BOOK REVIEWS

OPENNESS TOWARD THE WORLD


This is another of the growing number of attempts to free psychology from the Freudian blinders. "The developmental constructs of orthodox psychoanalytic theory and their modifications in ego-psychology ... do not suffice to account adequately for what we can actually observe in early development" (pp. v-vi). For the careful observation and description of experiential data the author refers to the phenomenological and existential authors, such as Binswanger, Goldstein, etc., and he acknowledges special indebtedness to Erich Fromm. The book, limited to the areas of emotion, perception and memory, is well written and well documented, especially with recent European references.

"Freud tended to overlook the fact that the movement of evolution as well as of history does create 'new things under the sun,' and that man is not only the slave of his past, but, with all his limitations, also the potential master of his future" (p. 277). Specifically, what Freud overlooked was man's "openness toward the world" (p. 247). The metamorphosis which the healthy individual undergoes very early in life is from a subject-centered, or autocentric, to an object-centered, or allocentric, mode of perception (p. 83) and attitude (p. 220). "With the help of the seemingly boundless energy of the child's exploratory drive, the great work of the gradual and expanding constitution of the object world proceeds, an achievement made possible by the shift from autocentric to predominantly allocentric perception" (p. 166). But today Freud's, and for that matter certain behaviorists', "nothing but" view of man still seems to prevail. It holds that even man's thought is nothing but a detour toward instinctual need-gratification (p. 277). Thus the appreciation of man's essential allocentricity "is a lesson the implications of which present-day man and society are reluctant to learn, as is evidenced by their overriding concern with technology, with know-how, rather than with the basic questions of man's relation to the world, to his fellow men and fellow creatures" (p. 224).

Schachtel makes a distinction between sociocentricity and allocentricity, although the Greek word allos means the other, and only additionally also that which is different or strange. He reserves the term sociocentricity apparently to signify mere conformity, or ethnocentricity. "Sociocentric perception is really a shared autocentricity" (p. 191). His allocentricity, however, comes rather close to Adler's social interest sub specie aeternitatis, in that the allocentric attitude, one of affirmation in general, includes "affirmation of the other person" (p. 227). "While this attitude becomes most readily apparent in the kinship of all men, it can extend to every part of nature" (p. 226).

This book should be of great help in pointing the way for the many who are still confined in Freudian and other forms of reductionistic thinking, yet are somewhat aware of and discontent with its inadequacies. To the rest of us it is a wel-
come further confirmation that the *Zeitgeist* is moving with increased momentum in a direction in which it started half a century ago, with Adler as one of the most courageous voices.

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**Heinz L. Ansbacher**

**THE THIRD VIENNESE SCHOOL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY**


Viktor Frankl's short account of the three years he spent in concentration camps can be read quickly, but, once read, it will stay with the reader a long, long time. Like a draught of medicine, it stings, it hurts, it sickens; but, compelled by the realization of its urgency, one drinks it down and fervently hopes for some sign of its purifying effect. It might well be prescribed for everyone who would understand our time. Few readers could stomach an objective description of the horrors of degradation of the concentration camps, but through the eyes of Frankl who not only survived them, but responded to them with supremely humane behavior and incredibly transcending spirit, it becomes possible for a wider circle to glimpse the lowest depths and to find solace and hope in Frankl's basic concepts of logotherapy. All of this is fascinating reading, which speaks well for the translation, too.

The existential ontology and therapy is most briefly appended to the body of the book, and leaves one hoping that Frankl will soon present the English reader with a full and systematic account of his thinking and practice. Indeed, one is left hungering for a thorough and, if possible, solidly psychological exposition of those concepts which are Frankl's unique contributions—the meaning of life, responsibility, the noetic dimension, and the variety of the suffering experience, to mention a few. Those aspects of his thinking which follow more closely the work of others are easier to understand, and are possibly no lesser contributions in view of the real gains in extensity and clarity which they constitute.

Gordon Allport has written a fine preface which summarizes so ably the conceptual portions of the book. He remarks that in creating the "third Viennese school of psychotherapy," Frankl builds on Freud and does not repudiate him (p. x). We would point out, however, that this is true only to the extent that there is no explicit criticism of Freud. It is most noteworthy that one will find no Freudian term or concept in the entire work, and that one does find outspoken repudiation of the hedonistic, mechanistic, and deterministic positions which have become so prevalent through Freud's influence.

On the other hand, although Frankl deals with Adler explicitly only in the briefest allusion to the inadequacy of the will-to-power, those familiar with this, "the second Viennese school," will find striking and repeated similarities to it. "It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live by looking to the future—*sub specie aeternitatis*" (p. 72). "Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual" (p. 77). "For what is demanded of a man is... the actualization of specific tasks in his world—and only to the degree to which he..."
accomplishes this actualization will he also fulfill himself” (p. 100). These quotations from Frankl are but a few of those which could also be taken as truly representing the thinking of Adler.

Frankl says most plausibly that every age has its neuroses, and every age needs its own psychotherapy. It is all the more interesting and mutually reinforcing that Individual Psychology, conceived in the age before Hitler and the second World War, should have so much in common with logotherapy, the distillation of the suffering of the death-camps, the quest for the meaning of existence in our very present.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

A SURVEY OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY


This is another survey of the scope and tenor of existential philosophy. The title reflects the main point of the book. Rational philosophy is well developed, but we have little to account for the irrational in man. Since Aristotle, Western man has held to rationalism, or to essence over existence. This led to the enlightenment and today’s ascendency of technology (the material incarnation of rationalism) and bureaucracy. We have overlooked the irrationality of existence. The philosophers have retired to the sterile academy where they can be detached from the immediate concerns of men. Barrett traces the whole development in living terms to the present anti-faith phase where there is material gain, danger (atom bomb), and homelessness. He shows how modern literature and art reflect the naked inner life of man.

The viewpoint of the book is that of existential philosophy which deals with the furies, the irrational in man. Barrett gives a chapter each to description of the position of four major philosophers in this tradition. They are Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. The latter two are made unusually clear. The book is a fairly important, and in some respects, original contribution to philosophical existentialism. It is written in a lively, literate style with many references to current situations and events from daily life. As a survey of existential philosophy it is among the most readable and understandable of the five I know, but not the most scholarly.

This book makes only passing references to psychoanalysis though it has many references to the life of man. The few references to Adler link him to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power and to Sartre, as was done by Stern (this Journal, 1958, 14, 38-50). The question is then whether clinicians should be interested in a book presenting the philosophy of the general state of man. The answer is probably yes.

Here enters an odd difficulty in the whole realm of existential writing. A philosophy that sets out to uncover existing man partly fails when making sweeping generalizations concerning das man, the generalized one. In this it moves toward essence rather than existence, in this case the essence of man. The great existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre are great because their
work is that of a person in a real, personal struggle. To come after them and talk about their ideas is to move away from the existential position one wishes to describe. Barrett has written about Zen too, and to write about Zen is even more clearly to commit high treason against the thought of Zen itself. In a very real way clinicians struggling with individual cases are more existential or existing than the philosophers generalizing about what might exist. Phenomenology not only relates to existentialism, it is its very heart. When existential writing is not the struggle of an individual with his own world (e.g., Kierkegaard or Nietzsche), nor a personal struggle of an individual with another individual's world (e.g., the therapist), it tends to become untrue to its own philosophy. This is not really a criticism of Barrett. He does well what he set out to do. Rather it is a personal rumination about writing in the whole field.

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WILSON VAN DUSEN

MANY CONSULTANTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL PATIENT


This is a fascinating and significant work. The editors have most carefully and effectively accomplished what they set out to do with their ingenious method of presentation: They enable the reader to glimpse a problem in psychotherapy and to learn how this problem would be handled or interpreted by several consultants of differing theoretical approaches. This is an invaluable experience to be offered between book covers, especially since the range of incidents is quite comprehensive, and the selection of consultants includes the best in their fields, their differences making for some genuinely critical comments and original suggestions in view and discipline.

The work of Standal and Corsini has produced a rich source book of psychotherapy. Its contents may be used latitudinally, as it were, by studying any of the 23 incidents separately and in comparison; or the material may be used longitudinally, by looking up the comments of any one of the 28 consultants and comparing their approaches in this way. The contributors were free to express themselves informally, as much as they chose; some make only one commentary, others, a great many; a few take the opportunity to give excellent, brief explications of their points of view (Ellis, Ruth Munroe, Rogers, Bess Sondel). Most of the expressions are marked by candor and modesty.

While the editors have gone to great pains to summarize their material latitudinally, a longitudinal systematization and ultimate conclusions are left to the reader. Naturally, he will scarcely be able to cover the whole work equally, and will see as emphasized that to which he is particularly receptive; but it is a credit to the method of presentation that many similarities and comparisons impress themselves with a new and striking clarity.

This reader's general impressions run as follows. Probably the characteristic which discriminates most between contributors is their place on a rigid-flexible
axis and the variation in qualities related thereto. It seems to follow that the more set the therapeutic procedure, the more opportunities are missed; the more ready-made the concepts, terms, or even frames of reference with which the patient is approached, the more escapes the grasp. Whether these are matters of standing on the proper length of a session, the course the transference should take, the safe thing to do; or ways of understanding via such beclouding labels as "the classic indication of the Oedipal problems," defenses (as Dreikurs once asks, defenses against what?), and even the masculine protest; or specialized references to "the learning point of view," "the communication process," psychodramatic structuring, etc.—one can actually see that in so far as all these forms are fixed, they tend to distort the perception; and in so far as they are means to achieve a therapeutic end, they interpose a hindering distance between the therapy protagonists. The therapist's appreciation of these limitations is indicated by the fact that, in a considerable number of incidents, he raises the question whether some non-prescribed action on his part is justified by its effect on the patient. Examples of such unusual actions may be in the direction of greater directiveness, more emotional involvement, and going beyond the therapy-hour relationship. As Riesman points out, there is still a good deal of "pluralistic ignorance" among therapists here, else they would have discovered that they are all sinners together in "transcending the limitations in which they were schooled".

Rules and terminologies are, of course, generalizations, and it would seem clear that therapy is moving steadily from the nomothetic to the idiographic. Thus the emphasis is more and more on the I-Thou relationship with the individual patient, and on individualized relationships in group therapy. The intensified respect for the individual in his uniqueness is manifested by the recurring concern with the problem of honesty with the patient, the questioning of anything like a trick or manipulation. And further, the unique qualities of the therapist in his relation to this patient at this time are recognized as well. Several consultants designate the nature of the therapist's own experience as an essential aspect in the evaluation of a therapy. Rogers gives the fullest expression to the importance of "being that which one truly is," but others also stress the integrity of the therapist. More and more the adjectives real and genuine are used together with human to describe the feeling between what Frankl calls the "two partners" of the therapy.

This essential feeling is described as "genuine interest" (Clara Thompson) and "altruistic love" (Sorokin); in several instances it is seen expressed in the second-mile accompaniment of the therapist, as in his "extra investment" in the patient (Montagu), his extra time, his extra help, and even his personal sacrifice. In a few "peak" instances the age-old paradox that the gift-freely-given kindles the spark of reciprocity, of cooperation, of co-responsibility, is rediscovered, as Herr and Mowrer and others point out. This is the ultimate achievement of any therapeutic relationship, which Adler described as the accomplishment by the therapist of the two basic functions of the mother—in these cases unfulfilled by her—to establish cooperation with her child, and to spread this attitude towards others.

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Rowena R. Ansbacher
THROUGH STATUS SEEKING TO ANOMIE


Adler distinguished between a healthy striving for superiority in which the development of personal talents and sensitivity to social needs and social justice are present, and a neurotic striving for superiority in terms of an *Ersatz* self-esteem, striving for power and for self-aggrandizement. The present volume, number one best seller by the author of *The Hidden Persuaders*, is, in effect, a catalogue of the forms through which Americans are expressing themselves in this second fashion. The concern with social problems and issues which characterizes so many middle-class Americans, is seen as not genuine by Packard. Rather it is viewed as a status-seeking activity which, in too many cases, reflects what the sociologist calls "consciousness of kind," i.e., the thing to do. To manifest such interest requires leisure and money and is therefore confined largely to do-gooding by members of status-conscious, upper middle-class women's organizations and to refined forms of political buttonholing by politically conscious representatives of "the real upper class" and "the semi-upper class."

Packard's chief concern is with the form of status-striving in which no pretense of social altruism is made at all. This form is nation-wide and cuts across all social strata. It manifests itself via packaged ideas, mass culture of the *Kitsch* variety, Veblenian conspicuous consumption patterns, the adoption of culture-heroes from the world of sports and from the cinema, the adoption of the standardized personality patterns derived by adolescents from the life-adjustment program, and finally from the adult ideal of gracious living fostered by the advertising fraternity and the carriage trade.

Status-seeking, Packard points out, derives from inferiority feelings which are standardized in relation to class level. Status appears to be the product of various sociological factors and these are, in the order of their importance, the kind of home owned, one's source of income, the type of education one has received and one's current occupation. The inferiority feelings and a good measure of the status-seeking are to be found in the white-collar and blue-collar classes, which Parkard calls the supporting classes, namely, the limited-success class, the working class, and the real lower class.

Packard describes extensively the style of life of the middle and upper class status-seeking Americans who are obsessed with what sociologists have come to call "our fun morality." He discusses the many ways in which these Americans, and their imitators in the supporting classes, are achieving alienation from self through status-striving. These are too numerous to mention in entirety here. A sample would include: seeking status through a college degree, a "ritzy" home, the choice of residential neighborhood, establishment of status symbols and pecking orders in business corporations, confining friendships to the right "circles," choosing to affiliate with a "conservative" religious denomination, belonging to the right clubs, attending the "tony" schools, possessing the proper car and the most up-to-date household gadgets, becoming a member of the proper civic and cultural groups and attending the most select cocktail parties.

Packard's volume is of focal interest to all psychologists who today stress the self-concept and self-development. The existentialist philosophers and psychol-
ologists have been stressing the roles which self-awareness, cognitive clarity, altruistic dispositions, and mature value orientations which are actually lived, may play in individual and social development. They have stressed, and rightly I believe, that these desiderata are not obtainable without suffering and what Unamuno calls "the tragic sense of life." At least they are unlikely to be achieved without awareness of suffering and tragedy, sensitivity to them, and a compulsion to do something to lessen the amount of both, in this world. Value-awareness has at least three dimensions: (1) a cognitive dimension in which we thoroughly understand the meanings of our asserted values for a variety of situational contexts, that is to say, the behavior implied for these contexts; (2) a hedonic dimension through which we reveal the proper feeling-tone or disposition for an asserted value (without which it is strictly an intellectual construction and nothing more) and which is sensed by others as present or absent; and (3) a behavioral dimension, that is to say, a record of enacting our held values whenever the occasion clearly calls for them, as contrasted with merely asserting them through the liberal rhetoric and by means of cocktail-parties held for the purpose of classifying ourselves intellectually, socially and politically.

Realization of values along any of these three dimensions is today completely stultified by the anomie, alienation and class-rigidity which the inane status-seeking associated with fun morality imposes. The drift is essentially away from the classical-humanistic ideals which stress the cultivation of intellectual and analytic power, religious sensibility, aesthetic sensitivity, the pursuit of knowledge, the respect for personal worth and achievement, and a sense of social responsibility. This last, translated into secular terms which would be appropriate for the twentieth century, demands the development of workable fictional finalisms for achieving all the preceding ideals in a world dominated by science, technology, administrative and political organization, the cult of personality, slanted mass communication, education dominated by vocation, and a church transmogrified into an annex of the country club.

If the classical humanistic ideal is not to be lost, and if it is to be incorporated in a program of mental hygiene, shored up by cross-disciplinary, behavioral studies, one should know what those features of social pathology are which work against this ideal. Packard lets us know what some of these are, by providing an illuminating description of our current syndromes of alienation and anomie.

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HENRY WINTHROP

AN INCONSISTENT "STYLE OF LIFE"


This textbook of educational psychology, first published in 1950, attempts to synthesize the research results in biology, psychology, sociology and anthropology. It is interesting for an Adlerian psychologist since in this revision as well as in the 1950 edition the style of life is given an important role in the model of man which the authors construct. One soon learns, however, that they are not familiar with the way in which Adler defined this term, even though, so far as we know, it was Adler who first used it in psychology, and certainly has written the
most about it. The authors refer only once to Adler, giving him credit for one of the various solutions for inferiorities, namely, compensation.

Searching for the meaning which the authors give to the term style of life is something like reading a detective story: One never knows quite what is coming next, or what this term really means. The first chapter is about The Varieties of Personality: Styles of Life. One is immediately impressed with the organismic terminology, particularly that used by Goldstein: "A unique human organism comes to terms," and "the organism interacts with its environment." This is not too foreign to Adlerian thinking, and even less so is the statement: "The individual (must be recognized) as a whole unique personality, and the particular patterns of his peculiar life style" must be studied. At the end of this chapter, however, one still does not know what this life style is. As one goes on, one reads that the individual builds his life style, but that Samoa also has its own life style (p. 50), and so has the growing child and the adolescent. This could perhaps be a style, a pattern, a type which would be characteristic for a culture, an age, an individual. But why call it a life style?

In Chapter 7, The Development of the Self into a Mature Person, which deals with the rise of the self, the emergence of the interpersonal self, the ever-changing nature of the adolescent self, the constancy of the self-system, there is no mention of style of life; nor is there in the other chapters dealing with the self.

When we do encounter the term life style again, it is used in a negative sense, and here suddenly life style and self are equated. "The lifelong style of life, the unchanging self, is ... an unlikely state of affairs." The authors are very definite: "The self which is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow, is a classifier's fiction. ... It is a static conception of the self and a poor substitute for the more dynamic reality." But we had read previously that the very constancy of a self-system is a dynamic thing (p. 317). Where is the difference between the self-system and the concept of the self? How can the self-system be permanent when the emphasis on self-consistency is deplored (p. 335)?

Later we find: "Sometimes a slight shift in our approach to a problem ... can start the cumulative changes which result in drastic shifts in style of life. The manic-depressive psychosis gives the extreme form of such shifts" (p. 485). We would ask, does the life style shift back and forth with each manic or depressive phase? And finally we learn that style of life is apparently meant to be a temporary pattern, an attitude, mostly "about life" (p. 486). What the authors seem to mean is a style about life, if such a thing can be imagined, and not a style of life in the sense of a style of living.

Although the authors recognize purposes occasionally and describe man as a purposive being (p. 227), and although they apply the Gestalt approach to the process of learning (Chapt. 11), they have nowhere reached a real grasp of the holistic principle or of the teleo-analytic approach. This would require recognition that the movement of the whole individual in life is expressive of long-range fictive goals and also of specific immediate goals. It is our experience that no teacher can really understand children unless she can determine the concrete goals of a child who presents problems, and unless she knows how to counteract these goals. While the authors are certainly moving in the right direction, they will have to discover for themselves, gropingly, what they could have found in the Adlerian literature.

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Rudolf Dreikurs, M. D.
CRITICISM CONFOUNDED


Dr. Campbell, whose untimely death occurred just before the publication of this book, was chairman of the department of psychiatry, University of Oklahoma, School of Medicine. He had undergone a training analysis and had practiced psychoanalysis for a few years before renouncing it, so that he knew his subject well. His perception of the untenables in psychoanalysis is sharp, and his book contains as impressive a collection of Freudian absurdities as one could find. If he had stopped at this, the book might have gone far to accomplish its purpose to break the hold which psychoanalysis has upon psychiatry, medical education, and the allied professions throughout the country today. But in his great passion Dr. Campbell has not only thrown the baby out with the bath, but left us with no tub at all.

He speaks very truly of the impossibility of explaining the normal through concepts of the abnormal; of the rigidity of the doctrines, and the pressures on the therapist and the patient to fit the pattern; of the subterfuges in all-embracing terms such as resistance and the various forms of transference; of the arrogant assertions regarding the profound and scientific quality of the analyst’s speculation when there is no proof that any of it is true; of the endeavor to get the neurotic to live in the past and to be conscious of it; of the unconscious as being a waste-basket of excuses for unexplained behavior and thinking while it is really synonymous with the unknown; etc.

But even a convinced anti-Freudian will object to Campbell’s blanket condemnation of psychoanalysts, for instance, and to his explanation and depreciation of the theory on the basis of Freud’s own disturbed personality. There is no mention of any observations or principles originating in Freud’s thinking which can be salvaged for inclusion in a common ground of working hypotheses. Furthermore, the author implies that every formulation which is unprovable by the “scientific” method is delusional. His only theoretical alternatives are hints that the factual explanation of everything—childhood and adolescent reactions, harrowing experiences, homosexual behavior—is physiological. The only alternative therapy for neuroses mentioned is shock treatment—and that, after Dr. Campbell has repeatedly berated the psychoanalysts for not identifying, specifically and scientifically, the cause of the patients’ troubles and the nature of the therapeutic process.

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THE UNTAPPED MENTAL HOSPITAL ATTENDANT


This is a remarkably clear and detailed compilation of all the pertinent facts concerning the deficiencies in professional mental health manpower, particularly in the state hospital setting. The book will probably stand for some time as the outstanding authority in this field. It is very well written, well organized, a pleasure to refer to.
However, the book suffers from being rather narrowly directed toward the professional aspects of the problem. The author does not mention such studies as those by Belknap, Myers, Hollingshead and Redlich, and the Cummings which demonstrate that highly professionalized manpower cannot effectively deal with the lower class, poorly educated patients who fill our state mental hospitals, but that an expanded and better trained attendant force can. The essence of the book's contribution to this aspect consists in one sentence. "Because of the importance of the attendants in patient care and treatment, a study of the emerging patterns and practices with respect to this occupational group is badly needed." With this, I most heartily agree.

But rather than tackle this most essential problem the author ends with: "We must conclude this survey with the prediction that our country will continue to be faced with serious personnel shortages in all fields related to mental illness and mental health for many years to come." Against this the author sets off an introduction which makes sweeping generalizations about the crisis in American education resulting from our anti-intellectual cultural climate.

As a blueprint for action, Albee, in essence, repeats the plaint of the puzzled ticket agent, "You can’t get there from here," and, indeed, you can’t.

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GEORGE W. BROOKS, M. D.

A DOCUMENT OF ALTRUISTIC SUICIDES


The two Japanese authors of this book were officers with the Special Attack Force (Kamikaze Corps) from its inception until its dissolution. The translation of Kamikaze furnishes the title of the book, The Divine Wind. The function of the Kamikaze pilots was to crash-dive with their bomb load into the enemy target in full knowledge that this meant their own death. The book is essentially an account of the military operations of the various Kamikaze units, documented by 25 pages of tables and a large number of American and Japanese photographs.

But the book also tells of how the suicide units were organized and how the pilots felt. The original decision is shown to have been a very grave one and to have been made with the consent of the young men themselves. "Commander Tamai ... reviewed the critical war situation when all 23 of the men were assembled and then explained Admiral Ohnishi's proposal. In a frenzy of emotion and joy, the arms of every pilot in the assembly went up in a gesture of complete accord."

The thoughts and feelings of individual suicide pilots as they waited their turn, and went on their missions are presented in the final chapter of seven "typical" letters home. Here the authors of the book remind us, that the Kamikaze principle was not so shocking to these Japanese as it would be to a Westerner because unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor and the people of Japan had been cultivated for many hundred years, and the prevailing belief in life after death
made the concept of death less final. Also, under certain conditions, suicide had been sanctioned by Japanese culture. But all this does not explain away the striking difference between these letters and the typical Western suicide note. Excerpts from the last letters home are:

I have never felt better and am now standing by, ready for action. My greatest concern is not about death, but rather of how I can be sure of sinking an enemy carrier.

Once the order was given for my one-way mission it became my sincere wish to achieve success in fulfilling this last duty. Even so, I cannot help feeling a strong attachment to this beautiful land of Japan. Is that a weakness on my part?

Please congratulate me. I have been given a splendid opportunity to die. This is my last day. I am grateful from the depths of my heart to the parents who have reared me with their constant prayers and tender love. Thank you for the 23 years during which you have cared for me and inspired me. I hope that my present deed will in some small way repay what you have done for me.

I want you to know that I am in the best of health at this last moment. My last wish is that my brothers may have a proper education. It is certain that uneducated men have an empty life. Please see to it that their lives are as full as possible.

Spring seems to come early to southern Kyushu. Here the blossoms and flowers are all beautiful. There is a peace and tranquility. I think of springtime in Japan while soaring to dash against the enemy.

(From an ensign reared in the Christian faith:) We live in the spirit of Jesus Christ, and we die in that spirit. I will precede you now, mother, in the approach to Heaven. Please pray for my admittance. I should regret being barred from the Heaven to which you will surely be admitted. Tomorrow I will plunge against the enemy without fail.

We shall serve the nation gladly in this present painful struggle. We shall plunge into enemy ships cherishing the conviction that Japan has been and will be a place where only lovely homes, brave women, and beautiful friendships are allowed to exist.

Durkheim in his classic work on suicide distinguishes three forms: egotistic, anomic, and altruistic suicide. The first two "both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals," and are the forms most generally found in our society. Adler, in similarity to Durkheim, attributed them to a personality structure in which lack of social interest was an important factor. Increasing case material seems amply to support such interpretation. Regarding the third form, however, which according to Durkheim may be obligatory, optional, or acute altruistic suicide, our knowledge is scanty. The Divine Wind stirringly and tragically helps to fill this gap. It might be questioned whether the Kamikaze pilots may properly be called suicides since their objective was not self-destruction but to destroy the enemy. However, Durkheim's definition justifies such inclusion, as he states: "The term suicide is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly (italics ours) from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result." The action of the Kamikaze pilots can, then, be taken as a combination of the three kinds of altruistic suicide. Accordingly, their letters reveal no self-boundedness or anomic as is found in the typical Western suicide note, but rather an extraordinary strength of social ties.
THE END OF AGGRESSION?


In the opinion of the reviewer, this book should be (if it is not already) the recipient of an award for excellence in the behavioral studies. It rates tops in the significance of its subject, in the importance of its conclusions, in readability, in amount of data, and in simplicity and clarity of presentation.

Scott defines aggression as "referring to fighting, meaning the act of initiating an attack." This operational approach limits somewhat our usual understanding of aggression, but at the same time keeps one from reifying, and makes it possible to relate and contrast the results from animal research with the facts of human behavior. Scott's purpose is to provide a clear picture of the problems of aggression and the possible solutions suggested by the newer discoveries in biology and psychology. His method is to find what is general in animal behavior, i.e. behavior which can be subjected to experimentation, concerning stimulation to aggression, learning and training, controlling and prevention, etc., and then to assume similar conditions in the human where this can be confirmed by observation.

Scott's conclusions on aggression in humans could have the greatest impact on our socio-psychological thinking and in our practices. They should be read in detail and brought to the attention of the widest possible public. They are in brief: There is no evidence for an instinct for fighting, learning and training are among the most important causes of aggression, and aggression can be prevented and controlled in a number of ways.

When we combine Scott's findings on aggression with those of Harlow on affection, we are given a great deal on which to base a factual conception of the nature of man. The now widely held view which considers aggression innate, and affection secondary to the reduction of physiological drives, would require a radical change.

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PHENOMENOLOGY STRENGTHENED


About 80 per cent of the 1949 edition of this significant textbook has been rewritten or rather reorganized. However, the underlying theory which stresses the necessity for knowing an individual's self concept and his perceptual or phenomenal field in order to understand him has fortunately not been modified except in achieving additional clarity and strength. The revision is the work of Combs, perhaps because Snygg, the former senior author felt, "There is nothing which I wish to take back."

For the original "phenomenological" the word "perceptual" has been substituted almost throughout this edition. This, I feel, is somewhat unfortunate, inasmuch as the original edition contributed so well to the acceptance of the phenomenological approach, penetrating the hostile, atomistic atmosphere of American
behaviorism. Whereas European psychologists have been largely favorable to the theory, American psychologists complained that it lacked research substantiation and historical development, was anti-physiological and ignored other areas in contemporary psychology, and avoided operational definition.

How many of these early criticisms of the phenomenological approach have been answered by the revised edition? The new text includes a far wider range of research data, particularly the Ames demonstrations and the increasing and respectable literature on the self concept. The book's scholarship is evident in a more effective discussion of the broader meaning of phenomenology; the bibliography is almost tripled. A new chapter on "The Physical Organism—Vehicle of Perception" has been added, as well as one on "Learning, Forgetting and Problem Solving."

Each of the earlier criticisms but one has been handled with skill in logic and exposition, so that this continues to be one of the most readable books presenting psychological theory. It must be said, however, that the demand for operational definition has largely been ignored in favor of definition by verbal clarification. Terms and concepts such as phenomenal self and field, the need for the preservation and enhancement of the phenomenal self, and the adequate personality, remain clear but somewhat untestable.

It is in its application to human behavior that the phenomenological or perceptual approach has distinguished itself through the past ten years. Clinicians and educators have hailed and utilized its concepts. In the revision, the emphasis on therapy is considerably lessened in favor of applications to more general human problems, individual, social, and educational.

As an innovator of modern phenomenology in 1949, this book brought about a moderate movement; it was a fresh breeze in the air for stagnating American psychological theory. The revision is strengthened and more compelling and may yet move even more minds.

*University of Florida*

**Ted Landsman**

**The Gang and the Masculine Protest**


This study of adolescence, by a professor of sociology and anthropology at Brooklyn College and by a lieutenant of the New York City police department, hypothesizes that adolescents universally want to prove themselves as men. One consequence is that in primitive and modern societies alike, the adolescent is motivated to participate in group-prescribed rituals, often painful, dangerous, and terrifying, in order to demonstrate his courage and prowess—his worth. But whereas primitive rituals are in the hands of responsible adults who co-ordinate adolescent needs with those of the larger society, our own adolescent initiation rites are in the hands of gang leaders in rebellion against society, contemptuous of its needs.

Regardless of the nature of the rituals, youths feel strongly motivated to endure them. To evade, flinch, or otherwise fail the imposed ordeals relegates the
lad to the limbo of "chicken," worthless. Appalled both at the failure of modern society to fill this need, and at youth's own disastrous efforts as reflected in gangs, the authors recommend that we offer our young people more constructive ways in which to express their masculine protest, e.g., by offering increased opportunities for realistic social participation.

This is a well-documented alive account of adolescent initiation rites from Africa's Bathonga to Los Angeles' Pachucos. The authors' generalizations are based on colorful concrete data, combining the field anthropologist's details of primitive rites, the detached social worker's and police officer's awareness of local gang practices, and the academic sociologist's appreciation of theory. On the anthropological side, emphasis is on cross-cultural similarities in psychological growth. On the theoretical side, they emphasize the Adlerian concern with feelings of unworthiness or inferiority and a compensatory striving towards power and manliness. On the practitioner's side, they emphasize the compelling necessity to recognize the implications of an age-group isolated from the main stream of American culture.

The authors' critique of current modes of regarding delinquency, and their promulgation of their own hypothesis, are convincing. Their recommendation that society give greater responsibility seems a satisfactory technique for effecting realistic transitions for all our youth toward responsible adulthood. However, if, as Bloch and Niederhoffer suggest, these gang members have fixated a self-defeating and destructive means to proving their manliness, then they can gain release from this compulsion only by renunciation of manliness as a primary goal, in favor of the trivial, humble, and unexciting but more constructive and contributive goals which make up daily existence.

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BOOKS RECEIVED


ADLER, ALFRED. The education of the individual. New York: Phil. Libr., 1958. Pp. xiii + 143. $3.50.—This book is not by the founder of Individual Psychology but by a distant relative who acknowledges his debt to the late Alfred Adler. The author, a Ph.D., Vienna, 1930, is now associate professor of education, Brooklyn College. The volume is a collection of 43 short essays nicely developing the theme that all man's experiences contain a reference to other people, and that only by helping others to become ends, rather than means, can the individual become assured that he himself can achieve this goal. The book is an original and thoughtful contribution.
