BOOK REVIEWS

TWO PSYCHOLOGIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL


Although the intent of the author has remained the same, this book is such a complete revision of Allport's world-renowned Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (1937) that it is justly published as a new book.

The author's credo, as stated in the last paragraphs, is: "Psychology is truly itself only when it can deal with individuality. It is vain to plead that other sciences do not do so, that they are allowed to brush off the bothersome issue of uniqueness. The truth is that psychology is assigned the task of being curious about human persons, and persons exist only in concrete and unique patterns (ital. ours). . . . We study the human person most fully when we take him as an individual." The individual, "always hoping and planning," struggles "for a more perfect democracy where the dignity and growth (ital. ours) of each personality will be prized above all else." With these words Allport, in fact, explains the full meaning of his title, Pattern and Growth in Personality.

Within this frame Allport succeeds in offering a "comprehensive and reasonably eclectic account of scientific studies of personality." The criterion for his eclecticism is: "Do these contributions have clear relevance to personality conceived as a patterned and growing system?"

The five parts of the book deal with: individuality as a prime characteristic of human nature, and insights from the past; the development of personality, which occupies nearly half of the book and deals with learning and other environmental influences, motivation, and perception; the structure of personality; the assessment of personality; and understanding of personality.

Among the particular innovations of the book is a new and far better conception of what is in most textbooks designated as primary or biological motives. They are now called "quasi-mechanical" motives, which are related to "quasi-mechanical principles of learning." These are contrasted with the motives of exploration, competence, superiority, function-pleasure, mastery, growth, self-actualization, which are related to cognitive, insightful, biographical, intentional learning. In this connection the author's original principle of functional autonomy of motives is redefined as referring to "any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tension from which the acquired system developed" (p. 229).

Another term new in psychology is "proception," by which Allport designates the influence of intention and expectancies for the future on sensory appearance, imagery, remembering and forgetting, judgment, reasoning, and reporting.

The book culminates in the last chapter, on the conception of the person in psychology. Here Allport rejects the positivist and psychoanalytic formulations as conceiving of man as a "quasi-mechanical reactor," and for resting on physicalism or a somewhat broader naturalism, whereas, "Personality is, verily, a work of art. Unless we view it in detail and in comparison with others, our impression re-
mains naive” (p. 548). Allport is in sympathy with the personalistic and existen­
tialist formulations, and notes that many of the ideas in question can be viewed
under Adler’s inclusive concept of life style. “To view personality as a process of
stylization has the merit of allowing for limitless individuality” (p. 566).

This is a textbook which has great scope and depth, is well integrated, and
provides the instructor with ample opportunity to introduce supplementary
material. It is bound to become a new rallying point for those who, in their courses
in personality, want to teach about the individual.

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FREDERICK C. THORNE. Personality: A Clinical Eclectic Viewpoint. Brandon,

This book represents a very serious and searching attempt to develop a com­
prehensive approach to the psychology of the individual personality. By this is
meant an understanding of the given individual in his particular stage of develop­
ment and life situation. For this conception the author has coined the term “per­
sonality status,” which he contrasts with personality as an abstraction relatively
far removed from the actual operations in which the individual is engaged in his
living.

The author contends that only clinicians have contributed to such an under­
standing. Academic psychologists with their experimental-statistical methods
have by and large been more interested in deriving abstractions and in testing
them, and have thus remained largely sterile with regard to contributions to practi­
cal knowledge about the individual personality. Among the schools of psychology,
the less individualizing are associationism, instinct psychology, psychoanalysis,
behaviorism, trait and factor psychologies, etc.; while Gestalt, phenomenological,
integrative, personalistic, individual, and existential psychologies have been more
individualizing.

Thorne rightly insists that only that represents valid knowledge about an
individual which can be directly observed in him, either objectively or phenom­
enologically, when we observe him faithfully, unencumbered by theoretical bias,
with an attitude of “disciplined naivete.” This is the clinical operationism to
which Thorne subscribes.

Since he admits only directly observable data, he also prefers concepts which
are at the lowest possible level of semantic abstraction. And since all important
facets of personality are already provided for in our daily language, he advocates
the use of Basic English, of lay terminology, because of its face validity and wide
public understanding. (This reminds us of Adler who preferred to express himself
in “common-sense” language.) Yet this book is far from easy to read; it pre­
supposes a broad background of the psychological literature.

What can be observed in the manner stipulated by Thorne turns out always
to pertain to a whole person carrying his past with him, confronted with a present
situation, striving for some point in the future. In other words, Thorne’s clinical
operationism leads to a concept of the individual which corresponds to a general­
ized holistic, idiographic, phenomenological, purposive, field-theoretical under­
standing of the individual who is to a certain extent self-determined and con-
cerned with solving his life problems, his existential questions. Thus this viewpoint finds support from a most rigorously scientific methodology.

With this viewpoint we agree whole-heartedly and appreciate particularly Thorne's argumentation that it simply does more justice to the observable data in the study of the individual. Thorne is close to Allport whom he credits with having provided the theoretical foundations for his own approach.

The uniqueness of Thorne's book is that it is really the presentation of a viewpoint, as stated in the title, almost without any supportive data from research studies or individual cases. Altogether, references are few, with a large proportion from the most recent existential psychiatric literature by which the author was encouraged and stimulated. This is a very personal book by an intellectual explorer; it is straight theorizing in the form of elucidating 97 postulates. The chapter organization is unconventional, as follows: personality status, operationism and eclecticism, personality dynamics, consciousness and the subconscious, the self, the stream of life, understanding and meaning, becoming, the person in the world, and positive mental health.

Thorne calls his viewpoint "clinical eclectic." By this he means the viewpoint to which one is led by accepting the findings from any school—provided they meet the criterion of operationism as understood by him. This is the significance he assigns to the qualifier "clinical." But this important qualifier does not immediately convey the full meaning which Thorne gives to it and is altogether semantically weak so that it is in danger of being overlooked. As to "eclectic," when qualified in any way it is not a very distinctive term, because most psychologists today are eclectics with qualifications. If it were to remain unqualified, it would mean uncritical acceptance of incompatible elements, resulting in a patchwork, as Thorne himself points out. So, why use the term "eclectic" at all? We have always held that in psychology eclecticism is not genuinely a viewpoint; one can be eclectic only from a certain viewpoint even if it be only an epistemological one. Thorne's book is a good case in point.

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A REBIRTH OF BIRTH ORDER


Except for the findings of a few scattered studies, the Adlerian concept of ordinal position has fared ill since it first began to undergo experimental scrutiny more than 30 years ago. All but abandoned in psychology as a variable worthy of serious theoretical and experimental concern, it has been dramatically revived in the series of experiments reported in Schachter's recent volume, The Psychology of Affiliation.

The basic finding is that first-born, in contrast to later-born college students are more easily frightened and display a strikingly consistent tendency to prefer to be with others under fear-arousing conditions. Fear, in most of Schachter's studies, was manipulated by confronting subjects with the prospect of participating in an experiment in which they were to be severely shocked or to be sub-
jected to other, highly unpleasant procedures (e.g., drastic lowering of glucose level). While presented with the utmost realism, these experiments were, of course, never carried out, and the intent was to arouse a degree of apprehension sufficient to make the choice of remaining alone or with others during a prospective waiting period a meaningful one. The desire to be with others rather than alone is not dependent on being able to communicate with them; their sheer presence is apparently enough. It is, however, contingent on being with others confronted with the same fearful situation.

A careful set of analyses established that the ordinal position findings are independent of family size and that affiliative choices decrease with later birth positions. First-born and only children show virtually identical patterns of affiliation. In an effort to extend the generality of his findings and to clarify their meaning, Schachter presents the results of other studies showing that first-borns are more influenceable; that they make poorer fighter pilots; that they are less likely than later borns to be found among the ranks of alcoholics; and that they are more likely to accept and to remain in psychotherapy (a finding which has failed of replication in an unpublished study done by a colleague and the reviewer).

The order of birth mediates differential dependency in Schachter's analysis; first-born children are overprotected or pampered by their uncertain, apprehensive, and as yet unskilled parents. Thus, they are not afforded the opportunities to learn to cope with fear- and anxiety-producing situations that are given to their later-born siblings, and they develop a greater dependence on the support of their parents and others. This interpretation is supported by ordinal position analyses of studies on dependency behavior in children.

In an ingenious experiment, it is shown that the affiliative response to threat appears to serve two major functions: First, just being with others reduces fear; and, second, the presence of others contributes to one's evaluation of his own emotional state in a novel and traumatic situation. Thus, social dependence leads directly to a process of anxiety reduction and also to social comparison and self-evaluation. It is worth noting that in groups in which communication was permitted, first-borns occasionally became more afraid in the company of others, presumably due to the effects of frightening conversations on their greater influenceability.

These studies, while perhaps presenting an oversimple experimental analysis to a clinician sophisticated in the world of Adler's thinking, are nonetheless clearly predictable from Adlerian theory. They are, moreover, neatly conceptualized and accomplished with noteworthy methodological rigor. It must now be revealed that Schachter nowhere cites Adler and in fact develops his own rationale for the effects of ordinal position. Nor, indeed, did Contemporary Psychology's reviewer of Schachter's book (2) take note of this striking omission.

How can these failures to acknowledge Adler's theoretical contributions be explained? One possibility is that psychologists are simply unaware of Adler, and Schachter's "discovery" of the powerful mediating effects of ordinal position was simply adventitious. A more likely alternative would seem to be that Adlerian concepts have become so widely incorporated in the Zeitgeist that they now form an implicit part of the psychological culture and constitute the (unacknowledged) conceptual underpinnings of many current notions in personality theory and social psychology. In point of fact, three decades ago Woodworth (3) made the same
point in a lucid analysis of the impact on psychology of Adlerian theory, and Rotter (1) has recently advanced a similar argument. Schachter's whole explanatory scheme, in addition to the basic ordinal position findings, reflects what might well be viewed as a neo-Adlerian orientation. His development of the implications of dependency bears an unmistakable stamp.

In the fact that psychologists display a considerable lack of sophistication as to the origins of some basic concepts, we are posed with an intriguing problem in the social psychology of psychological theory. Before, however, laying the blame entirely at the doorstep of the insouciant and untutored psychologist, it may be well to consider the possibility that Adlerians, engaged in therapeutic concerns and enmeshed in the struggle to maintain a viable identity vis-a-vis a hostile analytic camp, have not demonstrated sufficient interest in experimentation of a controlled nature. If Schachter's omission represents the failure of psychology in general and Individual Psychology to achieve a rapprochement, part of the answer may lie in the indifference of the clinician towards experimentation or his unwillingness to expose his prized concepts to the possibility of disconfirmation. As Schachter has so beautifully demonstrated with ordinal position, however, there need be no fear.

REFERENCES


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SOVIET PSYCHOTHERAPY


In a previous review (this Journal, 1961, 17, 229-230), we have intimated the similarity between Soviet educational and child psychology, and Individual Psychology, as far as certain basic propositions are concerned. The present volume gives occasion to repeat this observation in respect to Soviet psychotherapy. The volume consists of 35 papers presented at a conference on psychotherapy held in Moscow in 1956, covering a variety of topics. A quarter of the papers are concerned with the use of hypnosis.

It is the first paper, entitled "Certain theoretical questions of psychotherapy" by V. N. Miassischev, director of the Bektere Institute in Leningrad, which stimulated our initial comment. He defines personality as "a pattern of selective attitudes," and human relations as "the process of forming selective ties with various aspects of one's environment." These two concepts are considered to be of great significance for understanding mental as well as neural activities of man (p. 6). "It is not so much the persons or circumstances themselves that count, but rather one's attitude toward them" (p. 10). In the light of such understanding, a so called sexual trauma, for example, represents "but an outer appearance capable
of assuming a great variety of forms, which only conceal entirely different and highly individual traits of personality" (p. 18).

Psychotherapy is seen as "as a process of social interaction between the physician and his patient" (p. 12) in which the therapist gives "support and encouragement" and becomes "a teacher of life. He must devote a great deal of attention to the re-education of the patient" (p. 14).

Miassishev points out that such Soviet psychotherapy is built on the traditions of Marxism-Leninism, Pavlov's physiology, and materialistic psychology, and gives three short cases to illustrate the approach. Of these the following is cited in full to show how similar this can be to an Adlerian approach.

E. K. Yakovleva and myself have described elsewhere a case of deep hysteria, in which the woman would walk into the woods where she would moan and groan for quite a while and, on her return home, she would grab an axe and swing it violently over her baby's head. During all this the woman was, strangely enough, perfectly aware of what she was doing. The question is: what was the cause of this queer behavior?

As a detailed study of the case has demonstrated, at the root of the patient's conduct lay wounded self-love. At her parents' home she had always been the center of attention. When she was married, her attitudes remained essentially the same, and she assumed the domineering attitude toward her husband and, later, her children. But during the Second World War the patient found herself alone for many months, in the conditions where she had to consider others and even obey them. When at the end of the hostilities she was reunited with her husband and children, she discovered that they had changed and wanted reasonable respect. This made her feel strangely lost, for she was utterly unable to make adequate concessions to the demands of reality. Then she began to fight bitterly and stubbornly in order to regain her domineering position in the family, but her cries expressed only rage and feelings of futility.

Nevertheless, the patient fully recovered in the end when, with her physician's assistance, she was enabled fully to comprehend the cause of her illness and to reconstruct her everyday attitudes on a more realistic basis (pp. 15-16).

In Adlerian terms: A woman with a pampered life style developed symptoms when confronted with situations where she could no longer dominate without a challenge. She recovered when she was able to understand the mistake in her style of life, changing her self-centered attitude to one of better cooperation and greater social interest.

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