above quotation indicates Dewey’s
transition from a simple cause-and-effect view of science to a field
concept of science. His interpretation of how science operates,
advanced along a continuum from a reductionistic, elementaristic,
simplistic, objectivist orientation toward a holistic, organismic,
field, subjectivist orientation. This is the direction Adler took as he
moved away from the Freudian orientation. Somehow science was
not quite as simple as it appeared.

George Herbert Mead also took his stand against a simple cause-
and-effect view and therein was in agreement with Adler. According
to Charles Morris, “Both see the human personality as built upon
the interaction of an organism with other organisms in a social
matrix. And both maintain that the self which emerges in this
process of interaction nevertheless is a creative agent which plays
a part in the direction of its own growth” (27, p. 199).

**Transactionalism**

Transactionalism is a much underplayed dimension of pragmatism.
It was Dewey’s good fortune to coin the word in its current
meaning in his last book. “Transaction became a key symbol in
Dewey’s final work because it calls up connection rather than dis-
connection, wholes rather than parts, continuity instead of discon-
tinuity. A term like interaction, on the other hand, already has
begged the question of continuity, for it assumes that some things
have indeed been set apart” (19, p. 16).

George Geiger wrote this succinct summation of transactionalism.
The following items may indicate quickly how a naturalistic and necessarily
relativistic theory of knowledge will have consequences differing sharply from
those entailed by a static spectator theory: (a) knowledge can be neither dis-
cov ery nor disclosure of an aloof and already predetermined existence, for the
very nature of knowing depends upon a joint achievement of organism and en-
vironment; (b) so, the knower, as well as the perceived environment, is part of
his knowledge; (c) individual differences in knowledge among men can be detected
and controlled, eliminated or prized; but the general human element in all knowl-
edge can be neither isolated nor eliminated; (d) scientific knowledge is relative
to knowers in specific contexts; (e) thus, what something may be when totally
independent of any observer or frame of reference is a scientifically meaningless
question, for knowledge is a transaction (20, p. 141).

Hadley Cantril has used a slightly different vocabulary to indi-
cate the transactional approach. In the course of living one con-
tinually makes certain assumptions about the social and natural
world about him. Cantril has called this pattern of assumptions a
person’s “assumptive world” or “reality world.”
Once assumptions are formed and prove more or less effective, they serve both to focus attention and screen out what is apparently irrelevant and, as reinforcing agents, to intensify other aspects of the environment which seem to have direct bearing on our purposes. Thus we do not “react to” our environment in any simple mechanistic way but “transact with” an environment in which we ourselves play the role of active agents. This approach to an understanding of human behavior has therefore come to be called “transactional psychology” (8, pp. 16-17).

Since Adler’s death occurred in 1937, he could have had no contact with the primary documents on transactionalism, for example, Dewey and Bentley’s Knowing and the Known, 1949, and the scattered writings of Adelbert Ames, Jr., Hadley Cantril, P. W. Bridgman, et al. These appeared since the 1940’s. Yet there are in Adler some amazingly supportive statements for the position called transactionalism. “Our senses do not receive actual facts, but merely a subjective image of them, a reflection of the external world” (6, p. 182). This is the individual mixing something of himself up in everything he sees, hears, does. A good statement on this situation occurs in Bridgman.

Not only do I see that I cannot get away from myself, but I see that you cannot get away from yourself. The problem of how to deal with the insight that we never get away from ourselves is perhaps the most important problem before us . . .

Not only is each of us as an individual not able to get away from himself, but the human race as a whole can never get away from itself. The insight that we can never get away from ourselves is an insight which the human race through its long history has been deliberately refusing to admit . . . When we talk about getting away from ourselves it is we who are talking . . . The brain that tries to understand is itself part of the world that it is trying to understand (7, pp. 6-7).

The following passage from Adler is as transactional as anything any transactionalist has written. It is a truly remarkable statement.

Man utilizes only what and how his goal demands. Therefore the process of perception can be comprehended only when one has gained a picture of the hidden goal of a person and has understood everything in him as influenced by this goal.

Perception can never be compared with a photographic apparatus; it always contains something of the individual’s uniqueness. Not everything one sees is perceived, and if one asks for the perception of two persons who have seen the same picture, one receives the most varied answers . . . Perceptions are not strictly identical with reality, for man is able to transform his contact with the external world according to the demands of his uniqueness (6, p. 210).

This position is part of Adler’s Individual Psychology as a clinical process. “The development of the child is determined neither by his own intrinsic ability nor the objective environment, but by the interpretation that he happens to make of the external reality and of his relation to it” (6, p. 386). And because Adler knew this, he was able to achieve greater objectivity than the hard objectivist psychoanalysts.
And Individual Psychology? Has it not also its own particular conception of life? Has it not also a specific point of view regarding the behavior of the individual in his relation to outside problems? Of course it has. But in the first place we have tried to prove that our conception of life is more capable of objectivity than the conception of other psychologists. And secondly we know that we also are predisposed by our philosophy of life, while others do not know that they always find what they have known before. For this reason, Individual Psychology is more capable of detachment and self-control (6, p. 199).

Adler in this passage not only anticipated the transactionalism stemming from the perception demonstrations of Ames at Dartmouth College but also some of the principles propounded by Polanyi in his *Personal Knowledge*.

"As If," The Will to Believe, and Fictionalism

We now enter upon an area in pragmatism which has not received a systematic examination. The problem is to bring together Hans Vaihinger’s the philosophy of “as if,” James’s “the will to believe,” Schiller’s “axioms as postulates,” and Adler’s fictionalism. Vaihinger’s work is an erudite detailed difficult sort of book, but the basic idea is not too taxing.

The fictive activity of the mind is an expression of the fundamental psychical forces; fictions are mental structures. The psyche weaves this aid to thought out of itself; for the mind is inventive; and under the compulsion of necessity, stimulated by the outer world, it discovers the store of contrivances that lie hidden within itself. The organism finds itself in a world full of contradictory sensations, it is exposed to the assaults of a hostile external world, and in order to preserve itself, it is forced to seek every possible means of assistance, external as well as internal (31, p. 12).

So the mind creates fictions. A common illustration of a fiction is the proposition that “all men are created equal.” This is an obvious enough falsehood. Its practicality as a fiction comes from our acting as if all men were indeed equal. This particular fiction induces us to act in a particular way.

Philosophy has been so given to truth-seeking and to knowledge-funding that the prospect of assigning fiction a definite function in philosophy may impress some as a bit on the strange side of things, and further as something which is just not very nice. “We must not, however, always suppose that the purpose of logical thinking is knowledge. Its primary object is a practical one, since the logical function is an instrument of self-preservation” (31, p. 170). Knowledge can very well become secondary, while communication and action assume the position of being primary.

Vaihinger has been good enough to discuss the relationship
between fictionalism and pragmatism. The following occurs in his preface to the English edition of his book, 1924.

Pragmatism, too, so widespread throughout the English-speaking world, has done something to prepare the ground for Fictionalism, in spite of their fundamental difference. Fictionalism does not admit the principle of Pragmatism which runs: "An idea which is found to be useful in practice proves thereby that it is also true in theory, and the fruitful is thus always true." The principle of Fictionalism, on the other hand, or rather the outcome of Fictionalism, is as follows: "An idea whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its theoretical nullity may have great practical importance. But though Fictionalism and Pragmatism are diametrically opposed in principle, in practice they find much in common (31, p. viii).

The Anschers observed: "Vaihinger's system regards ideational constructs, even when in contradiction to reality, of great practical value and indispensable for human life" (6, p. 87). From Adler we have: "The development of the mental life of man is accomplished with the help of a fictional teleology through the proposing of a certain end under the pressure of teleological apperception" (6, p. 94). Our fictions become that far-off divine event which will move us; whether they can move all of creation is another matter.

Vaihinger felt that pragmatism and fictionalism are "diametrically opposed." In the pragmatic case, the useful becomes the true; in the fictional case, untruth becomes the very basis for usefulness. It may be presumptuous on my part, but I should like to suggest that fictionalism agrees in principle and in practice with one dimension of pragmatism which has been rather cast aside by many pragmatists. In William James, it goes by the name of "the will to believe." In F. C. S. Schiller, it goes by the name of "axioms as postulates." It would be my contention that Dewey's "ends-in-view" and "warranted assertibility" at least suggest something of the same. From Dewey's Logic: "Axioms are held to be postulates, neither true nor false in themselves, and to have their meaning determined by the consequences that follow because of their implicatory relations to one another" (13, p. 10).

But it is James and Schiller who seem most congenial to fictionalism, and to bring Dewey in as a co-sponsor from the field of pragmatism may be stretching Dewey to his own discomfiture and surely to the discomfiture of some of his more loyal followers.

Adler himself also saw the relationship between Vaihinger, by whom he was greatly influenced (6, p. 76), and pragmatism. Presenting the case against strict causality or determinism in psychology
he stated, "All thinking, feeling, and acting is based on an interpretation, a greater or lesser error which we can influence by discovering it." And he continues, "This view is not new. We find it in Kant, in pragmatism, in Vaihinger's Philosophy of 'As If'" (6, p. 91).

Basic to Vaihinger's philosophy of as if, to James's will to believe, to Schiller's axioms as postulates, to Adler's fictionalism is this: we need not be in the full possession of the facts to move into the future. Often man has to act whether he has the facts or not. Probably nothing in the entire realm of pragmatism has created such a fuss as James's will to believe. Santayana considered it "James's apology for personal religion." John Hick saw it as "an unrestricted license for wishful thinking" (26, p. 148). William MacLeod found the responses ranging from "cautious approval to wildly enthusiastic acclaim, or from carping objections to snearing denunciations. One might have expected that after the passage of several decades, the most flagrant misconceptions and distortions would have been eliminated" (26, p. 149). It seems to me that the tough-minded have tried too desperately hard to discredit James by accusing him of using this will to justify any religious belief; while the tender-minded have overplayed it as a rationalization for religious belief.

Opponents of James invariably seem to scream that James is doing no more than encouraging a permissiveness to believe in the field of supernatural religion whatever one pleases, so long as it leaves one feeling nice and cozy. But James set up responsible safeguards within his essay. We use the will to believe in order to decide between alternate hypotheses when the option is living, not dead; when it is forced, not avoidable; when it is momentous, not trivial. What is more, it must be a genuine situation (23, p. 89). A careful attention to these four levels would scarcely make for a careless permissiveness. James has given us a one-sentence description of his will. "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds" (23, p. 95). There are times, according to James, when a fact cannot come into existence unless there is a preliminary faith in its coming.

Schiller felt he gained some advantage in calling his essay on the same topic "Axioms As Postulates." He thus did not get tagged so readily with such words as faith and religion, which words could receive bad notices at the hands of many pragmatists. The tone in his essay seems more philosophical and less religious than what we
find in James. "The organism cannot help postulating, because it cannot help trying, because it must act or die, and because from the first it will not acquiesce in less than a complete harmony of its experience. It therefore needs assumptions it can act on and live by" (28, p. 91).

To Schiller, a postulate is a practical necessity as well as a methodological assumption. It arises out of an interest, a sense of purpose on the part of man; it does come to us from some vacuum. It is the very pragmatic notion: to live, we must act. "For we cannot afford to remain unresistingly passive, to be impressed, like the tabula rasa in the traditional fiction, by an independent 'external world' which stamps itself upon us. If we did that, we should be stamped out" (28, p. 55). There is no ready-made world out there; we construct that world by putting questions to it. James and Schiller have pretty much the same thing in mind in these two of their most famous essays.

We will, so we may move. It is an equivalent of the existential leap. It is our way of facing the future and advancing into it. "It involves a whole person... who at crisis points pushes out his own boundaries in order to make the unknown more and more knowable but who in doing so trusts the unknown as he trusts himself or because he trusts himself" (9, pp. 143-144). This, too, is an example of the will to believe in the psychology of the 1960's.

God

Vaihinger brought God into his fictionalism. "God is not the 'father' of men but he is to be treated and regarded as if he were" (31, p. 28). Vaihinger closed his *The Philosophy of "As If"* by holding that Nietzsche, had he lived long enough, "would have justified the utility and the necessity of religious fictions" (31, p. 362).

Fictionalism is an integral aspect of Adler's psychology. But Adler did not conclude that religion must be an inevitable part of his fictionalism or his psychology.

Should, or could, man have waited until he recognized through scientific illumination the necessity for brotherly love and the common weal, for the proper relationship of mother and child, the social lawfulness in the cooperation of the sexes, and the interest in the labor of one's fellow man? Such an intellectual clarification, which leads to the most profound recognition of interconnectedness, which closes all doors to error, and proves that virtue is teachable, has as yet not become realized by many. Religious faith is alive and will continue to live until it is replaced by this most profound insight and the religious feeling which stems from it (6, p. 462).
In short, the will to believe, the use of fictions need not at all be tied up with religion in the conventional orthodox meaning of that word. One may on these grounds believe as readily in the fiction of no-God as in the fiction of God. Nietzsche built his philosophy on the postulate that God is dead. To assume freedom for men, Nietzsche found that he had to postulate the death of God: only thus do we free men.

Schiller and James could be called the religious pragmatists. Schiller had a great interest in bringing science to bear on the study of immortality, and it griev ed him, as he said, that it was easier to raise money to build an orphanage for homeless leprous cats than to get up a fund to make a scientific study of immortality. An interesting aside on the religious feeling of James is found in the following. It occurs in a letter written by James in 1909.

I went there [Clark University] in order to see what Freud was like, and met also Jung of Zurich, who... made a very pleasant impression. I hope that Freud and his pupils will push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are. They can't fail to throw light on human nature; but I confess he made on me personally the impression of a man with fixed ideas. I can make nothing in my own case with his dream theories, and obviously "symbolism" is a most dangerous method. A newspaper report of the Congress said that Freud had condemned the American religious therapy (which has such extensive results) as very "dangerous" because so "unscientific." Bah! (29, p. 139.)

We have in James's reaction at Clark University one aspect of pragmatism's reaction to the Freudian concept of religion. To me, a more fascinating and in the light of our purpose a more important dimension is the similarity with which Dewey and Adler approached the idea of a God. Dewey's definition of God must be one of the shortest on record in the extensive files of philosophy. It reads: "It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name God" (12, p. 51). Adler was not so brief.

The contemplation of a deity is a concretization of the idea of perfection, greatness and superiority, which has been obvious in man's thinking and feeling since time immemorial. The desire to be in God, to follow His call, to be one with Him, are goals of a striving, not a drive or an instinct... The idea of God and the immense significance of this idea for mankind can be understood and appreciated from the point of view of Individual Psychology as follows. It is the concretization and interpretation of the human recognition of greatness and perfection, and the dedication of the individual as well as of society to a goal which rests in the future and which enhances in the present the driving force toward greatness by strengthening the appropriate feelings and emotions... Whether the highest effective goal is called God or Socialism or, as we call it, the pure idea of social interest, it always reflects the same ruling, completion-promising, grace-giving goal of overcoming (6, pp. 460-461).

Dewey too did not insist that God be called God. I confess that I am amazed at the parallelism found here regarding God.
Dewey’s concern for education is well known. Less well known is Adler’s concern. Adler saw the school as a community. He was instrumental in establishing an experimental school in Vienna; his child guidance clinics constituted a major breakthrough in the field of mental hygiene for the young. The following quotation must have a familiar sound for those who studied education in the United States between 1918 and 1939.

An educator’s most important task, one might say his holy duty, is to see to it that no child is discouraged at school, and that a child who enters school already discouraged regains his self-confidence through his school and his teacher. This goes hand-in-hand with the vocation of the educator, for education is possible only with children who look hopefully and joyfully upon the future...

Right education is the method of developing the individual, with all his inherited abilities and disabilities. By courage and training, disabilities may be so compensated that they even become great abilities (6, pp. 399-400).

According to Individual Psychology, “Everybody can accomplish everything” (6, p. 400).

Dewey has said the purpose of education is growth, the kind of growth which facilitates further growth. Adler has said: “The only individuals who can really meet and master the problems of life are those who show in their striving a tendency to enrich all others, who go ahead in such a way that others benefit also” (6, p. 255). Growth in Dewey means a growth which promotes growth in others as well as in oneself. Adler held that the individual cannot be understood apart from his society. Dewey wrote: “If we eliminate the social from the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass” (14, p. 6).

We could list further common elements: a goal-centered education, the centrality of experience, the place of interest, education for flexibility, individual differences, the importance of creativity. Education is very close to both Adler and Dewey, and within this area of common concern there are many common emphases. A text gives us this summary: “Adler fashioned a humanistic theory of personality which was the antithesis of Freud’s conception of man. By endowing man with altruism, humanitarianism, co-operation, creativity, uniqueness, and awareness, he restored to man a sense of dignity and worth that psychoanalysis had pretty largely destroyed” (22, p. 125). This also gives a pretty good picture of Adler’s position in education.
Loren Grey has put the case very well in the pages of this *Journal* some years ago:

The thinking of Adler is remarkably similar to that of John Dewey. When one considers the widely varying backgrounds of the two men... the agreement in their basic views seems all the more striking. In terms of general principles, both Adler and Dewey were concerned with knowledge gained through human experience... Both maintained that the source of knowledge is through sense-experience plus thought, and felt that truth could not be considered truth until the results verified it. Both considered the mind as a biological instrument with which man effected his adjustment to his environment, and both were deeply concerned with the modification of human behavior through education in order that man might live more harmoniously with his fellow beings (21, pp. 71-72).

**Social Reformism**

Pragmatism and Individual Psychology are devoted to social improvement. They lack and oppose fatalism which seems to dominate so much of the work of Freud and his followers. Even before Adler became interested in psychology he was oriented toward action for social betterment (3, pp. 311-313). When he had developed his theory of the neuroses and psychotherapy he stated:

All failures—neurotics, psychotics, criminals, drunkards, problem children, suicides, perverts and prostitutes—are failures because they are lacking in social interest. They approach the problems of occupation, friendship, and sex without the confidence that they can be solved by cooperation. The meaning they give to life is a private meaning. No one is benefited by the achievement of their aims, and their interest stops short at their own persons. Their goal is a goal of personal superiority, and their triumphs have meaning only to themselves... A private meaning is, in fact, no meaning at all. Meaning is only possible in communication, for a word which meant something to one person only would really be meaningless... Every human being strives for significance, but people always make mistakes if they do not see that their whole significance must consist in their contribution to the lives of others (6, p. 156).

More briefly and pointedly: “Psychotherapy is an exercise in cooperation and a test of cooperation. We can succeed only if we are genuinely interested in the other” (6, p. 340).

This is Dewey’s position in large part. He began “My Pedagogic Creed,” 1897, with: “All education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race... the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child’s powers by the demands of the social situation in which he finds himself” (14, p. 3). His complaint is that we are apt to look at the school from an “individualist standpoint.” We must seed education from a community standpoint, an effort whereby we improve personal living by improving the life of the community.

Allport held that we have to realize what Dewey “has long contended, that without democracy psychology cannot succeed, and
that without psychology democracy will surely fail” (4, p. 290). For Dewey the concept of democracy was “the widening of the area of shared concern” (33, p. 154). For Adler the responsibility of the psychologist was “the spreading of social interest in the family, the school, and society at large” (6, p. 454).

An important contribution to this section is to be found in Lewis S. Feuer's paper on Dewey and Freud.

A kind of necessitarian bias pervaded Freud's conception of scientific knowledge; man was condemned somewhat too readily to be bound by certain unalterable universal laws whose formulation perhaps concealed a dependence on alterable conditions. The contingent values to the variables in sociological laws can be easily mistaken for unchangeable constants. Dewey's notion of scientific laws was, on the other hand, more of an interventionist kind. He held that although human behavior is governed by laws, nevertheless the independent variables are controlled, accessible to human intervention; man is not in the grip of some awesome fate. Conservatives such as Pareto and Freud have a truncated conception of scientific knowledge, for their unconscious desire to prove that basic social reforms are impossible, leads them to repress scientific knowledge which is humanly possible. Only the man in whom the desire for reform is strong will press on to complete the scientific system in all its practicable entirety.

Freud's bias is that to "know" something is to prove that it has to be so, and can't be otherwise, whereas for Dewey, as for Marx, to "know" a reality is to be able to change it (17, pp. 125-126).

Like Dewey and many other pragmatists, Adler is the interventionist and not the necessitarian. Thus, according to Feuer, "The grounds for the divergence between Adler and Freud were similar to those which obtained between Dewey and Freud" (17, p. 121).

Of George Herbert Mead also it was pointed out, by Charles Morris, that "Adler's position seems . . . much more congenial to Mead's thought than is Freud. Mead refers . . . to the 'more or less fantastic psychology' of Freud; nothing in Adler's position would seem fantastic to a follower of Mead" (27, p. 200).

**APPLICATION AND COMMITMENT**

The gamut has been run from scientific orientation to social reformism; and it may seem that our survey has been sufficient. However, our examination of Individual Psychology and pragmatism would be severely truncated and incomplete if we did not discuss one further example of parallelism. This is the relationship between theory and application. Too frequently we find persons more solicitous of their theories than they are of the therapeutic improvement which may occur in individuals and society. Carkhuff and Berenson have observed that "the complexity of our abstractions and their
vague implications for therapeutic treatment are so far removed from behavior and life that assessing efficacy takes the form of crude judgments based upon modification of hypothetical dynamics. The dynamic, living, behaving person is lost in the labels” (9, p. 87).

We know the dangers of fixed beliefs, the pitfalls of theoretical purity. We have seen these purists remain Olympus-bound and refuse to test their theories in the marketplace on the basis of consequences. Dewey has commented on this. “Pure reasoning as a means of arriving at truth is like the spider who spins a web out of himself. The web is orderly and elaborate, but it is only a trap” (15, p. 48). Or again from Dewey. “Fixed forms and ends mark fixed limits to change” (15, p. 73). Carkhuff and Berenson have pointed out how disastrously narrow has been the approach of some Freudians. “Psychoanalytic practice often defines success in terms of the patient’s degree of acceptance of the therapist’s view of life” (9, p. 123). Indeed, success may at times be measured by the cordiality with which one accepts the vocabulary of the therapist: speak as I do, and you are well.

Somewhere along the way we must get to the level of application. Schiller has said it briefly and directly. “Truths must be used to become true, and to stay true. They are also meant to be used. They are the rules for action. And a rule that is not applied, remains abstract, rules nothing, and means nothing” (1, p. 63). Again from Schiller: “To become really true, a truth claim has to be tested, and it is tested by being applied” (1, p. 61).

Pragmatism has been associated with meliorism, and Dewey has given us the following description. “Meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered” (15, p. 142). This commitment to meliorism on the part of Dewey is the subject of an article by C. J. Karier on Dewey and Freud. Karier found revolutionary flexibility in Dewey whereas Freud is represented as a kind of authoritarian fatalist (24).

Individual Psychology and pragmatism possess this dual commitment: we must go into the marketplace, into the school, into the hospital to test and apply our theories; and the usefulness of our theories will be guided by the goal of meliorism, an improvement in the individual-and-society. Why study the slum except to make an improvement in the lives of those who live there? Kenneth Clark recently wrote:
There was early evidence that Adler was never content with abstract theorizing and never permitted himself the luxury of either clinical isolation from the very real problems of man or acceptance of the most profound insights as ends in themselves. Adler insisted upon seeking to understand the dynamics of man, as a means of helping man to move toward justice and dignity in his relations with his fellow man (11, p. 183).

Clark saw Adlerian psychology as an alternative to "fatalistic or misanthropic psychodynamic theories." To him, Adler's appeal is for man to use his "intelligence to assure human survival and progress" (11, p. 189). In Clark, we see a psychologist committed to testing his theories with the very real problems of man and to bringing his professional talents into play in the field of civil rights and ghetto education.

We know that in the summer of 1955 Hadley Cantril, the transactional psychologist, went to the White House. His purpose there was to assist President Eisenhower in gaining insights into the perceptions of other nationals. How did the world look to Cubans? How to Russians? Cantril wrote that to the best of his knowledge, this was "the first time a psychologist, in his professional role, had directly drawn a President's attention to the possible value of psychological theory in Government policy making" (8, p. 20).

Examples of application could be extended, but these few indicate the range with which applications may be made and the commitments underlying these applications.

We conclude with F. C. S. Schiller: "To what extent and in what direction the world is plastic and to be moulded by our action we do not know as yet. We can find out only by trying" (1, p. 50). Perhaps this is what both pragmatism and Individual Psychology are trying to say.

**Summary and Conclusion**

Over the years there has developed a modest literature on the relationship of this or that pragmatist to Freud or to Adler. It has seemed time that there should be a more inclusive and definitive effort to generalize the relationship between pragmatism and Individual Psychology. It is not easy to bring the many facets and nuances of pragmatism under a single umbrella. Nevertheless pragmatism in a general sense gives us a certain frame of reference, a certain philosophical climate, a certain proclivity for social reform, a certain concern for existential man. Within these general tenets and the valuational commitments of pragmatism we find pragmatism and Individual Psychology unusually supportive of one another.
ADLERIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

It seems to me that we have been mistaken in much of our discussion of pragmatism as it relates to psychology. We have tended to look backward to Herbart, to James’s Principles of Psychology, to the biological Darwinism which conditioned much of Dewey’s thinking. Perhaps our efforts could have been more fruitful if we had examined pragmatism in the light of what was going on in Vienna at the very same time that pragmatism was gathering strength and adherents in the United States; if we had made careful note of Individual Psychology as propounded by Alfred Adler.

REFERENCES


1Reviewed in this issue.
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