BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS


This meaty, readable volume is intended actually as the text for an introductory college course in ethics. But who among us cannot profit from a refresher course in reflections on “the life good to live”—especially those engaged in the helping and counseling professions? Thus this work is to be commended to all, for Professors Bertocci and Millard in their function as philosophers have ably put their questions to needle the reader out of any complacent assumptions he might hold, and have filled in a broad background against which to measure current and parochial views.

The authors’ approach is not purely philosophical, but, as their subtitle indicates, psycho-ethical, i.e., they are concerned with the relatedness of the ought to the is of human living, with the question, “What can exploration in the psychology of personality tell us about the nature of the good life?”

Accordingly, Part I deals with psychological perspectives, and includes the human situation as seen by Freud; by Jung, Adler, and Horney; by Fromm; by Maslow; and by Allport (143 pages). Part II deals with problems growing out of recent psychological discussions which tie in with persistent problems of ethical theory (70 pages). Part III presents the philosophical perspectives (180 pages); Part IV, ethical principles (200 pages); and Part V, social and religious perspectives (75 pages). Contentwise, therefore, the psychological explorations constitute the lesser part. What is more interesting is that although the authors seem to have carried out their aim of placing psychological thinking alongside ethical reflections, it is doubtful whether they have succeeded as well with their aim of a systematic approach to basic ethical problems growing out of both ethical and psychological analyses. A fusion of these two perspectives is limited partly by the limited psychological material available and partly by the authors’ selection from it. Since these are largely matters of belief rather than fact, it is understandable that where the ethicist meets psychological tenets which conflict with his own, he rejects the psychological.

With the exception of that one familiar bit of theoretical common ground, “Where id was there shall ego be,” Freud’s conclusions are gently but firmly rejected by the authors, on the basis of the evidence of their own and others’ experiences. As one would expect, the authors cannot accept Freud’s view on religion. Neither do they accept his explanation of conscience; they side with Butler and Kant in objecting “that guilt should ever be equated with anxiety or that moral approval is equivalent to parental and social approval” (p. 207). To the experiential appeal they add the rational suggestion that the fact that the ought-function appears later in the individual’s development does not prove it to be a product of social approval and fear. The authors feel that Fromm, like Freud, interprets the ought-function “in the light of a preconception of what man’s nature is rather than analyzed for its own sake” (p. 208).
Likewise, Freud's determinism by unconscious forces is rejected. "The insistence on freedom grows out of a common experience that persons have" (p. 182). Again, the authors add to this evidence from experience a rational suggestion: If one is always motivated by unconscious forces in spite of one's efforts to be rational, or at any rate, if neurotics are so compelled, what would be the use of putting the ego where the id was? Neurotic traits may limit one's freedom of choices, "but to say that neurotics have no freedom is simply to allow a deterministic doctrine to dictate what experience is, rather than allowing experience to guide doctrine" (pp. 190-191).

The authors counter the claims of irrationality, this apparent contradiction of the ought and the is, with the suggestion that the only check on the dangers of rationalization is "not giving up the attempt to be rational;" but to employ more rationality, "more careful consideration before and during action so that our choices... may be as consistent with each other as possible" (p. 436).

It is obvious that the good life has been the subject of ethical speculations for much longer than man's nature has been the subject matter of systematic psychology. Perhaps it is obvious too that ethics profits from a correspondingly lengthy distillation of common sense. Furthermore, it seems natural that the scientific psychologies, following in the tradition of the exact sciences, distrust common sense and in fact disavow it. We would say that whereas common sense may not be an adequate approach to the solar system, "common sense become self-critical" (p. 523) may still have the most to tell us about human being and behaving. According to the authors, "When we explore through criticism the depths of common sense, we touch upon what a poet has called 'reason in its most exalted mood'" (p. 523).

This thought is strikingly like Adler's when he wrote, "That quality which has so rightly been termed common sense is the highest development which reason can claim" (Int. J. Indiv. Psychol., 1935, 1[3], p. 9). Among the psychologists included in their presentation, the authors give the fullest endorsement to Allport. If they were familiar with Adler they should also find in his writings much that would truly prove a psychological ground and support for their ethics.

It is indeed a great loss to that very synthesis of disciplines which the authors are attempting that their knowledge of Adler is so limited as to be erroneous. This is not the place to clarify Adler's position with regard to the many ethical points with which he was explicitly concerned, but it should be brought out that he was the first psychologist and psychiatrist to have the insight and the courage to state that man's psychological well-being depends on his contribution to the common weal. It is painful to read, for example, the following, offered as a criticism of Adler: "Do most of us want superiority or power as such, or do we want to overcome obstacles on the way to gratifying our various desires in the physical and social world?" (p. 163) — when Adler came to see the desiring of personal superiority and power as abnormal variations of the one general dynamic force which he very frequently termed precisely the striving to overcome. And it is a sad miscarriage for the authors repeatedly to bracket Adler with Freud for failing to offer the ethicist something to serve as the ground for altruism in human nature, when this is precisely the locus of one of the greatest differences between Adler and Freud.

It would be difficult to conceive of a specific drive or need to be altruistic,
which seems to be what the authors would like psychology to offer. But a psychologically sound basis for ethical behavior is offered by Adler, which can be described about as follows. Man has survived, and never in the isolated state, so that group life is a must as well as an ought. The assumption follows inescapably that there is a built-in ability for social living in man’s original nature, “a gift of evolution,” as Adler called it, social interest, a readiness for social contact. This is not a need to be gratified, but an ability to be trained, much as the ability to use language. It is probably a combination of man’s original ability to make contact, as shown in the infant’s returning the glance of another, his early ability to empathize, and the urge to get close to and be with others. Since this ability needs to be trained, which includes self-training, one cannot say on the strength of it that human nature is originally altruistic (no more than one can say it is egotistic), but one can assert that man is naturally socializable rather than opposed to fitting into a social order. The significance of this difference can scarcely be overestimated, and affects child rearing, education, therapy, political theory, and all social practices — as well as ethics.

In spite of this criticism of omission, and our preceding comments on the (rightful) rejection of many psychological findings, we do not wish to give the impression that the authors’ ethical thinking has not at all been fructified by psychology. Just to mention one indication, they show a permeating understanding that human phenomena are marked by the quality of being in motion toward, of becoming. “What we actually observe at any moment are men at some stage in the process of realizing some ideal” (p. 44). “Morality is a pursuit, not an infallible recipe” (p. 301). This is given full expression in the authors’ excellent treatment of the virtues. “A person’s neatness and kindness and courage always have to stand new tests . . . because his development of a certain virtue opens new areas of sensitivity and new ‘moral mountains’ to climb” (p. 383). The prime virtue is termed “the will to become honest,” and the full definition of honesty is “the willingness to seek as accurate and complete an account as possible of any situation . . . in which one is living” (pp. 382-383). It seems fitting to end this review by commending the authors not only on their conception of this virtue, but also for the manifestation of it in their work.

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Systematizing the Systems


What’s in a system? Are all systems of psychotherapy variations on a single theme? What is lacking in our present systems? How do they compare in their analysis of human nature, of conflict and neurosis, of readjustment and self-realization? These are some of the difficult and challenging questions raised by this ambitious comparative study of ten major systems of psychotherapy.

The book is divided into three parts. First, the authors state their major themes, develop a schema for examining the systems, and define in detail the concepts which enter into their schema. Part II is an exposition of the systems themselves. For the record, the following ten are included: Freud, the Ego-Analysts
(a synthesis drawn from the writings of Hartmann, Rapaport, Anna Freud, Erikson, Kris and Lowenstein), Dollard and Miller, Wolpe, Adler, Rank, Rogers, Existential Analysis (a synthesis relying primarily on the volumes edited by May, Angel, and Ellenberger and by Ruitenbeek), Horney, and Harry Stack Sullivan. Part III fulfills the authors' titular promise to render a comparative analysis of the systems.

The authors' broad theoretical position is rooted in three major ideas which are presented in the introductory section and remain as persistent themes throughout the book. First, any system of psychotherapy must be developed around the concept of behavioral change where behavior is inclusively defined to include not only explicit behavior but covert behavior, personality organization, thoughts, feelings and ideas. Second, it is contended that better systems of therapy evolve out of the rigorous application of the scientific method to current and future systems. And here the authors not unexpectedly point to Rogers' attempts to subject his therapeutic constructs and data to experimental tests as a highly desirable development. Third, therapy in theory and practice should be grounded in behavioral science, particularly psychology and biology.

After considerable further elaboration of these general propositions, the authors take up the systems themselves according to how they stand on the normal and abnormal course of development, the goals of therapy, the techniques of therapy, and the evaluation of therapy. The examination of the systems is by far the least difficult part of the book and the only one which a layman could understand. Each system is expounded and then critically examined in terms of outstanding deficiencies and positive contributions.

Readers of this Journal will be interested in knowing that the treatment of Adler leans heavily on the volume edited by Ansbacher and Ansbacher. The increasing recognition of Adler's implicit influence on other systems is noted, and his explicit "rediscovery" is largely credited to the Ansbachers.

Adler receives special commendation for pioneering a phenomenological system of therapy, and for his emphasis on the goal-directedness of human behavior, the importance of self-evaluative feelings of adequacy and inadequacy in childhood, and for stressing social and situational factors in development. The chief criticisms of Adler revolve around his failure to leave a detailed account of concrete therapeutic techniques, and a tendency to overgeneralize molar concepts, both deficiencies admittedly growing out of his holistic point of view.

The third section of the book is a comparative analysis of the ten systems in terms of (a) the development of normal behavior; (b) the development of disordered behavior; (c) the theory and practice of psychotherapy. The authors' predilection for rooting therapeutic systematizing and practice in learning theory is most explicit in this section. Indeed, the lack of a foundation in learning is considered the major weakness of current therapeutic theory. The general assumption is that learning theory offers the soundest basis for understanding the acquisition and modification of responses, both normal and disordered, and for developing a scientific foundation for evaluating the progress and results of therapy. Perhaps their conviction that a wedding of learning theory and psychotherapy is fundamental to progress also accounts for the inclusion of Wolpe's relatively little known Hullian system at the expense of better known systems, such as Jung's Analytical Psychology or Erich Fromm's historical-ethical system of psychoanalysis.
This reviewer has two specific criticisms, both directed toward the second part of the book. First, the authors fail to follow their announced outline. Some headings are missing; others are interpolated. Moreover, the typographical subordination in the headings is not sufficiently distinctive. Second, the author index, which in a book of this type ought to be analytic, is a mere listing of page references. These two factors make it difficult for the conscientious reader to cross-compare theorists on specific issues.

This volume should be of interest to two classes of readers on two levels. For the advanced undergraduate and graduate student the summaries of the systems provide readable and surprisingly complete accounts of the theories which are included. Far more difficult, the introductory and closing sections are aimed at the professional psychologist, particularly those who are seeking to systematize the systems, to close the gap between the art of therapy and the science of psychology, or, in the case of clinicians, to find self-stimulation in thinking rigorously about the theory and practice of psychotherapy.

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TRANSLATING THE UNTTRANSLATABLE


Ludwig Binswanger represents one of the leading European proponents of existential analysis, of Daseinsanalyse. He, like Medard Boss and Jean-Paul Sartre, was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Binswanger is a psychiatrist who was a friend of Freud, who quietly developed views philosophically at variance from psychoanalysis. Previously Binswanger has been represented in English by a small volume of correspondence with Freud, translations in May's Existence, and one or two small articles in journals. Professor Needleman has done a fine job in presenting Binswanger to the English speaking public.

Nearly one half of the book is a long, much needed introduction to Binswanger and the school he represents. The reader might be deterred by such a long critical introduction, though it was my impression that Needleman throws a flood of light on a school whose works seem untranslatable even when translated. Needleman perceptively defines the structure of existential analysis and compares it in detail to psychoanalysis. Existential analysis attempts to describe and understand the unique mode of being-in-the-world (style of life) of an individual. In this it deals with the spirit of man rather than reducing man to instincts as in psychoanalysis. Needleman shows that every science and philosophy begins from a presupposed irreducible core, and out of this builds its explanation of many phenomena. Beginning with instinct as the basic element, psychoanalysis tended to conceive a structure that overlooks self and consciousness. The basic element in existential analysis is the existential a priori or the meaning matrix in which events are experienced. This is the background of human experience, corresponding to the unconscious in other systems. This leads existential analysis to be concerned with the design of an individual's world, grasping it by whatever aspects stand
forth for the individual. The arguments for the existential analytic position are too far-reaching in implications to present in summary form. It is enough to say that Needleman, the philosopher-psychologist, clarifies them as no existential analyst has.

The rest of the book consists of seven papers by Binswanger. Two papers are his answer to Freud, at once complimentary to Freud and yet saying that Freud overlooks the spirit of man. One paper on Heidegger says that science gains power by reducing man to a mere mentally present ownerless object. By grounding his psychiatry in being-in-the-world, Binswanger permits an approach to the whole phenomenal content of human experience. In mental illness the world is contracted to one existential a priori which is a self-chosen unfreedom which estranges the person from others. The other papers are one on dreams, his introduction to his book Schizophrenie, and the complete case report of Lola Voss. The last paper is a curious little one since it illustrates the almost poetic philosophy of existential analysis which Binswanger describes as a methodical scientific understanding.

Binswanger's position has been compared in this Journal to Alfred Adler's (1960, 16, 77-80). The papers in this present volume did not impress me. While existential analysis seems in a noble venture to capture the spirit of man and the shapes of his worlds, Binswanger goes beyond description to a turgid self-assured use of philosophy. The beauty of discovering the form of an individual's world (this Journal, 1961, 17, 80-92) is confused by Binswanger's lengthy interpretations. I couldn't help but feel that the great novelists are much closer to capturing a person's life as it is lived. My impression is that existential analysis is exploring further than any other system the a priori given ground of human existence, but Binswanger is unclear in this volume, while Needleman points clearly. Perhaps Binswanger represents a foreign world view himself, while Needleman doesn't.

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ORGLER'S BIOGRAPHY OF ADLER, AMERICAN EDITION


This is the first American edition of a book which appeared originally in England in 1939 and has since appeared in Dutch, French and German. The same as the English 3rd edition, this volume is introduced by a foreword written by Dr. Kenneth Cameron. The last sentence of this preface probably contains the main reason for publishing the new edition: "Mrs. Orgler, by her knowledge of Adler and his ideas, deriving from long and close cooperation with him and his work, and by her own experience, is particularly well equipped to introduce the man and his work to a new public."

Certainly the time is ripe to acquaint the second generation with the tenor of Adler's theories which unfortunately seemed too advanced for the bulk of the first generation. It is paradoxical that in this time of increased accent on humanistic values, mistakes rather than mental diseases, psychotherapy as education, and community mental health centers, one luckily blunders his way into the Adlerian
camp rather than reach it via formal route. But this awkward and wasteful approach to the spirit of Adlerian psychology will probably remain the popular mode until the helping professions overcome professional fixations and defensive grandiosity and accept for their own guiding fiction the necessity of interprofessional Gemeinschaftsgefuehl. As long as the only road to knowledge is defined as that which cynically avoids goals, preferring instead more refined measurement of part functions, the day of the Adlerian has not really arrived.

At any rate, Hertha Orgler's book is a welcome addition to the growing Adlerian literature now available. It is an interesting, readable book written with candid admiration for Adler's clinical acumen and courage. The former is definitely highlighted, therefore one must turn to Phyllis Bottome's Alfred Adler for detailed accounts of Adler's personal courage and cooperation. Orgler's biography, so it appears to me, would find an apt niche as an introductory text in a systematic approach to Adlerian theory and practice. It could be followed by Bottome's book and, on a more theoretical synthesizing level, by Lewis Way's Adler's Place in Psychology. Needless to say the Ansbachers' The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler would provide the source material for this mythical course.

Orgler's work has the merit of lightly touching on many facets of Adler's thought while providing good descriptive illustrations. A new chapter indicates the extent of Adlerian practice throughout the world. Apparently written mainly for educators, the book seemingly shares a shortcoming with many an Adlerian writing in the lack of coverage of the problems of the institutional psychotherapist with the limitations forced upon him by bureaucratic structures. Psychotics are not dealt with at any length. Although the author treats emotional disturbances as ultimate effects of the patient's persistent mistakes and useless goals, she does not question the medical man's supremacy in the educational hierarchy. "Only a physician can give to physicians a comprehensive presentation of Adler's significance in the study of neuroses" (p. 123).

Perhaps the weakest section of the book is the author's limited attempt to muster experimental evidence, e.g., "I hear from Dr. C. Dukes, a former British delegate to the International Union against Cancer, that recent research confirms the opinions expressed many years ago by Alfred Adler" (p. 225). The assets of the book seem sufficient on clinical grounds without excursions into an area worthy of volumes in itself.

As for myself, I deeply missed reading once again of my favorite Adlerian anecdotes: first, Adler's 1916 break with his Nietzscheans over Gemeinschaftsgefuehl; then the disgraceful reaction of orthodox psychoanalysts to Adler's rift with Freud and to his untimely death 25 years later. (Why can't authoritarians bereft of humanistic means and ends ever tell the difference between a rebel and a revolutionary? Why do they make an intrapsychic sickness out of attempts to improve the lot of mankind?) But doesn't this selectivity show again the influence of our styles of life, extending even to memories of a man many of us have never seen?

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Erikson states that this "is and must be a subjective book, a conceptual itinerary. There is no attempt at being representative in quotations or systematic in references" (p. 17). Although subjective, Erikson carefully scrutinizes his case material, observations, and field research to document his approach.

In his revised edition, Erikson has stayed close to the original. The work covers a tripartite approach to child development, encompassing biological, social, and ego factors. Erikson writes clearly, and his style of writing permits one to read quickly, as one reads a novel, or slowly, to ruminate how he came to his insights about childhood. Erikson falls back on his training and experience in psychoanalysis to structure his thoughts and to outline his observations.

The theme of Erikson's work is that the child develops individually, yet is always rooted in his biological make-up and influenced by his social milieu. The psychoanalytic emphasis presented in the material dealing with infantile sexuality is always subservient to a broader view of man.

Although his case material and observations deal only with psychopathology, Erikson has presented the theoretical underpinning for the development of the healthy as well as the maladjusted personality. This is rare, in that the predominant writings concerning personality growth are written by clinicians who utilize their cases for observations and thereby present only theories of abnormal growth. Here Adler certainly was a notable exception, in stressing both health and illness in his work. But Erikson absolves himself of crediting anyone (other than Freud) by stating that his book is subjective.

Although I would heartily recommend this book to professional and lay persons interested in childhood, I find fault with Erikson's ambitious attempts to explain the development of children and to relate children's growth to biological, ego, and social factors. The book does not adequately deal with "childhood and society." The author did not observe healthy children, and he presents only two American Indian societies which certainly do not represent "society." While he gives broad descriptions of American, German and Russian societies, these are concerned with problems of youth and not of childhood.

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**Forty Years of Group Psychotherapy**


Fifty-two papers, written between 1917 and 1957, republished in this anthology, impress the reader vividly with the historical development of group psychotherapy. Especially valuable are the articles by and on Trigant Burrow. Should we not know more about a man who, in 1917, "considered the positions of Freud, Jung and Adler as complementary and not mutually exclusive" (p. 155) and who wrote in 1926 that "an individual discord is but a symptom of a social discord?"
Articles available only in journals have been collected to form a stimulating and authoritative reference work on the theory and technique of group therapy, its indications, its use in training, etc. Included are the viewpoints on group psychotherapy of Jung, Sullivan, and Horney, and the Adlerian approach is ably represented by Dreikurs.

Of special interest to Adlerians are: an evocative paper by M. Friedman on Buber's philosophy, "Dialogue and the Essential We; " the Introduction, with its concise and objective summary of past and current research in small group theory; and particularly the basic social psychological papers, e.g., by S. E. Asch and M. Sherif. The latter offer those group therapists who are trapped in psychoanalytic intrapsychic thinking an introduction to wider concepts of interpersonal processes.

This anthology can be recommended highly to all professionals interested in group psychotherapy.

New York, N. Y.

HELENE PAPANEK, M. D

CHALLENGE AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR PARENTS


Parenthood in our time and place is truly difficult, and, interestingly, it seems equally so for all the various brackets into which families may fall. Hence, one wonderful thing about this latest book in Dr. Dreikurs' series on life's "challenges" is its cross-sectional appeal and usefulness. Anyone seeking guidance on how to deal with children—not necessarily one's own offspring — will find it here, and readers who already have a background of experience and/or theory will find enrichment and further challenge. In fact, the book should be a fine supplement to college courses in child development.

Convincing anecdotes of parent-child interaction, of about 200 words each, account for a little less than half the pages; sometimes an incident is rewritten to show how it might have happened if the parents had taken a different approach. The examples are followed by a discussion of the situation and the result, and the psychological principles which apply.

The strength of this work is twofold: Its message has, as the authors say, been tested in the laboratory of their family counseling and child guidance centers; and it is based on a consistent set of explicit principles. This is an Adlerian book. Thus these principles include statements of values and ultimate goals, which distinguishes this book from other practical guides, such as that by Dr. Spock, for instance. Among others, the following emphases are brought out: An understanding of the child depends on learning his interpretation of things and "recognizing his own 'private logic' which alone accounts for what he is doing." A change of behavior follows upon a reorganization of the child's view, just as the view of the parents must be changed so that they may adopt new procedures to train the child in a more cooperative and courageous approach to life.

The authors take as their starting point the respect due the child, as an essential principle of democratic practices. From this it follows that parents cannot make the child do anything; they can only stimulate him — by what they do —
to desire to conform to the demands of order. By maintaining firmness, the parents can help the child to adjust to order. It is most important that if they want the child to overcome a fault, they discover the purpose of his misbehavior, which is seldom known to the child himself, and then take action in accordance with their finding. By letting the child experience the natural or logical consequences of his mistake, they can help him to correct it. They must be guided by the situation and what it demands rather than their personal stakes. Talking ("How many times have I told you?!") must give way to action. Instead of giving him a "good talking to," parents must talk with the child, if they are to inform themselves about him. The more usual criticisms and warnings must be replaced by encouragement, since "we cannot build on weakness, only on strength." "Parental love is best demonstrated through constant encouragement toward independence." The ultimate goal is harmonious cooperation, the satisfactions which come from a sense of contribution and participation. Within the family as well as the larger community, freedom and self-fulfilment are insured by "that democratic order which is maintained by each for the benefit of all."

So effective is the challenge of this book that it would be an unresponsive soul indeed who would not read it to the end and then proclaim, "Oh to be a parent (again)!

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