BOOK REVIEWS

CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENOLOGY


For most American psychologists phenomenology is a kind of closed, off-limits territory seen as an annoying elaboration of verbiage without relevance to behavior. Since this implied conclusion deviates markedly from the veridical, it is a real satisfaction to find a book on phenomenology as readable and as clear in purpose and organization as the Field of Consciousness by Aron Gurwitsch. He states his definition and purpose in the following way: "Phenomenology is... characterized as a systematic study and theory of subjectivity for the sake of an ultimate clarification and elucidation of objects of any description whatsoever. Such a clarification is attempted by means of descriptive analyses of the appearances of objects through acts of consciousness" (p. 5).

In approaching phenomenology one should think of at least the following points of historical reference. Hume had thrown philosophy into great turmoil by denying both soul and self and insisting on a "kaleidoscopic succession" of mental events without the former bases of organization. The Mills attempted to restore order through principles of association. James used association but pointed to intrinsic bases; Brentano conceptualized the act as an organizational device, while the Gestalt group later insisted on a nativistic approach with emphasis on figure and ground. Some of the attempts to bring order out of chaos were so involved in consciousness itself (Wundt-Titchener structuralism) that the problems of behavior were systematically ignored. Unfortunately, much of phenomenology still is open to this American type of criticism, and it probably remains the problem of American psychology to discover or invent the conceptual schema by which phenomenology and the behavioral sciences can be integrated. Can such an integration be effected? It is with this frame of reference that reading Gurwitsch is highly recommended.

Gurwitsch devotes the first 85 pages to the problem of conscious field organization. He compares the theories of James, Koffka, Koehler, Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, von Ehrenfels, Meinong, Husserl as well as others. Following this scholarly and useful introduction, he turns to Gestalt theory for the basic illustrations and principles of conscious field organization. He extends the perceptual model of figure-ground relationship to the field of consciousness in general. This second segment, approximately 75 pages, might also be included in what Gurwitsch feels is necessary background and introduction.

With Part III, Gurwitsch introduces some of the basic methodological concepts of phenomenology and continues with facets of this exposition to the end of Part VI. By way of the Cartesian logic demonstrating the reality of consciousness and finally of the dualism of subject and object, Gurwitsch arrives at the method of phenomenological reduction. This type of reduction aims not at the nature of "things in themselves" but rather at the nature and patterns of meanings, appearances and experiences. The remainder of the book is essentially an elaboration in several directions of this central theme.
Unfortunately, the author never comes to grips with the nature of consciousness itself. It is difficult to assess, therefore, the implications of the kind of dualism which the author assumes and the degree of consistency with which he uses these implications. The reviewer is convinced that until the issue of philosophical dualism has better solutions than the traditional ones, discourses on phenomenology will continue to be plagued, too frequently, with vague and unclear statements.

Nevertheless, Gurwitsch has accomplished an exposition that for clarity easily exceeds the typical essay in this field. Both philosophy and psychology will be the richer for his Field of Consciousness.

Washington State University
Pullman, Washington

Rex M. Collier

MAN AS AN INTERCOMMUNICATION SYSTEM


This is truly a magnum opus, for the total page count will run to approximately 1700, all by one author. One is impressed not only by the quantitative aspect, but also by the courageous attempt to give central significance to three traditionally neglected concepts, namely, consciousness, imagery and affect.

Tomkins' goal is to present a comprehensive theory of human behavior wherein the emphasis is on the "transformations that make behavior possible" rather than on the behavior itself. He sees the human being as an intercommunication system, with affect assuming a dominant motivational role; the image, "which is created by the organism itself," functions as a kind of duplicated goal object; and consciousness monitors the feedback effects. The sensory process, in its role, is not a direct contribution to what is immediately conscious nor to general memory storage; rather "before any sensory message becomes conscious it must be matched by a centrally innervated feedback mechanism." This feedback mechanism is a central efferent process emitted at the central receiving station which attempts to duplicate the afferent message. The duplication process itself is essential to the development of the image and the functions of consciousness. Altogether, the combined functions of affect, image and consciousness become a kind of interlocking set of mechanisms that modify and control behavior.

In order to build his theory toward this arrangement, Tomkins designates the ability of the living system to duplicate itself as its most essential characteristic. The duplication process is seen as extending beyond genetic transmission to include both physiological and psychological subsystems. All communication is dependent upon duplication of some sort. Not only modern mass media are essentially duplicative, but the early forms of writing also attempted to duplicate, namely, the object as a picture word. The sensory process also duplicates. But it becomes transmuted in the central area by "an as yet unknown process" wherein central attempts at duplication transform the sensory message into usable report forms or information.
The foregoing paragraphs attempt only an oversimplified epitome of the theory. Tomkins' work is praiseworthy on at least the following issues: (a) The role of affect in behavior is given a dominant position instead of being left, as it is so frequently, in the traditional static, ineffectual role of a Titchenerian element. (b) There is a real attempt to give consciousness a functional significance in behavior, although the text is not as clear as one would like in regard to how consciousness does operate. This may be an issue which Volume 3 will clarify. (c) Tomkins has gone a long way in creating a unified theory of behavior even at the risk of being somewhat unorthodox in certain respects. (d) And he has most certainly done his own "home work" which in the day of compilations of other peoples' chapters must be noted with respect.

At the same time, he has clearly left targets at which shots will inevitably be taken. For example, when he insists that the most important characteristic of a living organism is its ability to duplicate itself, many will disagree. A counter-proposal for essentiality would be growth. To duplicate is only one aspect of growth; to differentiate and remain integrated are equally important functions and, some critics might insist, even more essential than duplication. Crystals duplicate themselves but are not living systems, hence the duplicating capacity does not distinguish between animate and inanimate systems. This reviewer kept wondering if Tomkins' persistent search for "mechanisms" was not instrumental in his emphasis on duplication. Again, is the ability to duplicate as important as the ability to vary a response, to adapt, to cope with, and to create? There seems to be no chapter on creativity. Could the mechanistic emphasis be the basis for this omission? In a theory of behavior as comprehensive as this, one might expect such a chapter.

Like many of his colleagues, Tomkins seems to see the nervous system in terms of its "wiring diagrams" rather than in terms of the phylogenetic contexts and continuities that give the nervous system meaning in relation to a total organism. However, this is a common error in modern psychological orthodoxy. It is doubtful if psychologists generally have learned yet really to use the principle of phylogenetic continuity in theoretical approaches.

Among other targets, the omission of bibliographical references and resources should be mentioned. Their inclusion would have greatly increased the usefulness of these volumes.

The writing is stimulating and has the marks of considerable originality. For those seriously interested in psychological theory, reading these volumes will become a necessity.

Washington State University
Pullman, Washington

REX M. COLLIER

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE LEARNING PSYCHOLOGISTS?


This is a valuable book, and especially so for personality theorists and psychotherapists who, with some justification, have been criticized for concerning themselves too little with learning theory and experimentation. Bandura and Walters
who have themselves, and together with collaborators, carried out an impressive number of conclusive experimental studies in learning, offer the serious and sophisticated reader a full survey of the work in this field as it relates to social behavior. Actually, they claim only to emphasize the role of social variables more than other learning theorists do, and use the term social for more-than-one person learning situations, regardless of the nature or extent of interrelationship involved. They hold that since psychotherapy is a learning process, the learning principles which apply to the socialization of children generally apply equally to clinical practice. These are: (a) imitation, including exposure to verbal description as well as a real or pictured model, and (b) direct training through reinforcement.

The experimentally grounded rejection of assumptions of "psychodynamic forces" is a most impressive aspect of the book. These conceptualizations, of Freudian origin, are the guise in which mystical demons reappear, "typically ego-alien," buried under layers of personality" (p. 30). A good example is the case of attributing "autism to an underlying schizophrenic process. This 'explanation' is, of course, completely circular, since the only evidence for the assumed underlying process is the behavior it is called on to 'explain.'" From a social-learning point of view, schizophrenics are persons who show certain characteristic responses to stress and frustration" (p. 67). Similarly, the authors show that "latent homosexuality" is better replaced by "the influence of external social-learning variables, such as distribution of rewarding power within the family" (p. 99); that the "release therapy" of catharsis, i.e., the encouragement of expression of aggression as a means of eliminating it, is counterindicated (pp. 253-256); that the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which presents aggression as a natural and inevitable consequence of frustration, is untenable (pp. 133-137); and that intermittent positive reinforcement and other social variables constitute a far better explanation for persistent delinquency than an unconscious sense of guilt which causes the individual to commit further offenses for the sake of the punishment he seeks (pp. 211-220).

A second target of the authors' rejection is the underlying theme of stage theories of personality development since these theories stress "intraindividual variability over time and similarities among individuals at specifiable age periods . . . and minimize obvious . . . interindividual variability in behavior due to biological, socio-economic, ethnic, and cultural differences and to variations in the child-training practices of socialization agents" (p. 24), and obvious intraindividual continuity.

The authors would not do away, presumably, with all inferences in explanation of behavior, but they insist that these be "systematically related to both the manipulable stimulus conditions and observable response variables" (p. 31). They further point out the necessity for defining the dependent variables in terms of specific observable behavior.

Enlightening and useful as their findings are, eventually one must ask, how far can these go in explaining behavior? Bandura and Walters claim to have gone beyond other learning psychologists in recognizing that studies on animals make no provision for self-generated inhibitory responses (p. 20), and that reinforcement alone provides no explanation of the origin of responses generally. Their step forward is the inclusion of the wide field of imitative learning. Yet one is soon struck by limitations even here, namely, the accountability for original—in the sense of
created—responses. The authors do point out that imitation becomes selective where several models are provided (as in most social situations). Is there not such a thing, also, as spontaneous learning? At times the authors emphasize the role of individual differences, but they ascribe these to constitutional factors or prior reinforcements. Though “personality development” is paired with “social learning” in the title, the word personality is scarcely mentioned in the text. The authors would seem to be begging the question of the individual as a unitary agent. They say that “learned patterns of response tend to generalize” (p. 8), and they may overgeneralize; and “patterns vary in strength, forming a habit hierarchy” (p. 21). But what agent arranges the hierarchy, or abstracts common features in the observed, or selects from among models? Is it less operational—or more ‘demonic’—to assume a unifying life style than to ascribe a generalizing ability to responses, and a self-organizing ability to habits?

It is to be recommended most strongly to personality theorists and psychotherapists that they, in spite of such points of probable disagreement with the authors, study the contents of this volume, some of which are new and surprising, some corroborative of useful hypotheses, and some invalidating nonoperational assumptions.

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

PERSONALITY THEORIES AND THEIR USE


Intended as a textbook for undergraduate courses in personality, this is a neutral, eclectic, integrative book reminiscent of Hall and Lindzey’s more advanced and sophisticated Theories of Personality.

Bischof presents his selections of personality theories in the following categories: biophysical—biophilosophical—Freud, Sheldon, Murray, Jung; biosocial-social interaction—Adler, Sullivan, Horney, Moreno; general and integrative—Rogers, Allport, Murphy. These eleven theorists constitute the major system representatives. Lewin, Cattell, Eysenck, and Mowrer are seen as symbolic, mathematical, and learning theorists; while Goldstein, Maslow, and Fromm are regarded as holistic, holistic-integrative, and social interaction theorists.

Of the eleven major theorists, Moreno gets most space, Rogers least. Possibly the fact that the author “has had personal visits with some of the theorists involved in the book” may be reflected here in this longest chapter, for he rather uncritically repeats Moreno’s statements. Adler is tenth with 36 pages, compared to 27 pages for Rogers, 59 for Freud, and 67 for Moreno. While Bischof does not declare especial interest or acceptance of any single system, the reviewer’s impression is that he handles Karen Horney’s position with the greatest degree of competency and sympathy.

An especial feature of this book is Bischof’s attempt to present each theory according to three functions: describing, explaining, and predicting individual behavior. Under the heading of explaining he has chosen nine examples of human behavior—marriage, perversions, suicide, lawbreaking, supernatural being, humor, smoking, play and recreation, and psychoses-neuroses—for each of which he gives the theory-specific views of ten of the eleven major systems (excluding Rogers).
For Adler, for example, marriages are explained by role acceptance as part of the life style; search for attainment of the fictional goal of a happy family life; as well as the force of social interest. Suicide can be explained by inverted inferiority feelings in which the individual can see only downward regression in his future; or by frustration of superiority strivings with collapse of the creative self, so that death means immediate entrance to a desired superior state.

Bischof seems to have read widely and penetratingly in the literature of Individual Psychology, and offers a relatively fair picture of the ideas of Adler and his disciples. While every Adlerian is likely to find points of difference in interpretations and emphasis in Bischof's summary, overall it is one of the clearest and most comprehensive statements by a non-Adlerian.

The author's intent is to present each system fairly, so that "the initial expository treatment may sound as if each theory were absolutely the best of all," inviting the student to construct his own personality system. While it is easy to find fault with any such ambitious undertaking which attempts to explain so wide a spectrum of ideas, this book must be commended for having a sound and original plan for realizing its purpose, and for giving a relatively accurate and comprehensive account of currently important personality systems from which the reader is able to make some kind of comparison and also to come to some personal formulation. Two special features of the book are: unusually extensive bibliographies for each system presented and diagrammatic summaries of nine theories.

University of California, Berkeley

Raymond J. Corsini

Beyond Gemeinschaftsgefuehl


The central theme of the book is a thought-provoking description of the development of the religious personality and the unauthentic or useless goals which lead to pathology in religious life. The author's approach is actually basically Adlerian with emphasis on the phenomenological operationism, the gestalt of attitudes and actions. His orientation is likewise "primacy of the existential over the organismic, the instinctual and the environmental" (p. 103). Existentialism and religion are aptly combined in this extension of Adlerian theory beyond the striving for perfection through social embeddedness to the search for "a personal Transcendent who is experienced as the Ground of One's Being" (p. 136). Adlerian concepts appear throughout the book although no mention is made of their source. Style of life, life plan, life lie, striving for perfection, as-if attitudes, and distance are a few of the more noticeable terms (although the latter two are used in a slightly different sense).

The three main phases of development of a religious mode of existence are preparatory, proper development, and an abiding, embodying phase. In the initial category the existential striving is transferred to something less than God. These existential transferences have narcissistic, parental, significant other, or cultural orientations. "Since I see them as the source and personification of all goodness, I naturally tend to identify myself with them" (p. 123). Here "a good psychotherapist, becomes for me like John the Baptist, who was not himself the
Lord but opened the way for the Lord” (p. 122). The mature person progressing through idolizing and demonizing tendencies (positive and negative existential transferences) finally learns to have faith that only God is perfect and good. In the second phase one’s persence to God has its own stages of development. The biosensual, functional, romantic, and existential levels have such inherent dangers as perversions in religious disguise, moral fanaticism, and fixations on emotionalism. Beyond the transferential and development growth phases is that of the incarnation or embodiment of religious development. “Temptation, anger, resistance, weakness, and failure may emerge in the more peripheral regions of man’s existence, but they cannot directly destroy the existential religious commitment which maintains itself in the core of his being” (p. 138). The deeper mode of religious existence, a truly existential commitment, is nourished by an authentic self-integration. Openness to self and others is paramount, and the life-long striving for perfection must never be based on a repression of other modes of existence or not-wanted impulses. Man’s authentic will or spirit grows through a never ending dialogue between his possibilities of existence. “Admitting the presence of negative qualities does not mean elaborating their presence” (pp. 19-20). “I can transcend only what I own in awareness” (p. 117).

Books such as this one should be used in training clinicians away from viewing personality in a narrow, “nothing-but” mold. In this excellent presentation, religion is not an illness but a healthful force for authentic existence, and life not a problem but a mystery to be lived.

**Veterans Administration Hospital**  
**Waco, Texas**

**WALTER E. O’CONNELL**

**RETURN TO COMMUNITY**


Three years ago Mower’s *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* appeared and it was our privilege to review it (this Journal, 1961, 17, 235-236). On rereading the earlier review we were amazed to see how closely it covered the present work. Taking it point by point, the new book too, contains a number of papers and all but two out of fourteen have been previously published; it inveighs against psychoanalysis; it sees the cause of neurosis and some psychosis as the painful experience of secret sin; and it calls for open confession and reforming conduct along the lines of ethical values. As before, we are wholly in sympathy with Mower’s view, possibly making us more sensitive to whatever shortcomings his work may have; and again we are impressed with the extent to which his position reaffirms that of Adler.

The particular function of the present review should therefore be to point out what is new in Mower’s most recent work. It would be most difficult to say how far he has moved, but it seems fair to say that the direction is toward emphasizing the interpersonal aspect of the individual, his relationship to the community. Mower has come to add to his understanding of guilt an emphasis on its alienating quality, and correspondingly he defines its reconciliation in a new interpretation of conversion—as “a ‘turning with’ and a ‘joining’ of the human race” (p. 114). Concealment is now more explicitly seen as a concomitant of evading cultural de-
mands. Just as Adler defined good from the viewpoint of the community, Mowrer says: "Conscience is a product of community life and experience and is designed to keep the individual in community, i.e., 'good.' Sin, in its most broadly defensible definition, is a rupture of this relationship; and there is, by the very nature of the case, no private solution possible for the personal 'condition' thus created" (pp. 174-175). Thus the scope of personal confession, traditionally in religion and psychiatry to one person, must be broadened to include "radical openness with the 'significant others' in one's life" (p. 90) and must be carried further into "an expanding circle of other 'growing' persons and relatively rapid introduction into a 'therapeutic community'... while [the neurotic] restructures and improves the quality of his relationship with 'significant others' and society in general" (p. 162). This openness Mowrer regards not only as the most effective treatment of neurosis, but also as the best form of prevention and as a way of life.

At this point, however, the reader must be warned that the title of this book is unfortunately deceptive. Mowrer does not deal with the description or processes of group therapy which he recommends. In his preface he identifies the "new group therapy" as that practiced in a large and growing number of self-help clubs by laymen, as in the pioneering example of Alcoholics Anonymous, but he declines to deal with these groups directly, hoping instead to provide them with "a unifying rationale and a sound psychological sociological underpinning" (p. iv).

There can be little doubt that many workers in the mental health field will be largely in agreement with Mowrer's basic theory, especially in its more socialized perspective. One is now left with the questions of its practical implementation. Just how, and how far is confession to be accomplished? What are the criteria for deciding how much one should tell, and to how many significant others? And, how does one insure that the individual, once having attained openness, goes on to a positive, contributing connectedness with the community? We need much light on how to work that cure which seems the only way out of so many mental disorders, "getting the person back into the family of the human race" (p. 166).

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbaicher

Freud and the Minister


This is in fact a great and self-disclosing debate between Freud and Pfister, a Swiss Protestant clergyman, the first pastor to use psychoanalysis. There is a splendor in the sheer dimensions of this correspondence which lasted almost 30 years, in the beauty of its language and the easy flow of its content, in the constant warmth of its mutual regard, and in its flawless honesty. Indeed it would seem to represent a peak achievement in dyadic relationships.

This is all the more striking because of the pronounced differences between the two correspondents. In his thinking Pfister is optimistic; he is holistic in seeking synthesis along with analysis, and in the ordering of elements into ever larger wholes within the universe; he differs from Freud on the primacy of sex, the death instinct, the nature of instincts in general, the aloofness of the analyst in therapy—in fact, one comes to wonder just what in Freud's teachings calls
forth the high praise in which so much of Pfister's letters consists, such as: "... what a great and magnificent thing analysis is, and what an enrichment of life it means. . . . It brought an unparalleled illumination into my life, and I cannot thank you enough for all you have done for me by your discoveries. . . . If I am able to work really hard for analysis during the years that remain to me I shall be a happy man, no matter what other things life may have in store for me" (p. 90).

Pfister's unbounded veneration for Freud, the man, flourished also, in spite of great personal differences. Some of these Pfister refuses to accept at their face value: "You are much better and deeper than your disbelief, and I am much worse and more superficial than my faith . . ." (p. 122). "[Although you profess the opposite] you act 'as if' there were a purpose and meaning in life and the universe . . ." (p. 127).

Pfister's feelings for Freud elicited correspondingly toned responses. In an early letter which Freud addressed, "Dear Man of God," he wrote:

A letter from you is one of the best possible things. . . . But do not believe that I believe everything or even a large part of the delightful things that you say to me and about me, i.e., I believe them of you but not of me. I do not deny that it does me good to hear that sort of thing, but after a while I recall my own self-knowledge and become a good deal more modest. What remains behind is the belief that you honestly mean what you say, and the pleasure given by your kind and enthusiastic nature (p. 29).

Beyond the reflection of Pfister's glowing acclaim, certain of Freud's virtues become disclosed as well in their own right, such as his many-faceted strength, his tenacity in holding to what he saw as objective, his unswerving sense of obligation.

In the theoretical debate we find ourselves on Pfister's side. (Incidentally, Freud chides Pfister several times for a leaning toward Adler.) Most importantly, perhaps, we agree with Pfister that "there can be no such thing as a pure empiricist" (p. 114). Freud maintained that "analysis itself is after all . . . in the first place an honest establishment of the facts . . . A squeamish concern that no harm must be done to the higher things in man is unworthy of an analyst" (p. 87). "I have not been influenced by constitutional factors or acquired emotional attitudes . . . The question is not what belief is more pleasing . . . or advantageous to life, but what may approximate more closely the puzzling reality that lies outside us. The death instinct is not a requirement of my heart . . . [but] an inevitable assumption . . ." (pp. 132-133).

It would be unfair, however, not to quote the remarkable statement which follows this one: "Of course it is very possible that I may be mistaken on all three points, the independence of my theories from my disposition, the validity of my arguments on their behalf, and their content" (p. 133). Though as a positivist Freud is bent on convincing his critics "that all our theories are based on experience . . . not just fabricated out of thin air" (p. 27), he does make the self-revealing statement, "Work and the free play of the imagination are for me the same thing" (p. 35).

This reviewer felt there was good reason for Freud's lack of success in his continuing effort "to put [Pfister] right in the matter of sexual theory." One of several surprising uses of the term love appears in a criticism of Adler. "He has created for himself a world system without love . . ." (p. 48). Yet Freud manifests little defense of love in the world in the following statement: "I do not break my
head very much about good and evil, but I have found little that is 'good' about human beings on the whole. In my experience most of them are trash . . . I subscribe to a high ideal from which most of the human beings I have come across depart most lamentably” (pp. 61-62).

However Freud may have felt toward mankind, one must admire his relationship to Pfister. Happy the reader who—on his own level and with his own theoretical opponents—may echo Freud's conviction: “We know that by different routes we aspire to the same objectives for poor humanity” (p. 113).

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOKS NOTED


BARNETTE, W. L., JR. (Ed.) Readings in psychological tests and measurements. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964. Pp. xi + 354. $3.00 paper. — A collection of almost 50 short papers which have been condensed from their original presentations to suit the undergraduate with limited acquaintance with statistics. They should serve this purpose well since they are indeed easy to read, and include some well known pieces from the literature and some of the most authoritative authors. Sections are headed: general measurement, test administration, norms, response set, reliability, factor analysis, validity, intelligence, personality, interests, critiques of testing.

BENNIS, W. G., SCHEIN, E. H., BERLEW, D. K, & STEELE, F. I. (Eds.) Interpersonal dynamics: essays and readings on human interaction. Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1964. Pp. xv + 763. $8.50. — 43 readings are grouped into 5 parts: love, fight and flight; identity formation and self-actualization; socialization and re-education; team interaction in work and play; and better interpersonal relationships. The editors, professors of industrial management at M. I. T. and Yale introduce the book and each part with excellent essays. Their main sources are: sociological symbolic interactionism, Sullivanian theory, neo-Freudian object-relations theory, and existential psychology. Within these areas the book is quite integrative and has a wide scope marshalling a wealth of studies from a large section of currently important authors. We regret that with all these advantages, the book is without an index as if it were an ordinary book of mere outside readings.

BERGLER, K Counterfeit-sex: homosexuality, impotence, frigidity. New York: Grove Press, 1961. Pp. xi + 376. $1.75 paper. — “Neurotics have produced a complete travesty of sex, creating a caricature which can only be termed 'counterfeit-sex.'” The author's own "newer psychoanalytic studies" are based very closely on Freud's "later discoveries," and he is greatly opposed to Kinsey's findings.