BOOK REVIEWS

ADLERIAN PRACTICE AND THEORY TODAY


As a volume intended to illustrate contemporary application of Adler's theories this is an important addition to Adlerian literature. Its contributors have all in some way been connected with the Alfred Adler Consultation Center and Mental Hygiene Clinic in New York, where its editors, Kurt Adler and Danica Deutsch, are supervising psychiatrist and executive director, respectively. The publication commemorates the first ten years of the Center. The book contains six sections: three articles on philosophical concepts, 17 on theoretical principles, 14 on psychotherapeutic procedures, 15 case histories, a conclusion, three appendices with a paper by Alfred Adler serving as foreword and a new introduction by Joseph Wilder, a non-Adlerian. Half of these papers are appearing for the first time in print; of the remainder, five are reprinted from this journal, and 13 from its predecessors, the Individual Psychology Bulletin and the American Journal of Individual Psychology.

As is to be expected, the contributions are not all of equal caliber, but they are in general representative of the literature produced in the past ten years or so, and no one should hesitate to place this collection in the hands of otherwise sophisticated people for informational purposes. The only major criticism I would have of the volume is the absence of a general introduction, one which would have increased the book's value for readers unfamiliar with Adler's theories, and would have lessened the feeling of fragmentation which occurs with reading some fifty items. As it is, the book does seem best suited for those who already have a basic knowledge of Individual Psychology, and so serves best as supplementary reading—which is probably its main purpose.

Unwise as it may be to single out any papers, some do seem worthy of special comment. Proceeding in order of appearance in the volume, Lydia Sicher's "Education for Freedom" is as notable for its style as for its content. She admixes skillfully beauty of expression with rigor of thought. In my opinion, it is the outstanding item in the volume. Ansbacher's "Causality and Indeterminism according to Alfred Adler and some current American Personality Theories" establishes him firmly as the most sophisticated Adlerian, viewing Individual Psychology from the broad point of view. This is the most scholarly paper in the collection. Dreikurs' "Adlerian Analysis of Interaction" is a skillful polemic and illustrates well how an independent thinker of considerable vigor can fit easily into Adler's general theory. "The Commonest Neurosis" (snobbism), by Krausz is a clever demonstration of how a single concept may be expanded to form an integral subsystem and yet remain entirely within the general field of Individual Psychology.

I especially enjoyed Sofie Lazarfeld's spoof, "Did Oedipus have an Oedipus Complex?" Psychoanalytic literature abounds with proof from mythology, but she shows that others as well can play the game of finding evidence in the most unlikely places. She seriously accepts the Oedipus challenge and devastatingly re-
The purpose of this volume is to serve as a guide for setting up counseling programs along lines similar to those which Alfred Adler first employed. These were distinguished from other child guidance procedures not only by the application of his theory of Individual Psychology, but also (1) by the inclusion of the entire family (and in Adler's Viennese setting, the teacher as well), and (2) by the public nature of the counseling, i.e., by the presence and even participation of other parents, teachers, students, and otherwise interested visitors. The volume's four editors constitute a most experienced team to treat their subject matter: Dreikurs has indeed been the leader of this counseling movement in the United States and in the theoretical, therapeutic, and educational work behind it; Corsini, a clinical psychologist, has specialized in therapy and group therapy; Lowe is a professor of education at the University of Oregon where the course of study has been arranged to reflect the Adlerian approach and to dovetail with the counseling program; and
Sonstegard, of the Iowa State Teachers College, has been instrumental in setting up the most recently established centers.

There are 15 short chapters, written by the editors and nine other contributors. These deal with underlying principles; the historical background; overall organization; the roles of the staff members—the counselor, social worker, play-room director, and recorder; and certain related functions such as group therapy, psychodramatic techniques, and learning opportunities for teachers in training. The basic principles in dealing with children given by Dreikurs should be singled out for commendation: They probably comprise the most complete, valid, and helpful list to be found anywhere.

Both the actual procedures and the rationale of this kind of counseling are conveyed best by the transcript of two sessions with a single family, for which Dreikurs served as counselor. Each session is divided into five phases: (1) counseling with the parents, (2) counseling with the children, (3) report of the play-room director, and any other reports available, (4) interpretation of the child’s purpose of his problem behavior, and (5) recommendations to the parents.

The editors imply that their approach is distinguished from that of others by their socio-teleological orientation, i.e., by their prime seeking to understand the child’s goal as a basis for interpreting his behavior and for arriving at the best ways of responding to it. The distinctive feature of their procedure, however, still would seem to be that a group sits in on the counseling—at times offering suggestions or asking questions, and often functioning much like a Greek chorus, supporting the counselor. The parents of a problem child are asked to attend a least two sessions before their own first encounter, in order to familiarize themselves with the procedure. Especially when they continue to attend sessions, they are enabled to acquire insight into other people’s problems and thus eventually into their own. In this way troubled parents are able to contribute to the general educational endeavor within a framework of professional guidance. In this sense, then, Adlerian counseling has a self-help aspect. Furthermore, these centers are organized by the lay members of a community, usually the parents who are themselves interested in counseling services.

This way of educating the child and his family (and his neighborhood) appeals to the reader because of its reasonable principles, its direct and simple procedure, and its opportunity for self-help. The stumbling block, it seems to this reviewer, is to find the right counselors. If the manual succeeds in its purpose of inspiring and motivating readers to organize their own counseling centers, the challenge will be flung back to those engaged in training counselors.

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbacher

Adler in Contemporary European Setting


Dr. Neuman describes the task which he hoped to fulfill with this book. It should present Individual Psychology so that the heritage of Adler may be brought to life again in Europe and foster the development of psychology and psychotherapy. It should also carry out the obligation which falls to a pupil, to develop further the work of his teacher. In his foreword the author asks his critics and
friends to attest whether he has achieved his goal. This reviewer is happy to state that Dr. Neumann has done so, magnificently.

He has not only presented an exemplary picture of Individual Psychology, in which no fundamental aspect remains neglected or unclarified; but he has also integrated his own thinking with that of his predecessors, drawing extensively from the writings of Adler, and from Seif to whom the book is dedicated, Wexberg, Kronfeld, and Kuenkel whose ideas he found particularly congenial. In addition, the material is compared throughout with contemporary thought, and is traced to its ideological sources in philosophy. Considerable space is devoted to a comparison of the Adlerian model of man with the philosophical systems of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. It is obvious that the author recognized the affinity of Adlerian psychology with existential philosophy long before this occurred to us in the United States.

The main theme of the book is the treatment of neurosis. This is supported by extensive case material which demonstrates clearly the author's points. However, in giving examples to show one major factor responsible for the development of a neurosis, there is a tendency to neglect the other factors present. Consequently, one often misses an understanding of the total situation. Particularly the discussion of early recollections, which in our opinion are crucial for an understanding of the lifestyle, seems to us rather short and not always adequate. But such differences in approach among Adlerians are inevitable and should be stimulating if systematically explored.

While the book is of immeasurable value to anyone who wishes to acquaint himself with Adlerian psychology and what it has to offer, both for an understanding of neurosis and for its treatment, it also has considerable interest for the trained Adlerian. Thus, its publication in English would be most desirable.

For this reviewer, who has lost contact with the trends in the European scene, it was highly interesting to observe it through the eyes of a qualified European Adlerian. Significant for the cultural variation is the fact that Dr. Neumann emphasizes the consequences of strict child rearing, and actually considers authoritarian upbringing as "the strongest source of neurosis" (p. 69), although he notes that strict autocratic methods are diminishing in Germany. Our experience in the United States would indicate that spoiling with all its implications plays a greater role in leading to neurotic behavior. Similarly, when Dr. Neumann tries to find support for the holistic concept of man, he does not use the term holism, nor refer to Smuts. Instead he cites Felix Krueger, the founder of Ganzheitspsychologie whose foremost proponent today is Wellek.

One of the most interesting discussions deals with the meaning of Gemeinschaftsgefühl, which, in the reviewer's opinion, has been so inadequately translated as social interest. Dr. Neumann distinguishes quite validly between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society).

A further noteworthy point is Dr. Neumann's view on dream interpretation. He considers such interpretation as requiring the assumption of a collective unconscious as described by Jung. This reviewer cannot agree. Some of the symbolic material in the dreams cited seems to be clear without recourse to a construct such as that of Jung. However, other dreams reported by Dr. Neumann are characteristic of patients treated by a therapist who believes in and is fascinated by such symbolism. Our patients do not bring us such dreams.
The book ends with an appeal for clarification of the meaning of the self. Dr. Neumann expects that all examinations of depth psychology will eventually converge on this point, and will find unity in their attempts to lead man to his own self. It seems in keeping with the author's sincere effort to move forward that he should conclude his book with this question and anticipation. We look forward to his future findings.

Chicago, Illinois

RUDOLF DREIKURS, M.D.

DIVERSE SCHOLARS CONVERSE ON VALUES


The symposium is a brilliant dialogue of contemporary scholars concerning the age-old problem of human values. Missing, however, in some of the papers is the dialogue with mankind in the past. This makes for an unnecessary vagueness in certain formulations, which could have been avoided by the study of the writings of earlier participants in the historical conversation about human values. Two contributors mention this lack implicitly. Suzuki says: "... something 'new' is really not at all new, it is very ancient ..." (p. 94) and Tillich: "I am the victim of the European vice of being unable to think any thought without seeing it in the light of its history" (p. 189).

The scholars who were invited to participate in this symposium were given the suggestion to be scientific, theoretical, experiential, and empirical. The meaning each of these words has been under discussion since the revolution in theoretical physics and in modern philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry. Fortunately, the current re-evaluation of the term "science" comes into the open in the papers presented. Tillich, for instance, makes his point very clear: "If science is understood ... in the sense of the German word *Wissenschaft*, a science of values is possible in the sense in which ontology is a science. If, however, science is understood as a cognitive approach according to the pattern of physics, only a science of actual valuation is possible not a science of values" (pp. 192 f.).

The masterful comment on all the papers at the end of the book by Weisskopf shows convincingly three different trends which dominated the conference (pp. 199 f.).Bronowski and Margenau are mainly naturalist in the sense that they try to apply the natural sciences to the study of value. The psychologists Allport, Fromm, Goldstein, and Maslow are mainly humanist in their approach in so far as they base themselves at least partly on empathy and intuition. The same is to some extent true for the social scientists Lee, Sorokin, and Weisskopf. Bertalanffy and Dobzhansky form a link between the naturalists and the humanists. Weisskopf mediated between the humanists and the ontologists. The ontological approach is represented by Tillich and Suzuki.
The variety of viewpoints of this splendid symposium points in a remarkable way to the need for an integrating anthropology, not in the sense of only a cultural anthropology but in the original etymological sense of the Greek word anthropology, the "science of man." This overall science of man is an ongoing concern of many philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists in Europe. Their fast developing anthropology integrates the various viewpoints presented here in so far as its fundamental basis is ontological, while its superstructure is an open integration of experiential and empirical data and theories on this ontological basis.

Duquesne University

ADRIAN L. VAN KAAM

PSYCHOLOGY ENHANCED BY WISDOM


It is characteristic of the positivistically oriented experimental psychologist to proceed as if we knew next to nothing about human nature, and his particular research were pioneering in complete terra incognita. Psychology is the perpetually "young" science. In spite of a growing realization today that there is after all a large body of common-sense psychology which serves us rather well in our daily dealings, this is largely ignored by the instructor when he enters the classroom. He is more likely merely to bring up common misconceptions to make a case for the "science" of psychology.

In science . . . we find people who can neither see nor hear, through sheer learning and hypothesis (Goethe).

That same suppression of sympathies, that same waving away of intuitions or guess-work which makes a man preternaturally clever in dealing with the stomach of a spider, will make him preternaturally stupid in dealing with the heart of man. He is making himself inhuman in order to understand humanity (G. K. Chesterton).

But now, in the present work by Cantril and Bumstead we have a bridge between the scientific approach and the views of common sense, of the humanities, of wisdom generally. For the book contains a brief, terse text, presenting psychological principles, together with a wealth of valuable psychological observations by great non-psychologists, varying widely in every respect save readability. This is bound to lead the instructor—and the student—out of his disciplinary provincialism to an awareness of other ways of knowing and to the greater exhilaration of sharing insights unlimited by time and professional divisions.

There is no scientific method as such . . . It is merely a special case of the method of intelligence (P. W. Bridgman).

To understand is to possess the thing understood, first by sympathy and then by intelligence (H. F. Amiel).

When you understand all about the sun, and all about the atmosphere, and all about the radiation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset (A. N. Whitehead).

Up to this point we have imitated the way the authors have put their book together, namely, by alternating text and readings, the readings here, of course, being excerpted from the book, but disproportionately few and short.
It is good to know that Polybius used the equivalent of the term "transaction" over 2000 years ago; that St. Augustine expressed the principle of subjective contemporaneity in his own delightful way as "three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future;" that Dostoevsky understood the on-going character of motivation and remarked that man "loves to attain, but not completely attain;" that Oliver Wendell Holmes realized out-of-awareness factors when he wrote, "consciously or unconsciously we all strive to make the kind of world that we like."

If the first function of the readings is to broaden horizons and correct perspectives, a second function is to clarify, as in a flash, concepts which might take hours of pedestrian lecturing to explain. Corey Ford's "How to Guess Your Age" is a wonderful example of such an illumination, conveying the effects of expectations upon perceiving. Or what could be more delightful than Thurber's "Many Moons," to prove that "perceiving is always a process which includes an actively participating person?"

The authors' own text gives the readings a systematic frame of reference. Although it comprises about one-fourth of the volume's content, it should not take second place in an evaluation of the work as a whole, for the transactional approach to psychology is most skilfully presented. The fruitfulness of this approach, closely related as it is to field theory and the organismic, holistic view, is demonstrated by the very fact that it led the authors to produce a book such as this. The authors have succeeded in making understandable the unity and complexity of the whole individual with his interlocking processes in their on-going connectedness. One does regret, however, that to a certain extent their text gets lost amidst the readings, and to whatever extent this may be true for each reader, it is a great pity. A greater differentiation in the print of the two presentations would have helped to set the text apart from the readings and keep it more intact. The authors have been modest in pointing to the difficulty of sandwiching their prose in between the magnificent examples of the readings, yet their own writing does seem quite in tune with the great company they have chosen. There is much in their own text which is quotable.

It is particularly tragic that the second author of this broadly life-centered book, Charles H. Bumstead, Professor of Psychology at Knox College, died shortly before its publication.

The ultimate purpose of the book is, in the authors' words, to give people "some guideposts for enhancing the quality of their own lives." This they have certainly achieved. Reflections on the Human Venture is a splendid and eminently useful book: As a supplementary text-and-source-book, it will give the student the human quality and substance which is so often missed in the usual introductory course in psychology. To use a paraphrase recently found in the New York Times: "Good words are worth a thousand pictures." The book will also equally supplement the on-going psychological education of those no longer in the academic situation.

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbacher

1 Portions of the textual material of the last chapter have been taken from an article by the senior author, "The Nature of Faith," which appeared in this Journal, 1957, 13, 24-37.—Ed. note.
Book Reviews

Common-Sense Psychology Academically Examined


In this book, long awaited by the admirers of Heider's lucid and penetrating thinking, he proposes to help build a conceptual framework for studying interpersonal phenomena. In his undertaking, influenced in part by Lewin's ideas on the function of conceptual representation, Heider takes the path of a systematic and critical elaboration of the psychological concepts of common sense as embodied in conventional language.

While keeping his sights on the ultimate goal of controlled systematic study, he asserts that our everyday understanding of human affairs is based on implicit theories which more often than not meet the test of permitting valid predictions. In viewing our social and physical environment we do not passively register the manifold "proximal stimuli" impinging on us or their most frequent sequences. Rather we view them in terms of the relatively invariant contents of the world around us, which we expect to be consistent with one another. Our analysis of interpersonal phenomena, though often distorted by our own preferences and needs, proceeds in a way analogous to experimental methods and leads to a veridical assessment of the important features of the environment. The quasi-scientific approach is already present in naive perception and judgment, in so far as "a network of concepts that are systematically defined is fitted to the empirical manifold, and lends the terms in which this manifold is encoded." Identifying and explicating these basic concepts of common-sense or naive psychology—such as perceiving, liking, wanting, being able, causing—should prepare the transition from intuitive to explicitly systematic thinking about human relations.

In carrying out this program Heider draws his material from our everyday observations, fables, proverbs, fiction, essays, and philosophical writings, as well as from experimental studies. Separate chapters deal with perceiving the other person and being perceived by another, with desire and pleasure, sentiments, values and obligations, with action in general, and with the specific social actions of inducing another to act and of benefiting and harming another. The last chapter discusses reactions to the lot of the other person, such as sympathy and envy. Throughout, the author tries to uncover the premises underlying our interpretation of personal events, and points out the criteria we use in attributing their various aspects to one or another of the relevant foci—environment, personal motives, ability, value-motivation—as well as the most common sources of error.

It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to the wealth of hunches and hypotheses, both specific and general, in which most of the chapters abound. Heider's far-reaching and fruitful hypothesis of balanced and unbalanced states and their effects is presented in detail in the chapter on sentiments; it is also applied to such topics as values. Very illuminating are the discussions of the effects of being perceived by another, of personal (intentional) versus impersonal causality, of the structure of retribution and of envy; it is enlightening to be shown the affectively rational factors in impulses of envy and revenge (as widely felt as they are condemned).

While the book is of interest primarily to theorists and researchers who will find in it many testable propositions, practical workers should also find it of use, although Heider does not incorporate into his analyses the insights derived from
"depth" psychologies or from observations of pathological functioning regarding gross deviations from common sense. Since therapists of all denominations in some phases of their work make explicit use of the common assumptions of the kind discussed by Heider, and since the patients' insights, which help to restructure their present and past, imply the same premises, anyone working with people will find that a more precise and articulate awareness of the common logic of human interaction will sharpen his working tools and facilitate mutual understanding.

Brandeis University

EUGENIA HANFMANN

PHENOMENOLOGY FOR THE NATURALIST


The core of this work consists of a rather severe critique of the position of Edmund Husserl, founder of the phenomenological movement in philosophy and forerunner of modern existentialism. This central section of the book (chapters 3 through 7) is difficult and demands concentration. The earlier and later parts of the work are easier to follow. All told, the experiencing of these materials is enlightening and provocative.

There is no doubt about Professor Farber's purpose. He is in favor of phenomenology, as a fruitful method of inquiry, but he is radically opposed to the ways in which Husserl and others have abused the method so as to try to justify idealistic metaphysics. "The independence of the world, with respect to the knower, is a brute fact which no philosophical arguments can alter" (p. 9).

One cannot seriously think of one's body as "not being." Nor can the bodies of one's parents or their parents be dismissed as not existing or having existed. It is also reasonable to allow such bodies to have an atmosphere, terra firma, clothes, food, etc. (p. 99). While one can "bracket" the natural world for a time while one is engaged in a phenomenological inquiry, there is nothing about the phenomenological method that leads to a denial of the physical universe.

Professor Farber has great respect for the rigor, erudition, and descriptive work of Husserl although he continually warns us of the philosopher's tendency to move beyond description into "a novel system of transcendental idealism" (p. 94). Max Scheler, by contrast, "was inferior in all respects." He displayed "a singular talent for filching fruitful insights from the literature of social science, and then rendering them worthless within the frame of his reactionary philosophy" (p. 328). Nor does Farber have anything very good to say, in his concluding chapters, about Martin Heidegger, Oskar Becker, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, or Jean-Paul Sartre. Their writings are continuations of the idealistic reaction against a scientific philosophy and must be seen as new types of irrationalism (p. 331).

Probably most psychologists will be happy to have their colleagues in philosophy move increasingly in the direction of evolutionary naturalism, which is Professor Farber's position. An end to the vagaries of transcendental idealism would provide a more satisfactory basis for collaboration in our mutual work of rendering intelligible the phenomena of the physical and social world.

One of the more interesting topics for further inquiry, to this writer, is the question of what is "given" in experience to various perceiving persons. Husserl's suggestion is that "the arithmetical world is there for me only if I have studied arithmetic" (p. 84). And Farber points out that a man who works in a mine so as
to support himself and his family must assign a position of central importance in
his "given" to the mine and all it entails (p. 11). It seems that a person cannot be
separated, in his perception of action, from his social position and cultural milieu.

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

ALFRED E. KUENZLI

AMERICAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY


The reader may be surprised at Professor Kuenzli’s collection of papers, and
so may be some of the fourteen authors to find themselves in the same book.
But the surprise is more likely to be pleasant since this is a careful collection in
which Kuenzli has discovered a unity of approach, theory, and methodology which
should go far toward settling the issues surrounding the identification of pheno­
menological psychology.

The problem as stated in the modest, brief preface is: “How can we study
the nature of the personal world and the influences which shape it?” It is a prob­
lem of investigative methodology for a frame of reference emphasizing personal
meaning and for a science requiring objective verification.

As a collection which spans almost two decades, this volume is much more
than an assembly of articles. It brings into focus a number of clarifications:
1. Since D. Snygg’s call for a phenomenological system in 1941, a quiet but
rigorous development has proceeded in American psychology toward its fulfill­
ment.
2. Many writers, such as C. R. Rogers, H. Cantril, A. S. Luchins, and T. H.
Newcomb, are truly phenomenological in their theory construction and research.
Their presence in the collection will help define the nature of American phen­
omenological psychology.
3. The development of methodology has met the challenge of science. Two
methodologies are now of major promise in the solution of the phenomenological
problem: projective methods as stated by L. K. Frank and S. Rosenzweig, and the
photographic techniques mentioned in the papers by Cantril and Luchins.
4. Phenomenology with its emphasis on the individual requires an integra­
tion of individual and social psychology. T. H. Cantril’s paper perhaps best illus­
trates this necessity.
5. The self and the phenomenal field or situation are the two basic con­
structs in phenomenology. Papers by A. W. Combs and D. W. Soper, and by V.
Raimy demonstrate these unifying concepts.
6. Problems in definition of terms and in logic itself remain, but no longer
seem as formidable as once foreseen by Titchener. The papers by R. Jessor and
by Combs and Soper point toward such resolution.

Perhaps Kuenzli is too selective in his brief bibliography, particularly in
that he omits the major European contributions. But the brevity and discrimina­
tion represented in the collection itself are admirably calculated to mark the role
which phenomenology is now playing in the science of human behavior and expe­
rience. Thus the book contributes to the dignity of contemporary phenomenological
psychology.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

TED LANDSMAN

BOOK REVIEWS

RELIGION FROM DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS


This volume of forty-nine essays explores religion from different points of view and disciplines.

The chapter "Religion and Psychopathology" will have special meaning for the clinical psychologist and psychiatrist. While Freud considers religion "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity," William James sees in it the opposite: the normal, vigorous person's willingness to risk a belief which cannot be proven with certainty; the daring in helping to create the actuality of a truth, whose metaphysical reality he is willing to assume, without ever being sure of it.

An interesting difference in approach appears further between the academic or experimental psychologist and the practicing psychotherapist. An example for the former is Price's view that the function of the psychology of religion is "to examine, classify, and formulate the mental processes involved in religious experiences . . . . It must hand over the final interpretation of religious experience to the higher disciplines." On the other hand, the psychotherapist, who sees the emotionally disturbed and the mentally healthy person in the frame of reference of an admitted or not admitted philosophy, is also inclined to make a value statement about religion. Thus religion as ontology becomes an essential part of therapy for O. Hobart Mowrer. In contrast to Freudian views, that neurosis is a consequence of repressed drives, and therapy releasing these repressed forces, Mowrer perceives the normal adult personality as self-determined and autonomous: Neurotic symptoms are the voice of our betrayed conscience; slavery to our unconscious is the consequence of our denial of autonomy and responsibility rather than the cause of neurosis.

Space does not permit mentioning all deserving papers. This book will be an asset to all concerned with the ministry to sick souls.

New York, N. Y. 

Elizabeth Auer

THREE CRITIQUES OF FREUD'S SELF-CENTERED MODEL OF MAN


A sociologist undertakes to hunt out the moral values that lie hidden in Freud's account of man. Implicit in Freud's writings he finds "a sweeping criticism of the contemporary moral climate" and an ideal of human conduct. It is an ideal of realism and honesty with oneself, one in which comforting illusions and civilized hypocrisies are laid aside in favor of "scrupulous self-centeredness" and the prudent rationality of the ego. Rieff discerns a "fatal lack of commitment about Freud's ideal type" and wonders "why unblinking honesty with oneself should inhibit unblinking evil." The solitary Freud, always siding with his patients against the superego, "never understood the ethic of self-sacrifice" or the true nature of the feeling of membership in community.

Harvard University

Robert W. White

It is a particularly happy occurrence that Fromm has selected from the wealth of Freudiana available, much of it in Jones' biography, that which fits into the framework of his own valid interpretation, to give us briefly and clearly a comprehensive picture of Freud and his movement. Fromm's interpretation should have a wide influence not only because he presents his evidence skillfully, but also because the reader will recognize him as a writer who is both close to his subject and objective. While he criticizes elements of psychoanalytical theory, he himself employs certain psychoanalytic conceptions. While he boldly draws in the negative lines of Freud's portrait, he also expresses his appreciation of Freud's greatness. Fromm points out, among other shortcomings, Freud's egocentric concerns, his insecurities, his lack of understanding of women, his respect for the prevailing social order and its authorities, and the little love he had for people; yet he writes with respect of Freud's zealous search for the truth, his courage, and his dignity.

In considering the psychoanalytic movement as such, Fromm relates it to the intellectual and social currents which joined in shaping its course and the degree to which its mission was accomplished. This mission he describes as helping to control man's passions by reason. Fromm likens the widened, aggressive endeavor which grew from the modest origins of a form of psychotherapy, to a religious or political movement in that it offered its adherents the essential attributes of the same—an idolized leader, dogma, ritual, and the superior feeling of possessing the truth. His criticism of the psychoanalytic "movement," which he also sees as the reason for its failure, is the limitation of the members' understanding of the larger society in which their group was a part, an understanding which is requisite to grasping the realities of the individual. For, as Fromm states, "one cannot separate man as an individual from man as a social participant—and if one does, one ends up by understanding neither."

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER


"Never has a doctrine of man that is so morbid, so discouraging, so without hope or confidence, and so lacking in inspiration been so widely acclaimed" (p. 54), says LaPiere of Freudian theory; "neither is there any scientific evidence for it" (p. 56). How then, one asks, has it become such a ubiquitous concept of the nature of man?

The thesis of *The Freudian Ethic* is that Freud's theory is in concordance with far-reaching sociological changes, and that the interaction between the two has thus been mutually strengthening. The Freudian ethic is the designation given to the values and sentiments logically correlated with the theory.

The greater part of the book deals with recent changes in the American culture reflecting the decline from a progressive society, enabling and rewarding individual enterprise and self-discipline, to a stagnant society composed of passively adjusting or irresponsible individuals. The Freudian doctrine supplies the process with an ideological sanctioning; the Freudian ethic pervades it all.

LaPiere is professor of sociology at Stanford University, and as a sociologist is interested in the "social validity" given to the Freudian doctrine. Even so, as a
social psychologist, he opens to criticism the Freudian conception of man against society. LaPiere asks, “If man is by nature contrasocial, how can it be that men have evolved the social system by which man lives?” And he points out, “If man were, as the Freudians hold, born with innate and enduring antisocial drives, then nothing short of force would keep him acting in a reasonably civilized manner ... [whereas] most law is [merely] legal reinforcement of cultural and local standards of behavior ...”

This reviewer disagrees with LaPiere’s view that the scientific validity of the Freudian doctrine is of no real social significance. It would seem that the public seeks guidance from scientific doctrines as never before, and their application is most rapid. It becomes all the more the social scientist’s responsibility to clarify and validate the theories dealing with man and society. If a thorough, interdisciplinary examination of the Freudian social-psychological doctrine were undertaken, this might very well result in a discrediting consensus, and even within the given reality of social changes in progress, this should go a long way to replace the Freudian ethic.

Burlington, Vermont

Rowena R. Ansbacher

Existential Dream Analysis


Medard Boss is one of the leading figures in European existential analysis and, at the same time, a leading Freudian analyst who has also had Jungian training. Among the existential analysts he is a controversial figure since he claims he is the only true follower of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. But I get the impression he isn’t so much a disciple of Heidegger as he finds in him some clarification of his own struggle. With regard to Freud, Boss says, in effect, the master was intuitively correct but his theory does not see into the living truths he sensed. This is precisely what I see of Boss in his writings.

This book forms one of the few detailed studies of what dream theory in existential analysis would look like. Boss reviews all of the principal dream theories. Often without very impressive evidence he dismisses them in favor of a position toward which he himself seems to be drifting intuitively. He lumps Adler with Stekel, Jung, and Maeder.

In 25 years of dream work Boss has become impressed with the manifest truth of dreams. It is not necessary to reach through them to the hidden libidinal or archetypal meaning, nor are theoretical transformations necessary to understand them. Just in the very human events and feelings of a dream is its truth. His approach is phenomenological. The dream is a dramatization of the truth of a person’s life. In a way Boss would say we are far from the meaning of our lives if we do not see this truth standing in its own light in our dreams. Indeed, in the end, the only essential difference he finds between the existential drama of our lives and our dreams is that we awaken after the latter. Somehow the relative consistency of our waking dream tells us something of the meaning of the sleep drama. Somehow they are each images of the other. The Hindus saw this long ago in the doctrine of Moya. In a somewhat intuitive way Boss gropes toward the phenomenal truth which simply stands forth in our dreams.
The book reminds me of experiments I am now carrying out in dream interpretation. More and more I can see that in the very telling of his dream the dreamer is subtly acting it out. The woman who dreams of braking her car to prevent an accident is braking in the situation with me. A young political scientist with dreams of being a wise old man unconsciously strokes his long white beard when he wisely reflects on his dreams.

Boss is moving along the same line as Adler in his common-sense view of the way in which the dream portrays life. The main difference is that Boss finds a more positive truth standing forth in the dream. The book is groping, but it has signs of greatness in it.

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TRIBUTE TO A DISTINGUISHED NEO-FREUDIAN

FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN. *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy: Selected Papers.*

Of the many gifted psychotherapists who left Hitlerian Europe, Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann was among the most notable. Although she retained her identification with the psychoanalytic movement, she was in theory, technique, and temperament far removed from classical Freudianism. Prior to coming to the United States in 1935, she worked closely with three original and productive thinkers: Kurt Goldstein, Georg Groddeck, and Erich Fromm. In this country, she was greatly stimulated and influenced by her deep friendship with Harry Stack Sullivan. To the moment of her death in April, 1957, she demonstrated a creative eagerness to seek out and utilize new ideas in her field.

The present volume contains a representative selection of papers published between 1935 and 1957, and includes a bibliography of the papers written in Germany between 1914 and 1931. It makes an excellent companion volume for her only other book, *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy.*

A considerable portion of Dr. Fromm-Reichmann's fame in psychotherapeutic circles came from her courageous and insightful work with schizophrenics. Her brilliance in both theory and technique stands out clearly in the eight papers on schizophrenia presented here. Other papers of special interest deal with the history and philosophy of psychotherapy, personal and professional requirements of a psychotherapist, the doctor-patient relationship, and comparisons of psychoanalytic and general dynamic conceptions of theory and of therapy. There are also stimulating papers on manic-depressive psychosis, hostility, migraine, the mother role, and anxiety.

In the latter paper, Fromm-Reichmann makes one of her quite rare references to Adler. "Adler," she writes, "uses his concept of inferiority feelings where other authors speak of anxiety. He asserts that these inferiority feelings can be overcome by people only in affirmation and strengthening of their social bonds with society, by enforcing the sense of belonging to a social group" (p. 308). Although she does not comment on this directly, she states her own point of view a few paragraphs later, that "many of the emotional states to which psychiatrists refer as anxiety are actually states of loneliness or fear of loneliness" (p. 309).
Loneliness, indeed, is the topic of the final paper in this book (published posthumously in rough draft). It makes a fitting ending for a memorial publication of the writings of this small, spirited, and brilliant psychotherapist who, though often apparently lonely herself, brought antidote for loneliness into the lives of countless patients and colleagues.

Washington, D. C.

ROBERT A. HARPER

LEARNING FROM CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES


This is a fascinating book, fully in accordance with the currently increasing realization that good science starts with good naturalistic observation and that abstractions derived must again be discernable in real life. It was the purpose of the authors to provide material for making such observations pertaining to social psychology.

With ingenious simplicity the authors went for their material to documents which are public property—the records of hearings before various committees of the U. S. Congress. The hearings presented here deal with urban renewal, civil rights, brainwashing and four further areas. Each is preceded by a brief introduction and a set of suggested discussion questions.

The hearings can be considered social-psychological case material from various aspects. One aspect is to consider the expert testimony as a reasonably close approximation to first-hand observation, and the voices of the congressmen, chairmen and others, as individual perceptions of the "facts," representing the various components of the national climate at the time.

As an example of what goes on in the book, let us take the chapter on brainwashing. The witness was Major Mayer, psychiatrist in charge of interviewing American prisoners recovered from communist captivity during the Korean war. We see from his detailed statement that "brainwashing" is a mystifying term for measures which in themselves are not mysterious. Physical torture was used only minimally, and "I don't think we can say properly that mental torture . . . was a very important part." Actually, brainwashing had many characteristics of psychotherapy—only with a reversed objective, namely to alienate the subject from his social setting, rather than to integrate him with it. Even a form of group therapy in reverse was used, group sessions in self-criticism. The main objective of the entire effort was to facilitate the physical control of the prisoners, rather than to convert them to communism, and in that respect was rather successful.

The role of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy at this hearing is almost humorous. E.g., completely ignoring the testimony, he opens a new topic with: "Regardless of what type of mental or physical torture was inflicted, . . . ." The new topic is the superiority of the Marine Corps, which he introduces with: "I am not here now to extol the virtues of the Marine Corps," mentioning also that he himself had been a Marine.

This brief sample may show that the material is rich in opportunities for making observations and for applying principles already formulated. The teacher of social psychology who is concerned with keeping his course close to significant realities of the subject matter, will be grateful to the editors for having provided
him with a convenient aid. The instructor who heretofore kept primarily in the realm of abstractive research, may well be influenced through this book to feed the principles thus validated back into the life situation.

University of Vermont

Heinz L. Ansbacher

CLOTHES MAKE THE MAN, AND THE WOMAN


Red Skelton (Parade, Dec. 13, 1959) tells the story:

Two little fellows, 5 and 6, were standing outside a nudist colony. One of the boys was peeking through a hole in the fence. "Wow!" he shouted. "There's a bunch of naked people behind this fence." The other boy said, "Is that so? What are they, men or women?" The first boy said, "I don't know. They haven't got any clothes on."

Clothes to distinguish the sexes is among the many diverse topics which Langner discusses in the first important work on the psychology of clothes since Flugel's. Additionally he treats modesty and nudism, hobble skirts, the Doukhobors, inflatable brassieres, space suits, transvestism, mores and law, religion, social status, uniforms, costumes, ornamentation and fashion.

Langner, founder of the Theater Guild, a playwright, and a patent specialist, brings vast erudition to his task. He rejects the utilitarian hypothesis and Flugel's erotogeneity hypothesis. A disciple of Adler, Langner proposes that man wears clothes because of his goal of superiority. Thus, man invented clothes because of "the self-importance which clothing imparted" (p. 14) and "which enabled him to claim kinship with superior beings, deities or gods and, in the case of the Western religions, to believe that he was created in the image of God" (p. 16). Langner believes "the main purpose of modesty is to enable us to maintain our belief in our godlike attributes by inhibiting the removal of garments or clothing which expose our lower centers in public" (p. 71).

Clothes affect our behavior. The soldier feels more courageous, officialdom becomes more officious, the delinquent becomes more non-conforming, and "The clothes of the very poor and the feeling of inadequacy or inferiority which is experienced by those wearing them, strongly affect their behavior pattern" (p. 154). Clothes serve to differentiate the economic classes, the high ranking from the low ranking, men from women, young from old. It can readily be observed that Langner places much emphasis upon purpose and that his is a psychology of use. "Thus, clothes are universally used to communicate constructive or destructive mass emotions and behavior, which is a far, far cry from the purposes for which clothing was originally invented and worn" (p. 167).

While Langner sticks rather close to the superiority-inferiority hypothesis of Adler and introduces no other Adlerian formulations explicitly, he demonstrates knowledge of the concepts of purpose, value, social interest, and the masculine protest. With respect to the latter, he traces the evolution of women's clothes and concludes that "by imposing confining garments on woman, or by otherwise hobbling her, man was enabled almost universally to keep her in a state of inferiority" (p. 54).
Like all Adlerians, Langner attaches value to his evaluations and offers some suggestions for the future. Anything, including clothes, which increases the feelings of self-esteem, equality, and belonging, and which decreases social distance, is recommended by him.

Three-hundred well chosen illustrations add to the edification and entertainment the book provides.

University of Chicago

Harold H. Mosak

FROM ADLER TO EXISTENTIALISM — HOW FAR?


When this reprint, published originally in 1939, came into my hands last summer, I at last understood why previous lectures and writings of the author seemed so familiar to me. The author, one of the foremost proponents of existential psychotherapy in the United States today, writes in the foreword that he owes a debt "to the humble and penetrating wisdom of Alfred Adler, with whom I had the privilege of studying and associating and discussing intimately," although he gives credit also to Freud, Jung, Rank, etc. The book is permeated with Adlerian ideas and references; it could be used as a textbook at our Institute. As another reviewer, Calvin S. Hall, put it: "Alfred Adler is the book's elan vital" (Contemp. Psychol., 1959, 4, 263).

In the appendix, Rollo May describes, with great appreciation, Alfred Adler as a person and then continues: "The criticism of superficiality that is leveled against some of his ideas is to an extent justified, but it is none the less true that his system as a whole will go down in history as a lasting contribution to the endeavor of man to understand himself" (p. 233).

Now, what has happened to Rollo May within the 20 years from the time of the first publication of this book, that he today no longer mentions Adler? Could it be that he accepted the criticism just cited—which, incidentally, seems unjustified as the Adlerian understands Adler—and eventually joined the ranks of the existentialists because he believes their concepts and vocabulary are actually more profound?

It has recently been amply shown that Adler can be considered a forerunner of existentialism. See, for example, the papers by Van Dusen (this Journal, 1959, 15, 100-111 and 143-156) who finds that "Adler's system translates rather directly into ontology." And Ansbacher (this Journal, 1959, 15, 141-142) has given a further example of how readily the simpler Adlerian and the more difficult existential terminology can be interchanged, concluding that Adler may well be used as an introduction to existential analysis, as "a key to existence."

This being the case, Rollo May's development from Adler to existentialism did in fact not take him so far from his point of origin, and this would then be the reason why an Adlerian, like myself, can still feel very familiar even with his present-day lectures and publications.

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Danica Deutsch